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INTERTEMPORAL CHOICES WITH TEMPORAL PREFERENCES
Hyeon Sook Park, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2012
This dissertation explores the general equilibrium implications of inter-temporal decision-
making from a behavioral perspective. The decision makers in my essays have psychology-
driven, non-traditional preferences and they either have short term planning horizons, due to
bounded rationality (Essay 1), or have present biased preferences (Essay 2) or their utilities
depend not only on the periodic consumption but are also dependent upon their expectations
about present and future optimal consumption (Essay 3). Finally, they get utilities from the
act of caring for others through giving and volunteering (Essay 4). The decision makers who
are dened by these preferences are re-optimizing over time if they realize that their past
decisions for today are no longer optimal and this is the key mechanism that helps replicate
the mean lifecycle consumption data which is known to be hump-shaped over the lifecycle.
In the rst essay, I prove that there is an income structure that leads to a consumption
hump for each time preference. Searching via simulation, I nd the best planning horizon
that is compatible with matching data for the US economy. In the second essay, I nd that
the consumption hump is obtained even without the credit constraint if the agent is naive
and keeps re-optimizing over time. In a third essay, I demonstrate that reference-dependent
preferences can also generate a hump-shaped consumption prole when the agent has age-
dependent loss aversion. In the fourth and the nal essay, I show how the inclusion of time
endowment generates full-blown lifecycle pattern of not only consumption, but also giving,
leisure, and volunteer time, which closely follow the data.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores the general equilibrium implications of inter-temporal decision-
making from a behavioral perspective. The essays in this dissertation study inter-temporal
choices in relation to income structure, time discounting, behavioral attitudes, and asset
accumulation. The optimal inter-temporal choice requires that current and future changes
in utility as implied by current behavior correspond to the decision makers inter-temporal
preferences. The individuals in this dissertation are allowed to have preferences beyond those
in standard model. The contribution of this dissertation is to explain the following obser-
vations: rst, the standard inter-temporal model fails to predict many known features of
macroeconomic data, especially the lifecycle consumption data. Second, there is experimen-
tal evidence, as well as eld data showing that economic agents often violate the assumption
of standard models.
In this dissertation, I aim to replicate mean lifecycle consumption data which is known
to be hump-shaped over the lifecycle: mean consumption is increasing while the consumer
is young, reaching a peak around middle age and then decreasing afterwards. Because
this prominent characteristic of the consumption prole is not expected from the standard
economic theory, it is called a puzzle. Among my essays, I specically attempt to address
how the consumption puzzle can be solved by extending the standard economic models into
two directions: allowing for bounded rationality in inter-temporal choice; and incorporating
psychology into decision-making. The agents in my dissertation essays do not necessarily
follow the standard norm of rationality assumption, because they may not be fully rational
or their preferences are beyond the denition of standard ones.
According to behavioral economics, individuals may deviate from the assumptions of
standard economic models, in terms of preference, beliefs, and decision making. Among
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these, this dissertation mainly concentrates on the element of preferences: the decision mak-
ers in my essays have psychology-driven, non-traditional preferences. I want to make it clear
that although the models in my essays may posit non-standard preference for the decision
maker, they still assume that the decision maker follows rational beliefs and non-biased de-
cision making. The psychology-driven preferences deviate from the standard ones in three
respects: time preferences (time-inconsistency), risk preferences (reference-dependence) and
social preferences (concern for others). This dissertation studies four economic models that
address each of these topics, answering directly the questions above. They are inter-temporal
models in which (i) decision makers have short term planning horizons, due to bounded ra-
tionality, or (ii) decision makers have present biased preferences or (iii) the decision makers
utility depends not only on the periodic consumption but is also dependent upon his ex-
pectations about present and future optimal consumption (belief dependent preferences).
Additionally, models in which (iv) decision makers get utility from the act of caring for
others through giving and volunteering (social preferences).
In the rst two essays, I explore the possibility that individuals behave myopically rather
than rationally. Specically, I suppose that they possess either time-inconsistent tastes for
immediate gratication or they optimize period-by-period without looking far ahead. In
the rst essay, the boundedly rational agents have less than full planning horizons and
because of this, their consumption proles are more closely tied with income stream when
they move their planning positions forwards. In the second essay, agents have generalized
hyperbolic discount factors so that their short-run discount factors are lower than long-run
discount factors. Thus their initial consumption should be higher at the price of next period
consumption. In the third essay, I examine the plausibility that individuals optimization is
a¤ected by comparison to a reference status of utility. If their gain utilities to the reference
are strong enough to overcome the more pondering loss utilities, then they may deviate
from the standard consumption behavior. In fact, these individuals are rational deviators
for their personal well-beings. Finally, in the fourth essay, I demonstrate that unlike the
standard assumption of self-interested decision makers, it may be plausible to assume that
individuals care for (or are concerned about) others in many ways.
All of the economic models in these essays are based on multi-period overlapping gen-
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erations models, which have been proved to be a useful analytic tool for inter-temporal
economic models. Decision makers who are dened by these preferences are re-optimizing
over time if they realize that their past decision for today is no longer optimal due to (i)
imperfect foresight (Essay 1), (ii) negating their earlier resolution (Essay 2: naive agent),
(iii) changing taste (Essay 3: time-varying loss aversion). These are the key elements that
allow the decision making under those preferences to generate di¤erent path than the stan-
dard one. This is because, in standard theory with perfect-foresight and full-rationality, the
re-optimization does not generate choice sets deviating from the determined path of initial
optimization. In this sense, agents preferences are temporal. This deviating outcome is
important in macroeconomic dynamics. To address and explain the consumption puzzle, for
example, models with standard preferences usually require outside mechanisms or certain
frictions unless the model has uncertainty. Those mechanisms include borrowing constraints,
mortality risk, choice between consumption and leisure, and consumer durables. However,
the models under these specications generally perform incompetent to the models in my
essays: for example, the hump in consumption-leisure model is easily disappearing when the
model is added with social security, while it is not in my models.
Although the fourth essay is somewhat di¤erent from these rst three essays, it is still in
the behavioral approach to inter-temporal choice, as decision makers have warm glow moti-
vations (Essay 4) for giving a share of their resources to care for others over the lifecycle. The
key feature of this essay is that the model explicitly assumes the endowment of time as the
main resource agents could exploit and its allocation is incorporated into macroeconomics.
The decision makers of the model face trade-o¤s between private and public choice over the
lifecycle because they get utility not only from private consumption of good and time, such
as consumption and leisure, but also from public choice behavior such as charitable giving
and volunteering. This essay addresses how the private provision of public goods can be
made through life, which has not been studied rigorously in macroeconomic model. In this
essay, I demonstrate a representative lifecycle pattern of consumption, leisure, charitable
giving, and volunteering in US data. The main mechanism generating the hump-shaped
lifecycle outcomes is the choice between consumption of goods and of time. Like the choice
between consumption and leisure, this mechanism generates a nonmonotonic consumption
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and giving prole. In the essay, the decision makers are subject to mortality risks and this
adds another channel reinforcing the non-monotonicity.
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2.0 BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND LIFECYCLE CONSUMPTION
This essay explores the general equilibrium characteristics of a lifecycle model with a short
term planning horizon, in particular whether or not the model can produce a hump-shaped
lifecycle consumption prole similar to the data. Using analytic solution, this essay shows
that an increasing income prole, together with exogenously imposed retirement is su¢ cient
to induce a hump for a simple model. Then with no other mechanism that can account for a
hump, than the short horizon, the model produces a consumption hump with a location and
magnitude consistent with data in a well-calibrated general equilibrium. Unlike partial equi-
librium where matching the data is trivial given any parameter set, in general equilibrium,
there exists stylized relationship among the parameters for the model to be calibrated with
standard macroeconomic targets. Moreover, the macroeconomic predictions of the model
are essentially independent of intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Finally, this essay
demonstrates that the model with a planning horizon of around 20 years provides a best t
to the salient features of the consumption data, which fact is well supported by behavioral
evidence found in surveys on retirement planning.
Keywords: bounded rationality, time inconsistency, short-term planning, lifecycle model,
general equilibrium, consumption hump.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The well-known feature of lifecycle consumption data is that a mean consumption is in-
creasing while the consumer is young, reaching peak around middle age and then decreas-
ing afterwards. This prominent characteristic of the consumption prole is known as the
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consumption hump.1 The consumption hump has been the central interest among many
researchers who study lifecycle consumptions because this property is not expected from the
standard economic theory. The standard lifecycle model, in which the agent is fully rational,
predicts a monotone consumption over time if the model does not assume any friction like
borrowing constraint or any uncertainty like stochastic income processes. This prediction
has a strong theoretic implication in lifecycle model because the monotonicity is achieved
regardless of the functional specication for the periodic utility of the model, as long as it
satises strict concavity.2 The optimal consumption is expected to be monotonically increas-
ing, decreasing, or staying constant over the agents life. Therefore, there is no way to break
the monotonicity and yield the consumption hump in a standard model.3
The discrepancy between the models prediction and the data has not gone unnoticed.4
Recently, among researchers who explore the consumption hump, there has been growing
interest in explaining the consumers optimization behavior based on bounded rationality,
deviating from the traditional assumption of full rationality but without breaking the general
optimization rule. By Bounded Rationality, it is meant in a way that the agents experience
limits in formulating and solving complex problems. It also means that they experience
limits in processing information: receiving, storing, retrieving and transmitting information.5
Therefore bounded rationality implies that the agents decision making based on rationality
may be incomplete if either the agent does not have full information regarding all the options
he could consider or there exists cost, physical or mental, related with decision making. This
incompleteness of decision making in bounded rationality models is thought to add other
possibilities to solve the lifecycle consumption puzzle.
In this paper, I nd that a bounded rationality model in which decision making is adapted
to changes in economic environment such as information on new income, can solve the dis-
1The earliest one shown in literature is from Thurow (1969)[103].
2When the periodic utility is strictly increasing and strictly concave, the Euler equation of the standard
model tells that u0(ct) = Ru0(ct+1): Because marginal utility is strictly decreasing, it must be satised that
ct < ct+1 or ct > ct+1 or ct = ct+1; whenever R > 1 or R < 1 or R = 1. Examples with CRRA are in
the Appendix.
3It is often called consumption puzzle.
4Details are described in the next section.
5The term is attributable to Herbert Simon. The description here is from the citation in Williamson, O.,
(1988)[106], The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach.
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crepancy between the lifecycle consumption prediction and its data, by generating a con-
sumption hump in a well-calibrated general equilibrium. Specically, I nd that in a short
term planning horizon model, where consumers optimize period by period, by maximizing
their utilities only over a subset of entire life,6 the general equilibrium result can be consistent
with the known characteristics of the lifecycle consumption data. In fact, the quantitative
result of simulation exercise shows that the model with planning horizon of around 20 years
provides a best t to the consumption prole from US data. I demonstrate that my result in
the calibrated general equilibrium is robust to alternative set of parameters within reasonable
range.
The implication of general equilibrium result is important because in partial equilibrium,
matching the data is trivial given any parameter set. One can t the data simply by changing
the consumer parameters7 for any target variable like interest rate. In general equilibrium,
however, the interest rate and thus the ratio8 of interest rate to wage rate is no longer a
free value. Because both labor market and bond market must clear simultaneously, the
equilibrium condition of one market directly a¤ects the other: the excess demand for bonds
in an economy should equate the economy wide capital stock; and the aggregate labor supply
should be equated to the aggregate labor demand at the same time. Therefore, many partial
equilibrium results may not be supported in general equilibrium. Moreover, because of the
interdependence of the macroeconomic variables, calibration result may be interpreted more
properly in general equilibrium. In this sense, my nding with general equilibrium model
is encouraging for the view that bounded rationality can be an alternative way to solve the
lifecycle consumption puzzle.
I set up the model with assumption that the agent is not fully rational so that he foresees
only to a degree. The agent thus plans for only part of his life and the planning horizon is
shorter than the usual lifecycle length. For example, a consumer who is 25 years old may
plan consumption or saving schedule only for 5, 10, or 15 years instead of full term of 55
years. It is inferred that the shorter the planning horizon, the greater the degree of bounded
rationality. Because the agent does not foresee perfectly, he needs to re-optimize as further
6This is related with time inconsistent preferences as is discussed in Related Literature.
7With CRRA, the consumer parameters are risk aversion coe¢ cient and discount factor.
8The ratio of returns to each factor of production.
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information or new resolution regarding future plan reveals over time. One may imagine
that the agent wants to reset his consumption plan as new information about future income
is available over time.9 In the model I posit that each time the agent re-optimizes for a
xed number of planning horizon.10 By the mechanism of re-optimization, it is shown that
the actual consumption is a series of the initial consumption of each planned path, being
an envelope. Moreover, the realized consumption is more closely tied with income stream
through this rebalancing. The standard lifecycle model with perfect foresight is a special
case of this, in which the planning horizon is exactly equal to the lifecycle length.11
The partial equilibrium model by Caliendo and Aadland (2007a)[20], aims to explain
behavioral phenomena noted in several surveys regarding retirement plan among workers.12
They use a continuous time control model to explain why a good portion of people do
not prepare for the retirement adequately. Because the workers are not far-sighted, they
dont think seriously until the retirement is eminent and in view. The authors show, along
with the workerssaving behavior, that the model produces a consumption hump in partial
equilibrium without resorting to any other assumption than the short term planning horizon.
However, the work of Caliendo and Aadland (2007a)[20] is based on the consumer be-
havior in partial equilibrium and does not answer the following questions: First, can the
short term planning model still produce a consumption hump in a well-calibrated general
equilibrium? This question is important because in partial equilibrium, matching the data
is trivial given any set of consumer parameters like degree of risk aversion or discount factor.
Second, if the answer is Yes,then which planning horizon does best match consumption
data in general equilibrium?13 The answer to this question is important in providing useful
policy guideline for economic issues related with retirement and social security. Third, can
all three standard macroeconomic targets, i.e. the interest rate, the capital-output ratio
and the consumption-output ratio, be calibrated with reasonable set of parameters for this
9Although this may be the simplest logic behind re-optimization, bounded rationality model admits other
psychological reasoning as well.
10Why would the planning horizon be xed at a specic number of periods and would not be changing
may be another question to ask. I study this in the last section, Modication.
11The hand to mouth consumer is another special case where the planning horizon is zero.
12They register many evidences from Retirement Condence Survey, Health and Retirement Study and
Survey of Consumer Finances.
13Caliendo and Aadland (2007a)[20] set arbitrarily the planning horizon at certain value.
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model? Fourth, is there any stylized relationship among parameters or any restriction on
the set of parameters for the short term planning general equilibrium to be compatible with
data?
I provide a general equilibrium framework that can answer those questions under quite
general classes of parameter values. Like Caliendo and Aadland, I do not assume any other
modication than the short term planning horizon to obtain the hump. Using discrete time
horizon I rst derive a closed form solution for a simple model and propose conditions to
generate consumption hump for any choice of time preference. Then using full model I assess
how well a calibrated, general equilibrium short term planning model can account for the
consumption hump. I consider a (T +1)-period overlapping generations general equilibrium
model where there are (T +1)-types of identical cohorts, who consume, save (or dissave) and
supply labor for production every period in a stationary economy. The equilibrium condition
species that consumption loans cancel out in aggregate so that the excess demand for bonds
should be equal to the capital stock.
To calibrate the model, I propose three standard macroeconomic targets mentioned
above. The model has four scalar parameters and one planning horizon parameter. The
risk aversion coe¢ cient and the discount factor are from consumer side and capital share of
production function and depreciation rate are from production side. Among the ve para-
meters, the four scalar parameters are jointly set to match the target, taking the planning
horizon as given, to see how closely the general equilibrium model replicates the data as the
planning horizon changes. Then I look for the best planning horizon for the consumption
prole of the model to t the mean consumption prole estimated by Gourinchas and Parker
(2002)[57].
2.1.1 Main Findings
The short term planning model produces consumption hump, with a reasonable size and
location of consumption peak, in a well-calibrated general equilibrium model. I rst set the
consumers time preference or the discount factor to be free to have any value. Then for
any choice of risk aversion parameter between zero to three, the general equilibrium model
9
produces a consumption hump for each selection of the planning horizon from 5 years to
26 years. If the model limits the discount factor not to exceed one, then the equilibrium
condition nds a maximum value of risk aversion coe¢ cient. This value becomes bigger as
the planning horizon gets longer. Thus the shorter the planning horizon is, the smaller the
acceptable range of the parameter is. I nd that the discount factor needs to be increased
if the risk aversion parameter is increased and the degree of this increment exaggerates as
the planning horizon gets shorter. This implies that in a model with very short horizon,
the equilibrium discount factor tends to be greater than one if the risk aversion coe¢ cient
is relatively high.14 However with the optimal choice of planning horizon that ts the data
best in general equilibrium, the discount factor is low enough to generate a reasonable value
of risk aversion parameter.15
Next I nd that the short term planning models with identical planning horizons produce
essentially the same macro variables independent of risk aversion parameter.16 This implies
that given a planning horizon risk aversion parameter and discount factor are not identied
from each other once the model is set to the target variables. Consequently, there are many
combinations of the two parameters admissible for any calibration.
Regarding the best parameter value of the planning horizon: the model with planning
horizon of 18 years ts best the consumption data in terms of minimum deviation, while
by the age of consumption peak and by the ratio between the peaked consumption and the
initial one, the model with planning horizon of 20 years and 22 years ts better respectively.
Moreover, the rank of these ts is remarkably robust to any alternative selection of the risk
aversion parameter between zero to three.
Finally, there are some stylized facts with respect to the two consumer parameters. First,
the discount factor becomes larger as risk aversion parameter gets larger for all choices of the
planning horizon. Second, for a xed risk aversion parameter, the discount factor decreases
as the planning horizon increases. Third, the shorter the planning horizon is, the faster the
necessary increment of the discount factor for an adjustment to higher value of risk aversion
14The very short term planning horizon may itself imply that the agent tends to evaluate highly the near
future.
15Or the inverse of the elasticity of substitution.
16Feigenbaum (2008c)[47] nds a similar result in his baseline model of precautionary saving.
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parameter. Fourth, if the discount factor is set to be less than one, then there exists a
highest value of the risk aversion parameter for any choice of planning horizon. Finally, from
the result of fourth fact, it follows that the longer the horizon, the wider the range of risk
aversion parameter available to the parameter set.
2.1.2 Related Literature
There are many related papers both in the bounded rationality framework and the standard
full rationality one. Regarding bounded rationality, hyperbolic discounting17 by Laibson
(1997)[69] should be addressed. The model is based on the evidence that people tend to
value the immediate utilities di¤erently from future ones. That is, delayed choices are de-
valued heavily relative to immediate ones, especially in terms of discounting. Unlike the
standard exponential discounting, the hyperbolic discounting on which his model is formu-
lated captures this sort of time inconsistency. Laibson posits the dynamically inconsistent
agent of a certain time as unique self and sets a T -period consumption and saving problem
into T -period dynamic game among the T -type selves facing asset constraints. He nds a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) strategy under certain assumptions. The empir-
ical implication of his work is that the existence of the commitment device like illiquid asset
plays a role that can produce a consumption prole which tracks the income ows. That is,
consumption and income can co-move. The short term planning approach by Caliendo and
Aadland (2007a)[20] belongs to this kind of time inconsistent preference as well.
Although related with, but in a di¤erent perspective of the time inconsistency is pro-
crastination. As argued in ODonoghue and Rabin (1999)[84], the self of an agent may be
divided into the naive and the sophisticated who have beliefs about future selves. Only the
sophisticated agent has correct beliefs and does not procrastinate. This model implies that
when there are many errors in retirement planning for the majority of the economy because
of the present biased preferences, policies with cautious paternalism may help solve this
problem. Thus, a policy such as tax incentives designed to increase savings may increase
the cost of procrastination of saving and can boost the saving. Also infrequent transaction
17Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, precisely. Also     model or present-biased preference.
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dates incurs large costs for procrastinators, while small costs for time consistent selves.
Another line of bounded rationality is the deviation from full information,18 known as
inattentiveness. Based on information friction, this approach explicitly assumes cost related
with information and due to this cost the planning would take place infrequently. Reis
(2006)[92] proposes a partial equilibriummodel with inattentive consumer who incurs costs of
acquiring, absorbing and processing information in forming expectation and making decision.
His result shows that in partial equilibrium with xed interest rates, inattentive consumers
face more uncertainty and save more for precautionary reasons.19
Regarding the cost itself, there may be other costs than the information. Implementation
cost would be one. Caliendo and Huang (2007b)[21] show seven stylized macroeconomic fea-
tures with just the existence of implementation cost of saving. Other than these, habit forma-
tions (Fehrer, 2000[39]), dual-self (Levine and Fudenberg, 2006[73]), rational inattentiveness
(Luo, 2005[77]), overcondence (Caliendo & Huang, 2008[22]), are the ones considered for
bounded rationality, as well as near-rationality (Caballero, 1995[19]).
Regarding the lifecycle consumption prole implied by the standard assumption on fully
rational agent, several literatures should be mentioned. Borrowing constraint, mortality risk,
consumption and leisure substitutability, income uncertainty and precautionary savings are
the main issues because these can induce a consumption hump. First, the relative importance
of precautionary savings related with the borrowing frictions of the model is well studied in
general equilibrium model by Feigenbaum (2008c[47]).
He shows that, along with the consumption hump, in a general equilibrium lifecycle model
with an exogenous borrowing constraint, observable macroeconomic variables are insensitive
to simultaneous changes in the discount factor and risk aversion coe¢ cient that preserve the
equilibrium interest rate. This calibration implication has a common element with my work,
in that the two parameters are not identied from each other. His work also demonstrates
that the unobservable fraction of aggregate saving due to precautionary motives increases
with consumersrisk aversion and the e¤ect of the parameter on observable macro variables
18See Sims (2003)[95] and Moscarini (2004)[83].
19One can easily show that the inattentiveness induces a consumption hump in a lifecycle model through
similar mechanism as precautionary saving in standard rational agent model, although Reis does not explicitly
work on this topic.
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di¤ers depending on the assumption about borrowing constraint in each proposed model.
If I turn to the other literatures that induce a hump, I address the followings: (1)
family size e¤ect (Attanasio et al.,1999[12]), (2) borrowing constraint (Deaton,1991[32]), (3)
mortality risk (Feigenbaum, 2008a[45]; Hansen & ·Imrohoro¼glu, 2006[60]), (4) choice between
consumption and leisure (Heckman, 1974[61]; Bullard & Feigenbaum, 2007[16]), (5) income
uncertainty and precautionary saving (Carroll, 1997[24]; Gourinchas & Parker, 2002[57];
Aiyagari, 1994[1]; Feigenbaum, 2008b[46]), (6) consumer durables (Fernández-Villaverde &
Krueger, 2010[49]).
A couple of remarks need to be mentioned. Fernández-Villaverde & Krueger (2010)[49]
show how the interaction between durable and nondurable consumption may work to explain
the hump in a model where durable goods serve as collateral for loans. Bullard and Feigen-
baums (2007)[16] calibration work with choice between consumption and leisure as well as
Heckmans (1974)[61] model produce similar result each other. Mortality risk (Feigenbaum,
2008a[45]; Hansen & ·Imrohoro¼glu, 2006[60]) needs also to be noticed as explanation for the
hump.
2.1.3 Chapter Organization
In the following section, I present analytic solutions for a simple model of short term planning
horizon. Based on this I prove that the model produces a consumption hump under very
reasonable condition. In the section, I present a full model and describe the baseline short
term planning general equilibrium. First the partial equilibrium and then the overlapping
generations general equilibrium is derived. In fourth section, quantitative analysis follows.
Targeting US data, calibration method and results are addressed. It discusses my ndings
about the short term planning model and reports several sensitivity analyses. Thereafter,
two modications to the model are presented and the chapter concludes.
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2.2 A SIMPLE MODEL
Consider a boundedly rational agent who lives four20 periods, t = 0; 1; 2; 3; but maximizes
his periodic utility only for two periods,  = fcurrent; nextg. Assume that the agent
has a nonnegative income stream of fy0; y1; y2; y3g21 and his utility is specied by a CRRA
utility form; i.e: u(c)22 = c
1 
1  where  denotes the degree of risk aversion or the inverse
of intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The agent discounts future utility by : Also
assume that there is no borrowing constraint and the agent can borrow or lend freely at the
market interest rate R: Then the optimization problem of the boundedly rational agent at
t = 0 is
U0(c0; c1) =Maxfc0; c1g
c1 0




c0 + b1 = y0
c1 = y1 +Rb1
where b1 is the bond holdings for the next period. Solving the maximization problem







































next period. At t = 1; however, the agent now foresees his future income
20Four is the smallest period to generate a consumption hump for a short term planner.
21The assumption of two-period utility maximization implies that each time the agent foresees or considers
income of those only up to one period ahead.
22CRRA utility is dened by u(c) = ln(c) when  = 1:
23 = (R) 1=R: This parameter is originally introduced by Feigenbaum (2005)[43]. A value of  contains
a combined e¤ect from three parameters, i.e. , R, and :
14
for the next period t = 2 and realizes that the consumption he planned for the period is








he wants to adjust his
consumption according to this future income realization. Therefore at t = 1; the boundedly
rational agent solves again the following maximization problem:
U1(c1; c2) =Maxfc1; c2g
c1 1




c1 + b2 = y
c2 = y2 +Rb
where y1 = y1+Rb1.
24 The solution to this problem is the optimal consumption prole for
 = f1; 2g; starting from t = 1: Notice that the optimal consumption from this maximization
is di¤erent from what the agent calculated from last period. To emphasis the di¤erence
between the new consumption and the one that was planned from last period, it is better
to call the new consumption c11 by denoting the adjustment for the new consumption plan
starting from t = 1: Likewise, c12 is the planned consumption for the next period, i.e. t = 2;


















It is noticeable that the adjusted consumption c11 is di¤erent from the planned one c
0
1 in
that the new consumption is a function of future income realization y2: Similarly, the optimal


















24In fact, this term corresponds to the cash on handby Deaton (1990)[32] but, here it is indexed by t = 1:
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All together, the adjusted consumption prole for the entire four friends, t = 0; 1; 2; 3 is,






























The last term in the bracket follows from the fact that the agent no longer needs to
adjust his consumption in the last period because no more income process is to be realized.
Solving recursively for bond demand of each period and substituting into yt = yt + Rbt for




























Then the realized consumption fc0; c1; c2; c3g  fc00; c11; c22; c23g is obtained from the above


































































It is worthwhile to see how the consumption is related with income. Rewriting the above
to get


















































Notice that consumption at each period, except for the initial and the last, is directly
related with income of the next period, together with previous consumption. In fact, this
is the core property of the bounded rationality model: re-optimization ties the consumption
more closely to income. To characterize further the consumption property of the boundedly
rational agent, rst look for the standard lifecycle consumption prole of a fully rational
agent who is looking forward up to T . The standard optimization predicts that the marginal
utility of consumption between any two periods conforms to the Euler rule and thus the
consumption prole over all periods exhibits monotonic movement. By monotonicity the
consumption prole of the rational agent is increasing, decreasing or stay constant over
the entire life time. Thus the fully rational agents consumption prole with T = 3 is
characterized by
fc0; c1; c2; c3gRational = fc0; c0; c0; c0g if R = 1































It is important to notice that the monotonicity of these consumption proles is preserved
across any choice of income processes. By comparing the consumption of the boundedly
rational agent with this monotone prole, it is easily seen that for the boundedly rational
agent, this monotonicity does not hold any longer except at the last stage.26 The breakage
of monotonicity can be obtained for a boundedly rational consumer even with a shorter life
time period and a proof with three-period model is presented at the Appendix. Another
property to consider is whether the consumption prole of the boundedly rational agent
could generate a consumption hump.27 To derive analytically the conditions for a hump, I
26This comes from the assumption that the boundedly rational agent plans for two periods. If he plans
for three periods, then the monotonicity holds for the last two periods.
27Precautionary motivation is often proposed to explain this property under uncertainty. With bounded
rationality, uncertainty is not necessary for a hump.
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want to dene rst the consumption hump for any T -period consumption prole in a strong
sense:28
Denition A consumption hump for T-period model is a consumption prole fctgTt=0
that satises
i) There is a consumption peak at time t 2 (0; T ):
ii) Consumption is monotonically increasing up to t.
iii) Consumption is monotonically decreasing beyond t.
For example, if there are four periods t = 0; 1; 2; 3, the hump condition requires either
fc0 < c1 < c2 > c3g or fc0 < c1 > c2 > c3g depending on whether the peak occurs at c1 or
c2: Can the hump be obtained with the four-period model solved above? To explore this,
assume that the gross interest rate is greater than zero, i.e. 1 + r = R > 0 and the net
interest rate satises  > r:29 Furthermore assume that  > 0 to ensure CRRA:






30 then the optimal consumption is increasing initially, i.e. c0 < c1,
regardless of the choice of time preference of the agent. For the agent with  > 1=R; the






Proof. First, consider the case of  = 1=R. Because R















Thus if the condition is satised, then (y2 +
y2
R
) + (Ry0 + y1) > (y0 +
y1
R
) + (Ry0 + y1);
RHS of which equals to (1 + 1
R
)(Ry0 + y1): Therefore, c0 < c1: Second, consider the case of
 > 1=R: Because R









































(Ry0 + y1). It is clear that only the rst one induces c0 < c1: Therefore, c0 < c1 regardless
of :
28In a weak sense, it allows to have any wiggle over the horizon with several local peaks.
29These assumptions are just for computational purpose. In fact, these assumptions are not restrictive at
all and easily satised in general.
30The meaning of the inequality condition is explained following the proof.
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:31 In line of roughly hump-shaped
income data, this inequality implies: if y2 is greater than y0 and if either y2 is as good as
y1 or, in case y2 is big enough relative to y0, if not too small compared to y1; then the
increasing property of the consumption at early stage of life is obtained, i.e. c0 < c1. Notice
that this condition is always satised with increasing income prole up to t = 2: But this
condition may not be satised if y2 is much smaller than y1:











(Ry0 + y1) >
1

(Ry0 + y1) > y0 +
y1

: This inequality implies
that, given  and R; the increasing property of consumption requires higher income level
of y2 than the one of the case with  = 1=R: Conversely, if  > 1=R; then the condition
implies that given  and R; the increasing property of consumption can be achieved with
lower y2: Intuitively, when  > 1=R; the initial saving is greater and this helps maintain
consumption to grow even with lower income level at later periods. Therefore, given any
combination of  and R; the desired level of y2 for the increasing consumption prole, has




2 ; while keeping both y0 and y1 the same for all
three cases.
Proposition 2. If the boundedly rational agents income stream fy0; y1; y2; y3g satises that
there is at least one non-zero income except for the last period and the last income is su¢ -
ciently small, i.e. yT = y3 = "; then c1 > c2, regardless of the choice of time preference of
the agent. The su¢ cient condition of the last income is yT = y3 = 0.






















y3: When  = 1=R; the inequality
condition reduces to 1
R
 












y3: Therefore if the last period
income y3 is su¢ ciently small so that y3 = " < (1 + 1R)
 2  y0 + 1Ry1 + 1R(1 + 1R)y2, and at
least one income among fy0; y1; y2g is non-zero, then c1 > c2: Because with non-negative





)y2 > 0, thus " = 0 is the su¢ cient
31Notice that there is no longer  in the expression, implying  does not play any role for this inequality.
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condition for c1 > c2: If  < 1=R; it is true that r < R <  because r < : Likewise, if








Therefore, if y3 is su¢ ciently small, then c1 > c2 for all choices of : The su¢ cient condition




















It is easily seen that if the last period income is zero such that yT = y3 = 0; or very small32
like y3 = ", then the inequality holds for general classes of parameter values. Therefore, if
retirement is exogenously imposed, then this condition is seldom violated. Finally, combining
both conditions yields the consumption hump.





(Ry0 + y1) and (B): y3 = 0, then the consumption prole of the agent
produces a hump regardless of the choice of time preference of the agent.
Proof. For the agent with  6 1=R; (A) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for c0 < c1
and (B) is a su¢ cient condition for c1 > c2: Similarly, for the agent with  > 1=R; (A) is a
su¢ cient condition for c0 < c1 and (B) is also a su¢ cient condition for c1 > c2: Therefore,
combining both conditions yields c0 < c1 > c2 regardless of time preferences: Thus the
consumption hump is achieved for fc0; c1; c2g:33
Example Suppose fy0; y1; y2; y3g = f1; 3; 2; 0g:34 Then the consumption prole of a
boundedly rational agent who is forward looking only for two periods and has 1=R for his
time preference, is characterized by
























annual interest rate Rann = 1:035 and per length  = 15 year, this yields fc0; c1; c2;
c3gBounded = f1:748; 1:842; 1:153; 1:153g: Clearly, c0 < c1 > c2 and a hump is achieved.
The following two graphs Figure 1 and 2 explain these propositions. The second graph
(B) replicates the example above and the rst graph (A) is the obtained with fy0; y1; y2; y3g =
32The common application for the case of zero income in the last period is retirement and the case of small
income is social security.
33The last consumption c3 follows the standard path starting from c2, increasing, constant, or decreasing
depending on  >=< 1=R and may not be the main interest of the analysis.
34This income stream is the case where y2 is greater than y0 and y2 is not too small relative to y1. But
with increasing income prole f1; 2; 3; 0g; the hump is always achieved with  = 1=R:
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Figure 1: The consumption hump in a simple model. The income stream is fy0; y1; y2; y3g =
f1; 2; 3; 0g.
f1; 2; 3; 0g. The consumption of the last period is residual and because  = 1=R it is equal
to the consumption of previous period. That is c3 = c2: By the both gures, it may be
noticed that the consumption peak comes no later than the income peak, which fact is
related with the length of planning horizon relative to the lifecycle horizon in the short term
planning model. In fact, the consumption and income data (Section 4) show that the age
of consumption peak comes slightly earlier than that of income peak. In this four period
model, the overall period is too small to show this detailed characteristic. Also one cannot
miss the observation that the initial consumption is higher than the initial income, which is
also supported by the data. I revisit these properties in the quantitative analysis with full
model.
2.3 A LIFECYCLE MODEL WITH SHORT TERM PLANNING
In this section, the full model with short-term planning horizon is presented, rst in par-
tial equilibrium and then in general equilibrium by including technology in an overlapping
21
Figure 2: The consumption hump in a simple model. The income stream is fy0; y1; y2; y3g =
f1; 3; 2; 0g.
generations economy.
2.3.1 Consumer
2.3.1.1 Environment Time is discrete and denoted by  : At each time, a generation
of identical cohorts is born. The population is constant over time and each agent who is
indexed by age t, lives for T+1 periods in a (T+1)  period overlapping generations economy.
During working periods agents are endowed with one unit of labor productivity, measured
in e¢ ciency units, which is supplied inelastically. There is no borrowing constraint, so that
agents can borrow and lend freely under market determined interest rate R. There is no
government, and there exists a single good which can be either consumed or saved, in which
case it is called capital. There is no uncertainty in this model. However, the agents are not
fully rational to foresee perfectly all the way up to their life time T . Instead, they care and
plan only up to S; which is shorter than T . Finally, the retirement occurs exogenously at
t = Tw+1 where Tw < T .
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2.3.1.2 Consumer Optimization Let us dene the consumption notation rst. A con-
sumer who is in age t with a planning horizon S has a consumption denoted by cSs (t). The
subscript s represents consumption time. The age t also represents planning time in the
model.35 For convenience, planning horizon is suppressed whenever the notation is unam-
biguous. Then the representative consumer who plans for S+1 periods at each planning








cs(t) + bs+1(t) = wes +Rbs(t)
b0(0) = 0; bt(t) = given; bt+S+1(t) = 0
36
where cs(t) is consumption planned at t for time s and bs+1(t) is bond demand pur-
chased at s for the next period, indexed by planning time t. The consumer has a stream
of productivity prole over life time so that he supplies es e¢ ciency units of labor at s into
production and earns labor income of wes each time, where w is the market determined real
wage rate which is assumed to be stationary over time. Because the consumer can save or
borrow freely under market determined interest rate, he will earn nancial income of Rbs(t)
or incur nancial cost of Rbs(t) if he carries bond to the next period. One thing to notice is
that the model does not restrain  less than one.37 This implies that a consumer with short
term planning horizon may have higher evaluation on future consumption than current one.
Solving the consumer optimization problem implies that for s = t; :::; t+S1;






35The physical age is t+ 25 if consumers start working when they are 25 years old.
36This implies that the agent plans to have no debt or saving by the end of a planning term [t; t+ S].
37Because the model assumes nite time horizon, the usual restriction on  for innite time horizon is not
necessary.
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Let ct(t) be the optimal initial consumption starting from the planning date (or age) t.











where bt(t) is the initial bond holding at each planning date t and b0(0) = 0: Let us dene
the total wealth at any time  over the planning horizon [t; t + S]; as the sum of human
wealth and nancial wealth:







Then this produces a compact form for the initial consumption at each planning time t,

















2.3.1.3 Planned and Realized Consumption Assume that the consumer has a pro-
ductivity schedule, over the working periods, which shows an inverse U shape. This agrees
with common sense as well as lifecycle income data. If a consumer at age or time t perfectly
foresees only S periods forward, then he maximizes his utility from time t to time t + S
following any income stream available for this planning horizon. The solution to this max-
imization procedure is a vector of consumption schedule for a planning horizon S starting
from t,
CP (t) = fct(t); ct+1(t); ct+2(t); :::; ct+S(t)g:
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Let us call this planned consumption determined at t for the subsequent S periods.
Initially the consumer intends to follow the planned consumption stream and consumes ct(t)
at t. However, at t+1 he realizes that the planned consumption for t+1; i.e. ct+1(t) is no
longer optimal because a new income of time (t+1)+S is in view.38 He has to re-plan to
incorporate this and solves again for the consumption stream starting from t+1. He keeps
doing this as long as there comes new income in view: as long as there is a drift between the
planned consumption and optimal consumption with new planning horizon.
Because each time the consumer follows a planned path only at the initial time of the
planning horizon, the actual consumption will be an envelope of the entire planned consump-
tion path over whole life. The realized consumption from age t is,
CR(t) = fct(t); ct+1(t+1); ct+2(t+2); :::; ct+S(T -S)g:
Therefore the lifecycle consumption prole of the representative consumer with any plan-
ning horizon S is
fctgTt=0 = fcS0 (0); cS1 (1); cS2 (2); :::; cST (T )g39
where the consumption is indexed by a planning time, a consumption time, and a plan-
ning horizon. Likewise, the prole of lifecycle asset demand is
fbt+1gT 1t=0 = fbS1 (0); bS2 (1); ::: ; bST (T   1)g
and
bS0 (0) = 0:
Figure 3 shows a planned and realized consumption prole. The realized consumption is
the envelope of all the planned consumption series.40
38Remember that the agent foresees perfectly S periods forward all the time. At time t+1; the Sth income
is the one of time t+1+S:
39The consumer follows standard consumption path for the residual periods in the last phase of life.
Therefore, the consumption beyond time T   S, is the same as the planned path.
40This result is obtained with S=10, =3, R=1.045, and =0.98.
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Figure 3: Planned and Realized Consumption Prole for the model with S=10.
2.3.2 Technology and General Equilibrium
To explore a general equilibrium model, let us add production technology to the economy.
Assume that there is a continuum (innite number) of identical perfectly competitive rms.
Specically, this model introduces the following Cobb-Douglas production function for the
representative rm:
F (K;N) = KN1 











Let us dene a competitive equilibrium for the model.
Denition A competitive equilibrium in this economy is an allocation fctgTt=0, a set of
bond demands fbt+1gTt=0, an interest rate R; and a wage rate w such that given R and w,
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the followings are satised:
i) fctgTt=0 and fbt+1gT 1t=0 solve the consumers problem.
ii) Factors are paid out their marginal productivity:
w = FN and R  1 = FK   
iii) Labor market and bond market clear:
K =
PT
t=0 bt and N =
PT
t=0 et
The market clearing condition in the last line species that consumption loans cancel
out in the aggregate so that the excess demand for bonds should be equal to the capital
stock. Also the aggregate labor supply that sums up over all cohorts should be equal to the
aggregate labor demand. By the equilibrium condition ii), it is obvious to have
















R  1 + 

:
The capital-to-labor demand ratio is written as a function of the interest rate and other
parameters. Rearrange the capital as a function of the interest rate to get
K(R) = N















Once the equilibrium interest rate R is obtained, the wage rate w is determined by
w(R) = (1  )






41At equilibrium, KD(R) = K(R) = KS(R) and KS(R) =
PT




The goal of quantitative analysis is to assess how well a calibrated, general equilibrium model
of short term planning can account for the stylized facts regarding lifecycle consumption data.
The following subsections answer the four questions raised in the introduction with respect to
the featured consumption hump. One methodological issue in the analysis is how to calibrate
the under-identied model parameters42 given the lesser number of target variables from
US data. The Calibration discusses this in detail. For simulation exercise, I utilize the mean
prole of lifecycle consumption and income estimated by Gourinchas and Parker (2002)[57].
Because the equilibrium series of consumption, income, bond demand, and labor supply in
the model of overlapping generation economy can be interpreted as economy wide cohort
averages, the mean proles should work well for the model.
Finally, in order to quantify the lifecycle model, I set a period of the model to a year.
The agents are born to be 25 years old. The economy is stationary and there is no population
growth. Let the agents live for sure from t = 0 to T = 55. This corresponds to physical life
from 25 years old to 80 years old. The agents work to 65 years old and because there is no
other income sources than the earnings from labor, their income is zero after retirement.43
Then the agents live on savings from working years.
2.4.1 Targets in US Data
I propose three targets in standard macroeconomic variables representing US data. They
are interest rate (R), capital-output ratio (K=Y ), and consumption-output ratio (C=Y ).
Following Rios-Rull (1996)[93], I set 2.9444 as a target value for capital-output ratio and
0.748 for the target ratio of consumption to output. The third macroeconomic target is the
real interest rate, which is determined by the equilibrium condition of the model. Following
42There are ve model parameters but three target variables.
43Thus Tw = 40 and et = 0 for t > 40:
44Other authors like Feigenbaum (2008c)[47], suggest 2.5 for this ratio. When I simulate the model with
this target ratio, I nd that the main result of the model is not altered in terms of the best planning horizon.
The alternative target ratio produces very similar consumption prole for each ; but with slightly lower 
than the baseline model.
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Figure 4: The consumption and productivity prole from US data estimated by Gourinchas
and Parker (2002)[57].
McGrattan and Prescott (2000)[81], I set the rate at 3.5%.45
Regarding lifecycle consumption data that the model aims to accomplish, I use the
mean consumption of Gourinchas and Parkers estimation mentioned above. Feigenbaum
(2008a)[45] interpolates their estimation into septic polynomial function of age:
cGPt = 1:062588 + 0:015871t  0:00184t2 + 0:000109t3 + 0:00000413t4   0:00000056t5
+0:0000000163t6   0:0000000001475t7
According to this prole, the age of consumption peak is 45 years old and the ratio of peak
consumption to initial consumption is 1.1476. These values, as well as mean squared error
between the data and the model, are used to assess di¤erent consumption proles that models
with di¤erent planning horizons produce. Also, regarding the income schedule, Feigenbaum
(2008a)[45] suggests a quadratic t for the US data. Since the labor is supplied inelastically
in the model, income is proportional to productivity. Therefore, Feigenbaums quadratic t
to the income data of Gourinchas and Parker (2002)[57] can serve for the productivity prole
as well. The prole is
45Similarly, Gourinchas and Parker (2002)[57] estimate the rate 3.44%.
29
et = 1 + 0:0181t+ 0:000817t
2   0:000051t3 + 0:000000536t4
According to this income stream, the peak occurs around 48 years old. Figure 4 shows the
consumption and income (productivity) prole from US data. With inelastic labor supply,
the mean income schedule serves as productivity prole of the representative consumer. From
the gure, it is clear that both lifecycle consumption and income streams are hump-shaped,
but the age of consumption peak comes slightly earlier than the age of income peak.46
2.4.2 Calibration
The model has four standard parameters: the risk aversion coe¢ cient  and the discount
factor  are from consumer optimization and the capital share  and the depreciation rate 
are from technology. But with the short term planning model of bounded rationality, there
is one more parameter to consider because the model assumes a shorter than full term
planning horizon. It is the planning horizon parameter, which is denoted by S in the
model. Therefore, the model has ve parameters and they are f; ; ; ; Sg: Unlike other
parameters, S allows only a small set of distinct integers for its value, from one to fty ve,
at most.47 Therefore, instead of calibrating all of these ve parameters together, I set the
planning horizon as given and have the other four parameters jointly set to match the target.
Then I explore how well the short term planning general equilibrium model replicates the
data as the planning horizon changes. In other words, the planning horizon itself is evaluated
in terms of best model tted to the consumption data.
Among the four scalar parameters f; ; ; g, I nd that the model is well calibrated
jointly with a set of three parameters, given the three target values of interest rate (3.5%)
and capital-output ratio (2.94), as well as consumption-output ratio (0.748). Those three
parameters are: ; ; and : Among the three,  represents a collective value of the two
consumer parameters f; g: The joint set f(; ); ; g that minimizes the deviation from
the targets provides unique value of  for each planning horizon, along with the other two
46This fact is also found in Thurows consumption hump in Appendix. This implies that the two proles
are closely connected, as I emphasize through this paper.
47The planning horizon is year based: the maximum length S = 55 corresponds to a plan from 25 years
old to 80 years old.
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production parameters. For example, with planning horizon S = 18, those three calibrated
values are:  = 0:986;  = 0:289004 and  = 0:063001. And with an alternative target ratio
of K=Y = 2:5; these values are  = 0:981;  = 0:3116 and  = 0:0896: Unlike ; the two
production parameters are found to be independent of the planning horizon S. This leaves
the model with two free parameters,  and : Therefore, for a choice of ,  is set from ;
matching the target for each planning horizon. The result section shows how the prediction of
each of the twenty two48 models of di¤erent planning horizon varies in equilibrium according
to a joint choice of  and : Table [1] summaries the description of parameters and targets.
Table 1: Parameters and Targets
Variable Description Target
 Risk Aversion Free
 Discount Factor Free
 Capital Share Free
 Depreciation Rate Free
S Planning Horizon Given
R Interest Rate 3:5 %
K=Y Capital-Output 2:94
C=Y Consumption-Output 0:748
Another issue is to nd the most plausible planning horizon that best describes the styl-
ized fact of consumption data. For this purpose, I employ both quantitative and qualitative
comparison. For the quantitative t, I calculate the models deviation from the consumption
prole implied by the data using mean squared error (MSE) and the least absolute deviation
(LAD). For the qualitative t, I compute the consumption ratio: the ratio of the consump-
tion at its maximum to the consumption at the starting age. This is a common measure
to quantify the consumption hump, proposed by Bullard and Feigenbaum (2008a)[45] and
Hansen and ·Imrohoro¼glu (2006)[60]. Another measure for the qualitative t is the age of the
48I analyze the model of all the planning horizons from S = 5 to S = 26.
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consumption peak. In the next subsection, I register the result of the consumption ratio and
the consumption peak age for each planning horizon.
2.4.3 Results
Simulation exercise reveals that the short term planning model does produce a consumption
hump, with right size and location of consumption peak, in a well-calibrated general equilib-
rium. The location of peak falls within 40 to 54 years old for all choices of planning horizon
from 5 to 26 and the location is reversely related with the length of planning horizon. By
this, it is inferred that there is a planning horizon that generates the same peak location as
the one from the data. Likewise, there is a planning horizon that produces the closest ratio
of peak consumption to initial consumption as the one of the data.
Next are the stylized facts among the major parameters that the model needs to hold to
be supported in the calibrated general equilibrium. It turns out that ,  and S are closely
related in the model so that  needs to be elevated for all of the planning horizons when
 is high, although the degree of increment is not equal to each other but di¤erent by the
planning horizon. Therefore, one can imagine a three dimensional relationship among the
three parameters f; ; Sg:
Regarding the best model parameter S I summarize the result by: about 20 years of
planning horizon.49 This is because when the planning horizon is around 18 to 22 years,
the model ts very well to the consumption data by all means generally considered. Finally,
the robustness report conrms the positive contribution of the short term planning general
equilibrium model.
2.4.3.1 Simulation Initially let us set the planning horizon at 18. This number is cho-
sen because the general equilibrium consumption prole from 18 years of planning horizon
best ts the consumption data in terms of minimum deviation from the objective. I rst
consider the case where the  belongs to (0; 1].50 Figure 5 and 6 show the optimal lifecycle
49In Conclusion, I mention summary remarks of the US retirement survey that strongly supports this
result.
50Again, in short term planning model, it is natural to allow  to be greater than one because the agent
can be very patient for a short period of time and may evaluate the near future more highly than the current.
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Figure 5: Optimal Consumption Prole C(t) for the model with S=18, =1, =0.986 and
R=1.035. C(GP) represents the data from Gourinchas and Parker (2002)[57].
consumption and the corresponding asset demand from the model of 18 years of planning
horizon. In the model the risk aversion parameter is set to 1. Figure 5 includes C(GP), the
mean consumption prole of Gourinchas and Parker (2002)[57], for comparison.
In the gure the simulated consumption C(t) shows a hump-shaped prole,51 together
with an increasing part at the tail. This is the residual,52 mentioned in Section 2, which
comes from the assumption that agents follow the planned path once they reach the nal
stage of planning where their end term T is in view.53 Figure 7 shows a series of consumption
proles that follow gradual increase of the planning horizon from 10 years to 26 years.54 In
order to compare them together, all of the proles are generated by the models of the same
51Except for the tail area, the hump is observed by the strong sense of the term, which is formaly dened
later.
52Because R > 1 in this gure, the consumption is increasing during the residual years.
53If mortality risk (together with bequest) is introduced to the model, then the tail part would be smoother.
But as described in the introduction, the main objective of the paper is to analyze the short term planning
model to induce a hump without any other mechanism that might account for it. Mortality risk is one of
such factors.
54A planning horizon beyond this may not be interesting because the consumption becomes closer to the
standard lifecycle model as the planning horizon increases.
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Figure 6: Optimal Bond Demand corresponding to the consumption prole for the model
with S=18, =1, =0.986 and R=1.035.
value of  = 0:5. This is because 0.5 belongs to the small range of  that can produce general
equilibrium with acceptable  range for the entire planning horizon from 10 to 55. In case
of high ; equilibrium requires very high  if the planning horizon is relatively short. In
fact, among the few discrete values of  = f0; 0:5; 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3; 3:5g;  = 0:5 is
the maximum for the model to generate a consumption prole that agrees with the targets
without invoking  > 1; for all of the planning horizons from 10 to 55. At  = 1, the general
equilibrium is obtained with  = 0:5967 for planning horizon 10. Notice that S = 10 is the
shortest planning horizon in this simulation. The next subsection shows that  becomes
lower as planning horizon gets longer. Thus, it follows that when  is higher than 0.5967,
the discount factor exceeds one. Therefore it may be good to set  = 0.5 to compare all of the
planning horizons.55 Needless to say, a planning horizon admits many di¤erent combinations
of  and  set to match the targets.56
If  is allowed to exceed one, then for any choice of  it is possible to obtain optimal
lifecycle consumption prole for every planning horizon. This is because  adjusts accord-
55It is also supported by Gourinchas and Parker (2002)[57], in which they estimate  = 0.5.
56This comes from the fact that the parameters are under-identied: in the model a composition of the
two parameters is calibrated, but not the  or , separately.
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Figure 7: Optimal Consumption Proles for the models with S from 10 to 26 and  = 0.5.
The darkest is the shortest horizon and the brightest is the longest.
ingly to any change of risk aversion parameter, keeping the model in equilibrium. From this,
I want to highlight two interesting facts with respect to lifecycle consumption. First, given
a value of risk aversion parameter, as the planning horizon gets longer, the agents tend to
consume more initially.57 Also the consumption peak arrives earlier but with lower level of
it.58 This means that the lifecycle consumption prole looks more atten when the planning
horizon is longer. This agrees with the common notion that as agents foresee farther, they
tend to plan for a longer period. Thus it is likely that a smoother consumption is made.
Notice that the analysis about initial consumption and consumption peak are related
with the attribute of the consumption-income data I describe in Section 2. If I revisit them:
(A) the initial consumption is higher than the initial income and (B) the age of consumption
peak comes slightly earlier than that of income peak. If I compare the models behavior
with the data regarding the two terms, I nd the following: for all models with horizon
beyond S = 18,59 the initial consumption is higher than the initial income. For all models
with horizon below S = 23, the age of consumption peak comes earlier than that of income
57This is because agents are aware of the income increase in later years.
58Again, this is because the agents are aware of the zero income in later years after retirement.
59This result is obtained with K/Y=2.94. When I use K/Y=2.5, the horizon is S=17.
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peak.60 Therefore the planning horizons between the two inequalities satisfy both properties.
Another issue to discuss is the limiting behavior of the model. What would happen to the
general equilibrium if the planning horizon gets longer and become the full lifecycle length?
Given a target value of interest rate R = 1:035, the value of R gets smaller as the planning
horizon increases because for a xed ;  becomes smaller with longer horizon. This implies
that R may converge to a value near one so that in the extreme, one gets very smooth
consumption prole like the one as the standard theory predicts. To see this, I compute the
value of R for the full horizon model, i.e. S = T = 55: It turns out that R = 0.9956
when  = 2 and R = 0.9989 when  = 0:5: Both yield a very smoothing, but slightly
decreasing consumption prole because R < 1: This implies that in the well-calibrated
general equilibrium, the standard lifecycle consumption prole with  6 2 is not a constant
one if the full length is 55 years, although it is nearly at and monotonic.61 This suggests
that if the model assumes a life span longer than 55, then there is a planning horizon, slightly
higher than 55, that yields R = 1 near  = 2, and another one that yields R = 1 near
 = 0:5: Both should generate a completely at consumption prole over the entire life.
2.4.3.2 Beta and Gamma Following the description in Calibration, three-dimensional
graph of the parameters f; ; Sg can be observed in Figure 8. In the graph, a value of  is
determined by a joint position of  and S: Table [2] shows the optimal  values for di¤erent
 over the major horizon grids. Figure 6 extends the result to all values of 22 planning
horizons from S = 5 to S = 26:
Figure 9 demonstrates the following facts. First,  is inversely related with planning
horizon S for all values of  and it is more so with higher . Second, when  is relatively
low,  does not change a lot over planning horizon. Third, with longer planning horizon, 
values are relatively stable for all choices of : These facts help understand why high values
of  do not bother with the analysis in general equilibrium. Because both  and  belong to
the reasonable range of parameter values around the optimal planning horizon, i.e. S = 20;
60If I specify the three year di¤erence between consumption peak (45 years old) and the income peak (48
years old), then S=20 ts exactly to this.
61This implies that unless  is very high, completely at consumption cannot be expected with S = T = 55
years.
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this result may justify the claim that the general equilibrium model of short term planning
would be a good approach to explain the data. Figure 9 shows the evolution of  for each
planning horizon over all risk aversion parameters from 0.5 to 3.
If  is restricted to be less than one, then for some planning horizons not every value of
designated  is available. Table [3] shows result about this fact. From Figure 10 and Table
[3], it is easy to notice the following summary facts. First,  is positively related with  all
choices of the planning horizon. Second,  is inversely related with planning horizon for any
: Third, for any planning horizon longer than 10,  is good enough to be over 0.5 even with
the restriction of  < 1: Fourth, the longer the horizon, the wider the range of  admissible
for  < 1.
The logic behind smaller range of  with shorter planning horizon is this: when the
planning horizon is very short, it is less likely to accumulate enough wealth that is trans-
formed into capital, clearing the bond market. Therefore, to compensate this shortage and
achieve an equilibrium it is necessary to let the consumer have very low risk aversion or,
in other words, very high intertemporal substitution.62 This implies that the agent should
yield enough saving to be matched with the necessary capital in an equilibrium. Table [4]
shows the highest values of  for a couple of major grids in planning horizon.
2.4.3.3 The Best Planning Horizon I look for the best planning horizon that repli-
cates the US consumption data most closely in terms of three measures described earlier. I
analyze all the planning horizons from 5 to 26. First, regarding the quantitative t, I nd
that both methods of MSE and LAD yield the same result for the best horizon in terms of
smallest deviation. The planning horizon of 18 years ts best the consumption data by both
methods and the errors are: MSE = 0:005045 and LAD = 0:05308: Although the two quan-
titative measures do not produce identical ranking over all the planning horizons, they do
produce unambiguously the same ranking near the planning horizon of minimum deviation
(S = 18) for all values of  between zero to three. One thing to mention is that the graph
of MSE is not symmetric from its lowest value.63 Rather it shows faster improvement from
62With CRRA, risk aversion is equal to the inverse of intertemporal substitution.
63With di¤erent scale the LAD graph has a similar shape as MSE. Thus the description here also applies
to LAD.
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the left hand side (horizons shorter than 18), implying the same deviation from the lowest
S engenders bigger error for shorter horizon. Thus S = 23 ts better than S = 13 although
both deviate 5 periods from S = 18. Any planning horizon less than 10 is not considered to
be a good t in terms of MSE or LAD. Figure 11 summarizes this. The minimum is achieved
at the planning horizon of 18 and the MSE value is about 0.005.
Second, for the age of consumption peak, S = 20 ts better than any other planning
horizon, for all values of risk aversion coe¢ cient, to the data where the peak age is 45.
Also the peak age increases constantly (proportionally) as the planning horizon becomes
shorter but only up to the point of S = 11; beyond which it stalls at 54 and stays the same.
Third, the data displays that the ratio of mean consumption at the peak of the hump to the
one at the beginning is 1.1476. In term of this measure, S = 22 ts best. One remarkable
feature is that the consumption ratio decrease as the planning horizon gets longer, suggesting
a smoother consumption prole with longer horizon. Figure 12 and Figure 13 summarize
these results.
2.4.3.4 Robustness In this section, I want to check the sensitivity of the model to
alternative calibrations of the baseline parameters f(; ); ; g: Notice that  is going to
adjust accordingly to specic  for a predetermined planning horizon S: Therefore S is
not considered to be a parameter for this analysis. For the three targets of macroeconomic
variables, i.e. r = 3:5%; K=Y = 2:94; C=Y = 0:748, I report a couple of sensitivity check
around the best planning horizons found above. Table [5] shows two sets of sensitivity report,
one with baseline  = 2 and the other one with  = 0:5: The reports for the planning horizons
S = 15 and S = 20 are based on  = 0:5 and the ones for the planning horizons S = 18
and S = 22 are based on  = 2: The second column, Model of the table shows di¤erent
alternative calibration to the baseline model, keeping other parameters intact. Thus, for
example, the rst group of the table represents the alternative calibration to the baseline
model fS = 15;  = 0:5;  = 0:979;  = 0:289;  = 0:063g; by changing only one parameter,
except S; and keeping the others constant.
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2.5 MODIFICATIONS
The main model discussed so far assumes two things. First, the planning horizon does not
change during the agents entire life. Also there is no heterogeneity in the model. Because
the agents are identical in the economy, this implies that there is only one planning horizon
which is stationary over time. Second, the agent is able to adjust his plan at any point
during his life time.
The rst assumption is based on the premise that agent would not learn from the past
and does not improve his planning skills for the future. In other words, the agents limited
ability to foresee the future is persistent through his entire life. Thus the optimization process
stays unvarying in an economy as well. This may not be a good assumption if one accepts
the argument that human cognitive ability suggests learning through past experiences. If
this is the case, then a modication to the baseline model on the consumer optimization
is necessary and this is the topic for the section. I consider two modications: one is the
gradual learning until the end of the consumers life, while the other one is the gradual
learning only up to specic horizon S.
The second assumption implies that each agent may not incur any cost related with the
planning itself so that he can plan frequently for the future whenever he wants. Thus it
follows that the better his welfare would be, the sooner he re-plans if he nds the planned
consumption already set up is no longer optimal. If, however, there exists any cost to the
frequent planning, like time and energy, then this assumption would be at question. For
this reason, a modied version of the model may be considered. Frequent planning is no
more an optimal strategy and the planning occurs infrequently. One way to construct this
is to assume that the planning occurs only after the previous planning term ends. Another
variation may be a model of endogenous planning horizon with planning cost.65
65Regarding planning cost, there are related works by Reis (2006)[92] and by Caliendo and Huang
(2007b)[21]. Reis focuses on endogenous planning horizon for an infrequent planner due to information
cost that depends on the unplanned periods. Caliendo and Huang focus on the role of cost related with
saving implementation to explain many phenomena on consumption-saving puzzle. Here I focus on how this
modication help us understand the prediction of lifecycle consumption of the short term planning model.
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2.5.1 Learning
The boundedly rational agent learns from past experience and plans better as his experience
accumulates. Thus, for example, each year he plans for one or more additional years to his
previous planning horizon. But he is still assumed to plan frequently, year based, without
incurring any cost related with planning. Assume that the planning horizon of each time
is just one more year than the previous one and the initial planning horizon is zero: the
consumer at t = 10 (age=35) is able to plan for 10 years and at age 36 for 11 years,
etc. Then the representative agent plans for age + 1 periods each time and maximizes the







cs(t) + bs+1(t) = wes +Rbs(t)
b0(0) = 0; bt(t) = given; bt+St+1(t) = 0
St+1 = St + 1; S0 = 0:











Figure 14 shows the result in general equilibrium when the agent keeps learning through
his life.66 Planning horizon expands each year through consumers life time. In this graph
the age of consumption peak comes earlier than the data. This implies that as the agent
learns more from past and plans further, he is more likely to prepare for his retirement early.
Consider another case where the agents learning ability grows only up to S years and then
it stalls after that. The summary result for this case is in the next graph. From Figure 15,
it is also clear that learning for longer periods give the agent more chances of consumption
smoothing. The consumption peak age is closest to the data when the length of the gradual
learning is about 20.67
66As in the baseline model, once the agent is able to plan for up to the end of life, he follows the planned
path for the residual years.
67In fact, L = 18 is the best by this criterion in learning model.
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2.5.2 Cost and Infrequent Planning
Let us modify the baseline model into the one in which no adjustment is allowed between any
two planning dates. This modication would be justied if the planning horizon is relatively
short. For example, if the planning horizon is two to ve years, then the total cost to
frequent planning would be more than the cost related with the sub-optimal consumption
between those periods. However, if the planning horizon is relatively long, then re-planning
would be better than following the original prole even though it may incur some cost related
with the planning activity. Assume the agent chooses planning dates t1; t2; : : : ; tn from his
life time. At each planning date ti and only at this date, he incurs a planning cost X which
does not depend on the duration of non-planned periods.68
Assume the agent plans for S(i) periods that may di¤er by each planning date ti. He
plans only on planning date ti when the previous planning term ends and the new planning
term starts. Therefore, he solves the following maximization problem at ti, i = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; n;









cs + bs+1 = wes +Rbs, if s 6= ti
cs + bs+1 = wes +Rbs  X, if s = ti
b0 = 0; bti = given; bti+S(i)+1 = 0:




















cs + bs+1 = wes +Rbs, if s 6= ti
cs + bs+1 = wes +Rbs  X(S(i  1)), if s = ti
b0 = 0; bti = given; bti+S(i)+1 = 0; t0 = 0; tn + S(n) = T;
where S(i) is the planning horizon (duration) set at planning date ti:
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subject to
cs + bs+1 = wes +Rbs, if s 6= ti
cs + bs+1 = wes +Rbs  X, if s = ti
b0 = 0; bti = given; bti+S(i)+1 = 0;
t0 = 0; tn + S(n) = T:











where Xs = 0 if s 6= ti and Xs = X if s = ti:
Remember that between two planning dates, the agent follows the planned path that is
monotonic. The result is shown in Figure 16. In this gure the model is simulated with
the assumption that the planning cost is not monetary cost, but mental or time cost related
with the planning. Therefore planning occurs infrequently but there is no actual nancial
cost with this example. The agent plans for 5 years which is constant over the entire life69
and the planning occurs infrequently only on the planning dates when the previous planning
term ends.
2.6 CONCLUSION
The prominent feature of lifecycle consumption data known as consumption hump has been
central issue in lifecycle consumption literature because standard lifecycle theory cannot pro-
duce one with such property. The standard theory implies that consumption is not directly
a¤ected by income uctuation: it is the average of income that matters, not the individual
ups and downs. Therefore, a hump-shaped lifecycle consumption cannot be expected in a
model of standard assumption, even though the income, the resources that the consumption
relies on, is roughly hump-shaped over life.
69In this example, the planning horizon is xed for all i: Thus, S(i) = S = 5.
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In this paper I study a bounded rationality model that is based on time inconsistent
preference and that solves the discrepancy between the monotonic prediction and the hump-
shaped data of lifecycle consumption. The standard lifecycle models usually require extra
assumption about the structure of model beyond preferences to reconcile the discrepancy.
Motivated by this, I explore a model of novel framework that deviates from the main core
of the traditional theory: the full rationality assumption. The rational agent is now allowed
to be boundedly rational and maximizes his known utility over certain period of time, which
is shorter than full life span. By this way I nd that it is possible to construct a model
in which the optimal consumption prole clearly links to income stream. Moreover, from
the fact that existing bounded rationality literatures that deal with the issue analyze only
the partial equilibrium features, I highlight the general equilibrium approach through this
paper and characterize a model of boundedly rational agent under (T+1)-period overlapping
generations general equilibrium with production.
With analytic solution, I rst prove that the short term planning model produces the con-
sumption hump that is closely related with income prole. Then, with no other assumption
than the short term planning horizon, I show that the model produces consumption hump for
all of the planning horizons I consider. Among them I nd that the planning horizons of 18,
20, and 22 years generate the consumption prole that resembles the data most closely in a
well-calibrated general equilibrium. That is, the general equilibrium result is consistent with
the known characteristics of the lifecycle consumption prole. I also nd the exhaustive inner
relationship among the main parameters (time preference, risk aversion, and the planning
horizon) that is necessary to be supported in the calibrated general equilibrium. Through
sensitivity check, I show that my general equilibrium result is quite robust to alternative
choice of parameters. Finally, I introduce two modications of the model incorporating (1)
learning and (2) infrequent planning due to cost. These modications help understand how
the model of short horizon works to induce a consumption hump.
The simulation exercise demonstrates that the general equilibrium model with planning
horizon of about 20 years provides a best t to the salient features of the lifecycle consump-
tion data. One remarkable thing is that this result is very consistent with peoples actual
behavior reported in many survey literatures, specically the survey on retirement planning
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(Retirement Condence Survey, 2007). The ndings from the survey can be summarized as
the following: the average US worker tends to start to save for retirement around age 45,
planning to retire at 65, with an expectation of being retired for 20 years. By this statement,
it is expected that the representative consumer who has a planning horizon of 20 years and
an exogenous retirement age of 65, does not realize that he needs to accumulate assets for the
retirement until 45 years old, at which age he could see clearly there is no more income after
20 years and has to set up an retirement account, by dramatically reducing his consumption
he has enjoyed so far. This fact exactly coincides with the models prediction if the planning
horizon of 20 years is used, which this paper proves the optimal planning horizon for the
model.
44
Figure 8: Optimal Parameter Surface from the parameters f; ; Sg
Table 2: Optimal Beta Values over Gamma and Planning Horizon
 S = 5 S = 10 S = 15 S = 20 S = 25
0:5 1:0580 0:9944 0:9800 0:9742 0:9710
1 1:1586 1:0235 0:9940 0:9822 0:9759
1:5 1:2688 1:0517 1:0081 0:9903 0:9809
2 1:3894 1:0818 1:0225 0:9985 0:9858
2:5 1:5215 1:1128 1:0371 1:0068 0:9908
3 1:6661 1:1447 1:0519 1:0151 0:9957
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Figure 9: Optimal Beta Values for the models with S from 5 to 26.
Figure 10: Optimal Beta Values for the models with risk aversion parameters from 0.5 to 3.
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Table 3: Optimal Beta Values over Planning Horizon
 S = 5 S = 10 S = 15 S = 20 S = 25
0:01 0:9679 0:9667 0:9665 0:9664 0:9663
0:05 0:9759 0:9689 0:9676 0:9670 0:9667
0:1 0:9839 0:9718 0:9689 0:9678 0:9672
0:15 0:9929 0:9746 0:9703 0:9686 0:9676
0:2 0:9774 0:9717 0:9694 0:9681
0:5 0:9944 0:9800 0:9742 0:9710
1 0:9940 0:9822 0:9759





Table 4: The Highest Value of Gamma Less than One






*The second number in the brackets is the value when  = 1
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Figure 11: The Best Fitting Planning Horizon: minimum deviation from GP.
Figure 12: The Best Fitting Planning Horizon based on the age of maximum consumption:
S=20 ts best by this criterion (45 years).
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Figure 13: The Best Fitting Planning Horizon based on the ratio of maximum consumption
to initial consumption: S=22 ts best by this criterion.
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Table 5: Sensitivity to Alternative Calibration
S Model r C=Y K=Y Age64 Cm=Co MSE
Baseline =0:5; =0:979 3.50% 0.748 2.94 50 1.369 0.0063
 = 0:40 3.60% 0.753 2.91 50 1.365 0.0061
S=15  = 0:30 3.93% 0.747 2.92 51 1.380 0.0054
 = 0:07 3.80% 0.751 2.77 50 1.351 0.0058
 = 0:98 3.61% 0.732 3.02 50 1.395 0.0060
Baseline =2; =1:006 3.50% 0.748 2.94 47 1.259 0.0051
 = 1:90 3.39% 0.743 2.97 47 1.262 0.0054
S=18  = 0:33 4.43% 0.712 3.07 47 1.328 0.0019
 = 0:07 3.20% 0.746 2.83 47 1.239 0.0071
 = 1:00 3.83% 0.763 2.84 47 1.250 0.0041
Baseline =0:5; =0:974 3.50% 0.748 2.94 45 1.202 0.0058
 = 0:60 3.64% 0.754 2.90 45 1.199 0.0053
S=20  = 0:30 3.58% 0.730 3.01 45 1.210 0.0048
 = 0:08 3.34% 0.747 2.66 45 1.169 0.0083
 = 0:98 3.08% 0.707 3.17 45 1.232 0.0072
Baseline =2; =0:993 3.50% 0.748 2.94 43 1.139 0.0074
 = 2:10 3.58% 0.752 2.92 43 1.153 0.0071
S=22  = 0:30 3.73% 0.737 2.98 43 1.168 0.0058
 = 0:05 4.09% 0.755 3.18 43 1.189 0.0039
 = 0:98 4.32% 0.784 2.71 43 1.139 0.0049
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Figure 14: The gradual learning result in general equilibrium:  = 0:5:
Figure 15: Planning horizon expands each year only up to S periods and stalls:  = 0:5;
R = 1:035.
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Figure 16: Infrequent planning due to cost: S = 5;  = 2;  = 0:98; R = 1:035:
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3.0 PRESENT BIASED PREFERENCE AND CONSTRAINED
CONSUMER
A consumer who has present-biased preference is more likely to accumulate debts because
of his time-inconsistent taste for immediate gratication. From this observation, I examine
how the consumers with such preference react to credit constraints and explore the general
equilibrium characteristics of an economy of these myopic consumers. With analytic solutions
that dene life time consumption of the agents who re-optimize, negating earlier resolution,
both with and without the credit constraint, I show the possibility of consumption and
income co-movement without resorting to any other constraint. For a constrained consumer
who has a generalized discounting function for immediate gratication my model produces
the prominent consumption hump in an empirically plausible, calibrated general equilibrium.
Beyond the baseline analysis, I also introduce a pay-as-you-go social security system, as well
as mortality risks and bequests to the model, making it even more empirically plausible
and keep nding that the model predicts many of salient lifecycle features of consumption
data. Finally, the simulation exercise demonstrates that the values of the discount factors
estimated from eld experiments, are consistent with the models prediction.
Keywords: present-biased preference, time inconsistency, borrowing constraint, lifecycle
model, general equilibrium, consumption hump.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, economic theory has posited that individuals are innitely far-sighted, fully
rational, expected utility maximizers with time-consistent preferences. Increasingly, eco-
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nomic researchers are questioning these assumptions, as the models that rely on them often
yield predictions that are not corroborated in the available data (DellaVigna, 2009[33]). In
this paper, I explore the possibility that individuals behave myopically rather than ratio-
nally, demonstrating that this tendency among individuals can be supported in macro level
analysis. Specically, I suppose that they possess time-inconsistent tastes for immediate grat-
ication.1 Myopic decision makers may not have full self-restraint to be patient for delayed
gratication and they are more likely to show greater desire for immediate satisfaction.
Individuals discount the utility of a later reward with many reasons and the discounting
usually increases with the length of delay. They discount a delayed reward simply because
they are impatient. But individuals also discount a later reward because they dont like the
uncertain outcome of any future event.2 In fact, as argued by Frederick, Loewenstein and
ODonoghue (2002)[52], time discounting admits any motivation for caring less about future
consequence and the driving forces include impulsivity, uncertainty, and the possibility of
changing tastes. Because the time preference conveys a composite3 of all di¤erent motivations
driving their choice behavior, myopic consumer may be represented by a time preference
parameter that describes such behavior.
In discounted utility theory, the utility of a myopic consumer is represented by Present-
Biased Preference,4 where the valuations fall very rapidly for small delay periods, but then
fall more slowly for longer delay periods. This time-inconsistency contrasts with the standard
exponential discounting, where valuations fall by a constant factor regardless of the length
of delay. Since Laibson (1997)[69] and ODonoghue and Rabin (1999)[84], by their formal-
ized works about the consumption and saving decision for a myopic consumer, the model
of present-biased preferences has been widely conrmed in diverse eld studies. Selected
eld evidences include: Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2009)[71], Skiba and Tobacman
(2008)[96], Ashraf, Karlan and Wesley (2006)[11], Thaler and Benartzi (2004)[102]; Choi
1Experiments on intertemporal choice are summarized in Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)[76]. See also
Frederick, Loewenstein, and ODonoghue (2002)[52].
2Regarding the relationship between uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting, see Thomas Epper, Helga
Fehr-Duda, and Adrian Bruhin (2010)[36].
3For the experimental analysis on the combined e¤ect of time and uncertainty, see Andersen et al.
(2008)[2].
4It is also called Strotzian,or Hyperbolic Discounting,or (; )-model,by many other researchers.
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et al. (2004)[29], Cronqvist and Thaler (2004)[31]; Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002)[9].5 The
core theoretic framework of these works is based on the intertemporal pattern of discounting:
the short-run discount factors are lower than long-run discount factors.
The Quasi-hyperbolic discounting model6 by Laibson (1997)[69] is based on the this
evidence that per-period discount rate changes over time. With dynamically inconsistent
preferences, Laibson nds a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy for a dynamic
game in which time-indexed selves who face choice between liquid and illiquid assets, solve a
T -period consumption problem. To control future selves, in his model, it is necessary for the
long-run self to choose more illiquid assets. The empirical implication of Laibsons work and
a related work by Angeletos et al. (2001)[7], is that the existence of the commitment device
like illiquid asset or borrowing constraint helps induce the occurrence that consumption may
co-move with income ows,7 an empirically important characteristic of consumption data.
Their ndings, however, are based on the assumption of asset constraint that induces such
property and do not explain the consumption property from the present-biased preference
itself. In fact, self-controlled individuals would not show the consumption and income co-
movement if they are not equipped with such commitment device.8 Therefore, the research
question to ask is: under what condition does consumption behavior co-move with income
prole for an agent with present-biased preference? My paper directly answers this.
The myopic agents in my model possess time-inconsistent tastes for immediate grati-
cation and because of this, they continually re-optimize at each date in time as they realize
that their past decision for the present period is no longer optimal. They keep negating their
earlier resolution from consume more now taste. By this mechanism, I nd that the model
of naive agents with perpetual re-optimization can demonstrate the co-movement property
without resorting to any other assumption like the asset constraint. Moreover, my model
answers the following important questions in macroeconomic analysis: rst, what would
be the actual lifecycle consumption prole for a consumer who has a present-biased prefer-
ence in partial equilibrium as well as in general equilibrium? The next question is regarding
5The subjects of these elds include liquid and illiquid savings, 401(k), retirement plan, homeworks and
deadlines, and credit cards.
6This is a discrete version of Hyperbolic discounting model.
7In other words, if income ow is hump-shaped, then it is possible to have such consumption ow.
8Section 3 analyzes this for a sophisticated or self-controlled agent.
55
the consumption hump, an important element describing consumption data. Although the
co-movement of income and consumption is implied in several works mentioned above, its
details are not specied. Therefore, the second question is: can the consumption prole from
the present-biased preferences model match the consumption data, producing the featured
consumption hump in general equilibrium?
I provide a general equilibrium framework that can answer these questions for quite
general classes of parameter values. I show that the standard macroeconomic targets, the
interest rate, capital-output ratio and consumption-output ratio, are calibrated with reason-
able set of parameters with this model. Moreover, I answer the questions from very realistic
model economy, by including a pay-as-you-go social security system, as well as mortality
risks and bequests. I rst present closed form solutions to a simple model of present-biased
preferences, with and without borrowing constraint. Based on this, I derive analytic condi-
tion for the consumption hump.9 This result demonstrates that the hump is obtained even
with myopic consumers if the time preference of the agent remains in a specic range.
An important issue for the consumers with present-biased preferences is self-awareness:
whether or not the agent is aware of his self-control problem of future behavior. Unlike the
naïve agent who is not aware of the self-control problem, the sophisticated agent is clearly
aware of this and prepares certain commitment device to limit his future behavior of over-
consumption. ODonoghue and Rabin (1999)[84] demonstrate how awareness of self-control
problem can successfully moderate the behavioral consequences of those agents with present-
biased preferences. Based on this notion, I provide an analytic solution to the optimization
problem of the sophisticated consumer. For three-period model, I derive the optimal amount
of a commitment device (saving plan) that can limit the overconsumption of the agent by
controlling his future behavior and giving him the desired result. Then I compare the three
consumption proles of the model with and without self-control problem.10 When the con-
sumer successfully controls his future behavior by a commitment device, his consumption
behavior is very similar to the one of a consumer who does not have the self-control prob-
9Remember that precautionary saving is often proposed to explain the consumption hump under uncer-
tainy. Here the hump is obtained in a deterministic world.
10The three models are: (1) the model without self control problem, (2) the model for a naive consumer,
(3) the model for a sophisticated consumer.
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lem. But in the full model of general equilibrium I do not assume that there is a conict
between the short term and long term selves: I posit that each time, because of his taste
for immediate gratication, the agent denies his previous resolution without hesitation and
re-optimizes his consumption prole for the remaining periods following his current taste.
In a recent eld study, succeeding many other theoretic and empirical studies, Meier
and Sprenger (2009)[82] show that present-biased individuals are found to be more likely to
borrow and borrow more than dynamically consistent individuals. In their eld experiments,
they nd that present-biased individuals are around 15 percentage points more likely than
dynamically consistent individuals to have any credit card debt. Moreover, they nd that,
conditional on borrowing, present-biased individuals borrow around 25 percent more than
dynamically consistent individuals. From this observation, I examine how the consumers
with present-biased preferences react to credit constraints and explore the general equilibrium
characteristics of an economy that is populated by these myopic consumers. The contribution
of my work is to assess the reality, generality, and tractability11 of the assumption of the
present-biased preferences for a lifecycle model economy in general equilibrium. I show
that reasonable parameterization of the model generates a hump-shaped consumption prole
among other empirically plausible features.
Using discrete time horizon, I rst show how to incorporate agents with myopic or time-
inconsistent preferences into otherwise standard models of intertemporal decision making. I
then show how models with myopic decision makers can explain some puzzling features of
inter-temporal consumption decisions. In particular, the model I develop can explain why
the pattern of household consumption over a lifetime is humpshaped: mean consumption
is increasing while the consumer is young, reaching a peak around middle age and then
decreasing afterwards. By contrast, standard models with far-sighted rational agents with
time-consistent preferences imply that consumption over lifetime should be monotonically
increasing, decreasing or constant, but not hump-shaped. In the paper, I demonstrate that
the model solves the discrepancy between the lifecycle prediction and its data, by gener-
ating a consumption hump under reasonable parametrization, in a well-calibrated general
equilibrium model. I nd that in my model of constrained myopic consumers, where their
11Stigler (1965)[99] suggests this criterion to assess any economic theory.
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preferences are specied by either a quasi-hyperbolic discounting or a generalized double
exponential discounting, the general equilibrium result can be consistent with the known
characteristics of the lifecycle consumption data. Finally, through simulation I look for
the best parameter values for the consumption prole produced by the model to t the
mean consumption prole of the US consumption data estimated by Gourinchas and Parker
(2002)[57].
3.1.1 Main Findings
I nd the model with present-biased preference helps solve the consumption puzzle, i.e.
the discrepancy between the hump-shaped consumption data and theoretic prediction of
its prole denoted by monotonicity, far from the hump. In particular, the model with a
constrained myopic consumer produces a consumption hump, with similar size and location
of consumption peak, not only in partial equilibrium, but also in a well-calibrated general
equilibrium under reasonable parameterization. In calibrated general equilibrium, I nd that
the model also predicts many of the salient lifecycle features of consumption data, even in
more plausible environment of social security, bequest and mortality risks.
In the baseline model with double exponential discounting, I nd that for all of the values
of risk aversion parameter that I consider, the model generates a consumption hump, but
with a consumption peak age earlier than the data. In term of quantitative t to the data,
MSE as the criterion, it is shown that the model with risk aversion value of 0:5 induces the
best t to the data. By the location of the consumption peak age, the model with around
2  3 gives better t. Also, by the peak to initial consumption ratio, models with lower
risk aversion give better ts. When I set the risk aversion parameter at 2; I nd that each
aggregator ! = f0:3; 0:5; 0:7g12has a relative strength in explaining the data, according to
each di¤erent criterion. When I perform simulation exercises to nd the optimal values of the
discounting factors, I nd that the resulting consumption proles do not change signicantly
by the choice of alternative : This may be explained by the fact that in a calibrated general













equilibrium, the other discounting factor, which is  in the model, jointly adjusts to the
macroeconomic targets.
Beyond these ndings, I also nd the following relationships among the parameters in
the general equilibrium: rst,  is inversely related with risk aversion parameter ; for all
values of  and !: Moreover, given any ; the  is inversely related with , but positively
related with !. Second, when  is relatively low, the  may have chances of exceeding one so
that it is more likely to violate the assumption of present biased preference as  gets lower
and ! gets higher.
When the model is extended to include mortality risks and social security, I nd the
followings. First, like in baseline model, when the value of  is greater than one, the model
tends to conform to the featured consumption peak, but at somewhat earlier age than the
data.13 In term of quantitative t to the data, the model with higher risk aversion values like
 = f2; 2:5; 3g; induces a smaller deviation from the data. With these values, the location
of the consumption peak age is also close to the data. Also, by the peak consumption to
initial consumption ratio,  = 1:5 gives the best t, followed by the group of  = f2; 2:5;
3g. Therefore, when both mortality risks and social security are introduced, the model with
 around 2 to 3 gives overall good t to the data .
Second, when the risk aversion parameter is set to the baseline value of 2; the consumption
peak age ts better to the data with lower aggregator, i.e. ! = f0:3g; but by other criterion,
! = f0:5g is better. Third, like in baseline model, I nd that consumption stream does
not change a lot by the choices of alternative . Finally, I compare the four di¤erent model
specications and nd that the model with both mortality risks and social security produces
a best result in terms of quantitative t and the peak to initial consumption ratio. But by
the consumption peak age, the model without either mortality risks or social security ts
better. In this case, it is found that the consumption peak age is slightly earlier than the
data.
13The peak age is also earlier than the age of the baseline model.
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3.1.2 Literature Review
There are many related papers both in the non-standard models of economic agents with
behavioral assumptions and in standard models of far-sighted and fully rational agents.
Regarding behavioral models, time-inconsistent preferences must be addressed. The Golden
Eggsmodel by Laibson (1997)[69] is the one, as is discussed in the introduction. Caliendo
and Aadland (2007a)[20]s short term planning approach belongs to this time inconsistent
preferences, as well.
Related, but not a direct logical consequence of time inconsistency is the procrastination.
As ODonoghue and Rabin (1999)[84] argue, the self is divided into naive and sophisticated
ones who have beliefs about future selves. The sophisticated one has correct beliefs and
does not procrastinate, while the naive one does. The policy implication of this approach is
that in the presence of many errors in retirement planning by the majority of the economy
with the present-biased preferences, cautious paternalism may help solve this problem. For
example, tax incentives designed to increase savings may also increase the cost of delay in
saving. Likewise less frequent transaction dates incurs small cost for time consistent selves,
but large cost for procrastinators, and thus help curb the procrastinators from such behavior.
A concept that is related to, but distinct from, the present-biased preferences and that
has not been much addressed in the behavioral economics literature is the shorter than usual
lifetime planning horizon due to bounded rationality of decision maker. Bounded Rationality
may be dened to be a limitation of human rationality arising from bounds on available
information, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the nite amount of time they
have to make decisions. Therefore bounded rationality implies that the economic agents
decision making based on rationality may be incomplete if either the agent does not have
full information regarding all the options he could consider or there exists costs, physical or
mental, to decision making. Caliendo and Aadland (2007a)[20] and Park (2011)[86] model
bounded rationality as short term planning horizon where the boundedly rational consumer
maximizes the discounted utility from consumption over a shorter interval of time than his
known lifetime. It is shown that this modication of the standard model can generate a
hump-shaped consumption prole in general equilibrium whereas the standard model with
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full planning horizon cannot. Another line of bounded rationality is the deviation from full
information, due to information cost (Reis, 2006[92]) or implementation cost (Caliendo and
Huang, 2007b[21]). Other than these there are a couple of others that may be considered
for bounded rationality. They are rational inattentiveness (Luo, 2005[77]), dual-self (Levine
and Fudenberg, 2006[73]), and overcondence (Caliendo and Huang, 2008[22]).
Regarding the lifecycle consumption prole implied by the standard assumption on fully
rational agent, several papers should be mentioned. Borrowing constraint, mortality risk,
consumption and leisure substitutability, income uncertainty and precautionary savings are
the main topics among them. First, the relative importance of precautionary savings related
with the borrowing frictions in the model is well studied in Feigenbaums (2008c)[47] general
equilibrium model. He shows that, along with the consumption hump, in a general equi-
librium lifecycle model with an exogenous borrowing constraint, observable macroeconomic
variables are insensitive to simultaneous changes in the discount factor and risk aversion that
preserve the equilibrium interest rate. This calibration implication has a common element
with this paper although my work posits a di¤erent preference specication than his. Feigen-
baum also shows that the unobservable fraction of aggregate saving due to precautionary
motives increases with consumersrisk aversion and the e¤ect of the parameter on observable
macro variables depend on the assumptions about borrowing constraints in the model.
Regarding other mechanisms to show a hump, the most successful ones are: Family Size
E¤ect (Attanasio et. al., 1999[12]), Borrowing Constraint (Deaton,1991[32]), Mortality Risk
(Feigenbaum, 2008a[45]; Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 2006[60]), Choice Between Consump-
tion and Leisure (Heckman, 1974[61]; Bullard and Feigenbaum, 2007[61]), Income Uncer-
tainty and Precautionary Saving (Carroll, 1997[24], 2009[25]; Aiyagari, 1994[1], Feigenbaum,
2008b[46]), Consumer Durables (Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2010[49]).
3.1.3 Chapter Organization
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present closed form solutions for a
simple model, with and without borrowing constraint. Using these results, I derive the
analytic conditions for the consumption hump. The next step is to analyze the sophisticated
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agent who is aware of his self control problem. Then in the next section, I present the
full model and describe the baseline general equilibrium for the model of present-biased
preferences. First the partial equilibrium and then the general equilibrium in an overlapping
generations economy are derived under the condition of borrowing constraint. In the fourth
section, quantitative analysis follows. Target variables with US data, calibration method
and the results are addressed. The result section discusses the main questions addressed
in the model. It also reports sensitivity check. Thereafter, the chapter concludes with the
emphasis on the implication of the general equilibrium, as well as of the employment of the
non-standard preferences to complement the standard ones.
3.2 ANALYTIC SOLUTION TO A SIMPLE MODEL
First, let us introduce a simple version of the present-biased preference. The well-known
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model is a discrete-time approximation to hyperbolic discount
function.14 By the quasi-hyperbolic discounting, an individuals intertemporal choice at time
t is represented as follows:




where ;   1: If  = 1; this preference corresponds to the case of standard exponential
discounting. However, for  < 1 this representation captures the time-inconsistent taste for
immediate gratication. The result is a declining per period rate of time discounting and
a violation of time-consistency.15 Notice that the quasi-hyperbolic discount function can be
written as a series of  and :
f; g =
8<: 1 if  = t t if  > t+ 1
9=; :
14Hyperbolic discounting is described by a discount factor 11+t :
15Strictly speaking, there are two changes from the standard discounting: (1) it makes the per-period
discount rate change over time. (2) it bases discounting on relativistic time rather than absolute time. For
other detailed charcteristics, see Rasmusen (2008)[90].
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Consider a present biased agent who maximizes consumption utility following his taste
for immediate gratication, which is represented by the quasi-hyperbolic discounting with
;  < 1. Assume that the agent has a nonnegative income stream of fy0; y1; :::; yTg and his




1  if  6= 1
ln(c) if  = 1
9=; :16
The agent discounts future utility by the sequence of f1; 1; 2; :::; Tg: For simplicity,
assume for now that there is no borrowing constraint and the agent can borrow or lend freely
at the market interest rate 1 + r = R: Furthermore, let us consider a simplest case that the
agent lives three periods so that T = 2: Although the main analysis through this paper
focuses on the lifecycle model with T > 55; this simple model is easy to tract, yet rich
enough to demonstrate the analytic property of the intertemporal optimization with the
present-biased preference. The optimization problem of the three period model for the agent
at t = 0 is,
U0(c0; c1; c2) =Max
c1 0










c0 + b1 = y0
c1 + b2 = y1 +Rb1
c2 = y2 +Rb2
where b1 and b2 are savings (or borrowings if negative) for the subsequent two periods.
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16As discussed in Laibson (1998)[70] and Geraats (2006)[55], the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
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where  1 = R 1(R)1=:17 Thus he consumes c0 at t = 0 and he intends to consume
c1 at the next period. This consumption plan implies that because  < 1; unless R > 1;
it is always satised that c0 > c1 > c2 regardless of income stream. The tendency of
overconsumption at early stage may be curbed if the interest rate is high enough to reverse
the inequalities. Notice that the consumption di¤erence between the rst two periods is
greater in absolute value than that of next two periods, characterizing the consumption
outcome from (; )-preferences.18
At t = 1; however, the present biased agent realizes that the consumption he planned
for the period is not fullling his taste of immediate gratication. In fact, he wants to
consume more now than what he is supposed to have. This desire can be realized at the
cost of future consumption c2. Thus, instead of consuming c1 obtained above, the agent
re-optimizes the current and future consumption according to his consume-more-now taste.
He solves a revised maximization problem for the remaining periods such as:
U1(c1; c2) =Max
c1 1






c1 + b2 = y1 +Rb1
c2 = y2 +Rb2
The solution to this problem is the optimal consumption prole for t = f1; 2g: Let the
consumption be c11 and c
1
2; emphasizing the di¤erence between the new consumption solved
at t = 1 and the one planned from t = 0. They are
17This measure is related with the limit of marginal propensity to consume. For details, see Feigenbaum
(2005)[43].
18It is worth to notice that except the rst period consumption, all others are monotonically increasing or
decreasing by the rate of R : This is true for any T period optimzation of the model.
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Figure 17: Consumption with Q-Hyperbolic Discounting in Three-Period Model: R = 1:035,




















The rebalanced consumption c11 is di¤erent from the planned one c
0
1. The new consump-
tion is a function of current cash on hand y1 + Rb1: All together, the revised consumption
prole for the entire three periods, t = 0; 1; 2, is


























1 + 1= 1

!9>=>;
The last term in the bracket follows from the fact that the agent no longer needs to
renew his consumption at the last period because no more cash on hand is realized. That
is c22 = c
1
2: Solving for b1 = y0   c0 pins down the consumption prole fc00; c11; c12g for
the model: Figure 17 shows the resulting consumption with the simple model. In general,
for any t = 0; 1; :::; T; solving recursively for bond demand of each period returns the
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Figure 18: Lifecycle Consumption with Q-Hyperbolic Discounting in Partial Equilibrium:
R = 1:045,  = 0:5,  = 0:5;  = 0:98, T + 25 = 80: The income follows GP.
entire consumption prole. The consumption fc00; c11; :::; cTTg is obtained by substituting the
renewed cash on hand yt + Rbt into consumption equations. Figure 18 and 19 show the
lifecycle consumption proles simulated from the US income data for the present biased
agent with T + 25 = 80:
From these graphs, it is easy to notice that the consumption prole may or may not
be hump-shaped depending on the parameter values. To study further this issue, I want to
dene here the consumption hump as follows:19
Denition A consumption hump for T-period model is a consumption prole fctgTt=0
that satises20
i) There is a consumption peak at time t 2 (0; T ):
ii) Consumption is monotonically increasing up to t.
iii) Consumption is monotonically decreasing beyond t.
19This denition is in a strong sense. In a weak sense, it may allow having any wiggle over the horizon
and there can be many local peaks.
20For example, if there are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2, then the hump condition requires that fc0 < c1 > c2g
implying the peak occurs at c1:
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Figure 19: Lifecycle Consumption with Q-Hyperbolic Discounting in Partial Equilibrium:
R = 1:035,  = 2,  = 0:7;  = 0:95, T + 25 = 80: The income follows GP.
Let us go back to the consumption prole of the simple model. The closed form solution
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1= 1
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 1
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To explore the consumption property, rst compare this with the one of a rational agent
who has a standard exponential discounting, i.e. the case where  = 1: Then







































Proposition 4. Given a xed interest rate R; for any xed  value, 0 <  <1, the agent
with the present biased preference consumes more initially than the standard, rational agent
for all values of time preference parameter . That is, cpresent biased0 > c
standard
0 for each 
and :
Proof. This is a direct application of the denition of the present-biased preference, requiring
 < 1: Fix the value of R. Then for all values 0 <  < 1; and for all values of  < 1 and



























2 = cstandard0 :
Now, assume that the agent is constrained in asset markets and the agent can only save
but not borrow. Then the optimal consumption plan of the unconstrained agent in the
previous section may not be feasible and it should be modied. To explore the consumption
prole for the agent under the constraint, consider the following three cases regarding binding
situation over fc00; c11; c22g:
 All of the three consumption points fc00; c11; c22g are not binding: [NNN]
 fc00g is binding, but fc11; c22g are not binding: [BNN]
 fc00; c11g are binding, but fc22g is not binding: [BBN]
Case 1: [NNN] When consumption is not binding at all during the entire life, the
resulting consumption prole is exactly equal to the one fc00; c11; c12g of the unconstrained
model above. That is,













































then the prole yields a hump dened above. Therefore, assuming 0 <  <1 and R > 0; I
have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. With the present biased preference, i.e.  < 1; and  < 1; the consump-
tion hump is obtained regardless of income stream if it is satised that R
R 1+(R)1= <









Proof. Suppose that consumption is not increasing initially. Then it should be satised
















implies R > (R-1+(R)1=)(R)1= which contradicts R
R 1+(R)1= < (R)
1=. Suppose
secondly that consumption is not decreasing at later periods. Then it must be true that
c11 6 c12, which means that 1 6 R1= (R)
1=
R






The condition can be rewritten directly from the consumption function as:





1= + 1= 1






It is easy to notice that the inequalities are not satised when R

6 1 because 1= < 1:
However, when R

> 1, the condition is satised for certain parameter values that induces
1  " < R

1= < 1: Intuitively, when the interest rate is high enough relative to agents time
preference, even the present biased agent is willing to curb his overconsumption for future
benet.22 The key implication of the proposition is that there exists a range of parameter
values that can induce a consumption hump regardless of income stream. Moreover, the
hump is achieved without any asset constraint. This is important because in most of the
literature that deals with present biased preferences, a sort of borrowing constraint plays a
crucial role to induce a consumption hump.23 In my model the hump is achieved without
21Here I assume that the interest rate satises R + (R)1= > 1 for technical purpose. Unless the real
interest rate is deep in negative value, this condition is always satised.
22Remember that this does not mean he violates the tenet of quasi-hyperbolic discounting or consume
more now taste.
23As described in Introduction, the possibility of consumption hump in Laibson (1997)[69] comes from the
fact that there exist illiquid assets (Golden eggs), in his model, which play an equivalent economic role as a
borrowing constraint. Unlike Laibson or others, my model demonstrates the property without resorting to
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Figure 20: Lower and Upper Bound for the beta over various  when R = 1:035 and  = 0:5:
those constraints, but under certain parameter values when the agent negates his earlier
resolution and re-optimizes following his consume more now taste. Figure 20 shows the
upper and the lower bounds for  over various  in the simple model when Rann = 1:035 and
 = 0:5, together with per length of 20 years:
Case 2: [BNN] If the borrowing constraint is binding at t = 0, the agent cannot achieve
his optimal consumption c00 because it is not feasible. Instead, his consumption is limited by
the current wealth or cash on hand, which is y0 +Rb0 = y0: Thus, the feasible consumption
for the rst period is y0: At t = 1; because he saved none (in fact, borrowed none) last
period, the agent solves a revised maximization problem for the rest of the periods, with
current resource (cash on hand) and the expected future income afterwards. Because he
inherits nothing from last period, the current nancial wealth is y1+Rb1 = y1 and his future
income is y2
R
when discounted. Thus, for t = 0; 1; 2, the consumption prole is


















To explore further the consumption property with BNN, consider two agents who face
the same interest rate but di¤er either in their income or taste. Between the two agents, it
is the one who has a lower initial income if both have the same time preference; and the one
any asset constraint.
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who has a stronger taste if both have the same income stream, that may face a borrowing
constraint. By this it is inferred that a constrained agent is more likely to have either a lower
income or a stronger taste unless the interest rate is quite low.24 Therefore, unlike Case 1
where the income prole does not matter to induce a hump-shaped consumption prole, in
Case 2, the structure of income stream matters. Thus I propose conditions for the hump
under constraint like the following:
Proposition 6. When a borrowing constraint is binding initially, the consumption hump is






and ii) (R)1= < 1:
Proof. Suppose that the consumption is not a hump. Then it should be satised that either
c00 > c11 or c11 6 c22: The former implies y0(1 + 1= 1) > y1 +
y2
R1







: The latter, on the other hand, implies 1 6 R1= 1

, which
contradicts (R)1= < 1. Therefore, the consumption is a hump.
This rst condition implies that a lowest initial income is a key factor for the hump when
the interest rate is su¢ ciently low.25 Notice that if the income keeps increasing over time,
y0 < y1 < y2; then the inequality condition is always satised when the second condition
cooperates. If, however, the initial income is not the lowest, then it is necessary to have
a relatively high income for y1 to satisfy the condition. The second condition implies that
the interest rate should be low relative to the time preference of the agent so that the
consumption of later stage is decreasing. Finally,
Case 3: [BBN] If the borrowing constraint is binding at the rst and the second
periods, no part of his initial plan can be realized. His consumption is limited by the cash
on hand each time. The consumption for the rst period is y0; the same as [BNN]. But the
consumption for the second period is also y1 because his planned consumption26 for t = 1
is not feasible, either. At the nal period, t = 2; because he has no nancial income from
earlier periods, he should live on his current income. Thus, fc00; c11; c22gBBN = fy0; y1; y2g :
24When interest rate is su¢ ciently low there is little incentive to save and even the patient consumer may
want to borrow.
25If the interest rate is low, it is more likely for the agent to borrow when his income is not su¢ cient.




1 + 1= 1
:
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Then the hump is obtained if his income has a hump-shaped prole, i.e. y0 < y1 > y2: In
this case, the consumption and the income co-move over life time.
3.3 SELF AWARENESS
In this section I analyze the case in which the agent is not naïve but sophisticated enough to
be aware of his future behavior of overconsumption. Consider again an agent with present-
biased preference who lives three periods, t = 0; 1; 2, and maximizes his periodic utility over
the three periods given a known income stream fy0; y1; y2g: Although the agent has a time-
inconsistent preference and discounts the future utility by the sequence of f1; 1; 2g, the
sophisticated agent is aware of his inconsistency. Because there is no borrowing constraint,
the present-biased agent is able to consume as much as he wants at earlier periods, so long
as it satises the three-period lifecycle wealth constraint.
The sophisticated agent wants to solve this problem by controlling his future behavior.
Because, as shown in previous section, overconsumption occurs on the prey of nal stage
consumption, the agent wants to control his behavior of the second period to guarantee a
comfortable life for the nal period.27 At t = 0; the agent considers a saving plan in which he
deposits certain amount in the rst period. Let the saving be s: By this saving contract, he
is not allowed to withdraw the saving till the maturity, which is t = 2. Assume for simplicity
that the interest rate for this saving follows the same market interest rate 1 + r = R by
which the bond rate is made.28
To analyze the self control problem and get the sub-game perfect equilibrium, it is nec-
essary to solve the maximization problem by backward induction. I want to solve for the
saving amount s that the initial self needs to have to control his future behavior. Let each
self at three di¤erent times be self (0), self (1), and self (2). At the nal stage t = 2; because
there is no more period to consider, it is clear that self (2) consumes everything available to
27The sophisticated agent can control both the rst and the second period overconsumption. This is
sometimes called the behavior of long-run self, and analyzed with  = 1. In this case the outcome goes back
to the standard exponential one.
Here, I focus on more interesting case where the agent does not give up his initial preference but wants to
control his next-stage self.
28The model assumes the agent utilizes bond market between periods to borrow or lend as before.
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him regardless of his taste:
c2 > R2s
R2s is the minimum amount self (2) can get when there is nothing left from earlier
periods except for the forced saving amount. In fact, the last consumption c2 is the residual
from the consumption behavior by self (1) from his optimization at t = 1. Therefore, the
key solution needed for the analysis is the one by self (1). The optimization problem of the










c1 + b2 = y1 +Rb1
c2 = y2 +Rb2 +R
2s
c2 > R2s
where b1 = [y0 s] c0 is the bond holding by the initial self, representing self (1) inherits
nancial wealth, positive or negative, from the maximization at t = 0. Remember that s
is not available at t = 1 and the maximum amount he can borrow should not go beyond





Solving the problem gives optimal solution to the self (1) at t = 1. If the optimal
consumption fc11; c12g does not violate the minimum allowance constraint c2 > R2s; then the
solution is not di¤erent from the one in the previous section.29 Upon this result there will
be no need of commitment device like the saving plan by self (0). However, if the constraint





29This is because the model assumes the same interest rate for both bond demand and the saving plan.
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which requires for self (0) to occupy the commitment device of the saving plan. Thus
letting fc1; c2g = fc11; c12g, self (0) solves
U0(c0jc1; c2) =Max c
1 
0










c0 + b1 = y0   s
Following the Appendix for maximization procedure, the saving is obtained










R2s, substituting b1 into the
saving equation returns
s = R 2 (R)1=

























































because c0 = y0 s b1: By the value of b1 and s; the consumption points of the subsequent
periods are
































All together, the complete consumption prole is
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The controlled consumption of the sophisticated agent tells us that the last consumption
c2 is large enough that it can be higher than the second c1 even in the case of R < 1: Let
us compare this controlled consumption (A) with the consumption prole made by present
biased self (0) who is without the self control problem (B)30 and the consumption prole of
the present biased naïveté obtained in previous subsection (C). Thus,





































































It is easy to see that for a special case of R = 1; the initial consumptions by all three
methods are equal to each other. In fact, when R = 1; the controlled consumption prole
(A) is identical to the one without self control problem (B). That is, fc0; c1; c2gControlled =
fc0; c1; c2gNo Self Control: But with usual interest rate of R > 1; it is clear that
fc0gControlled > fc0gNo Self Control = fc0gUncontrolled
And regarding the last period consumption, it is also true that
fc2gControlled > fc2gNo Self Control > fc2gUncontrolled
Figure 21 and Figure 22 show this result. Once the agent controls his future selves, the
result is not much di¤erent from the one without self control problem.
30In other words, the consumption plan by the initial self is honored by subsequent selves.
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Figure 21: Three consumption proles with and without self control problem. With self
control problem, agent is either naive (Uncontrolled) or sophisticated (Controlled): R =
1:035,  = 0:5,  = 0:9;  = 0:95:
Figure 22: Three consumption proles with and without self control problem. When R=1,
the self controlled consumption coincides with the one where there is no self control problem:
R = 1,  = 0:5,  = 0:7;  = 0:98:
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3.4 A LIFECYCLE MODEL WITH PRESENT BIASED PREFERENCES
In this section, a general equilibrium model with a constrained consumer who has present-
biased preference is presented. Consumers time preference is represented by the usual
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. But a more generalized discounting form can also be used.
Here I analyze both cases. I consider a (T + 1)-period overlapping generations general
equilibrium where there are (T +1) types of identical cohorts, who consume, save or dissave,
and supply labor for production every period. The consumers optimization results in a series
of rebalanced consumption and bond demand, net of which meets with capital demand in a
stationary competitive equilibrium.
3.4.1 Consumer
3.4.1.1 Environment Time is discrete. At each time a generation of identical cohorts
is born. Each agent who is indexed by age t, lives for T periods in a (T + 1) - period
overlapping generations economy. There is no population growth. During working years,
agents are endowed with one unit of labor productivity, measured in e¢ ciency units, which
is supplied inelastically. There exists a single good that can be either consumed or saved,
in which case it is called capital. Each agent has present-biased preference represented by
either Q-hyperbolic discounting or generalized discounting dened later. Although the agent
is able to foresee perfectly his future labor productivity or the income stream, all the way up
to his life time T , he is not rational enough to control his future taste in advance. Therefore,
there is no self control problem in this model and the agent optimizes each time following
his myopic taste given his income stream and cash on hand. Moreover, there is a borrowing
constraint which the agent cannot anticipate in advance.31 Thus under market determined
interest rate, the agent can earn the nancial income if he ever saves. Finally, for this
section, assume that there is no government running social security and there is no bequest.
No bequest assumption comes from the premise that agents live for sure up to T without
any mortality risk. These assumptions are relaxed in next section where we could see what
31This implies that the agent can not internalize the borrowing constraint into the his optimization process
until the actual consumption time and there is no anticipatory saving for this.
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happen to the equilibrium consumption in more realistic environment.
3.4.1.2 Constrained Consumer Optimization A consumer who is in the age t and
lives for T  t+1 periods has a consumption denoted by cs(t). The subscript s represents the
consumption time. The age also represents the planning time in the model.32 The myopic
consumer at age t, who has a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function, discounts his future
consumption at the rate of  t for  = t+1; t+2; ::; T: Then the representative consumer
who is credit constrained in asset market, plans for T   t+ 1 periods at each planning time
and maximizes for t = 0; 1; :::; T;
U(t) =
c1 t (t)







c (t) + b+1(t) = we +Rb (t)
b0(0) = 0; bt(t) = given; bT+1(t) = 0
c (t) > 0
b+1(t) > 033
for  = t; :::; T:
c (t) is consumption planned at t for time  and b+1(t) is bond demand purchased at 
for the next period, indexed by planning time t. The consumer has a stream of productivity
over life time so that he supplies e e¢ ciency units of labor at age  to production and earns
labor income of we for  = t; :::; T , where w is the market determined real wage rate which
is assumed to be stationary over time. Likewise, under market determined interest rate, the
agent earns Rb (t) if he carries bond to the next period.
32The physical age is t+ 25 if the consumer starts working at 25 years old.
33The borrowing constraint can be modied to accomodate the situation where borrowing is limited by
the extent of a portion of current wealth level:  b+1(t) <  ax(t): I nd that the result is not much di¤erent
from the model I propose here.
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Before solving the constrained consumer optimization problem, let us rst look for the
optimal condition for the unconstrained consumers problem. The rst order condition says
that, for  = t; :::; T;
c  (t) = (R)c
 
+1(t); if  = t
and
c  (t) = (R)c
 
+1(t); if  = t+1; :::; T
If the borrowing constraint is binding at  , these equalities are not satised. Let ct(t)
be the optimized initialconsumption starting from the planning date or age t. Using the














where bt(t) is the initial bond holding each planning date and it is assumed that b0(0) = 0:
Let us dene the total wealth at any time  over the planning horizon [t; T ]; as the sum of

















where  1 = (R)1=R 1:
Now that the consumer is constrained in asset market, whenever the constraint is binding,
the consumer cannot follow the optimal rule, not fullling his taste of immediate gratication.
Instead, his consumption is curbed by the available cash in his hand. Thus given t =
wet +Rbt, the feasible consumption under the borrowing constraint is,
ct (t) = ct(t) if ct(t)  t
ct (t) = t if ct(t) > t:
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In this subsection, I want to explore the model with more general discount factor than












By this preference, the agent discounts future consumption using combined discount fac-
tors of f() and f(): One possibility for the form is a linear combination of two exponential
discount factors: f! + (1  !)g.34 Some argue that the double exponential discounting
has a better t to the lab data than the Q-hyperbolic. Then the representative consumer













c (t) + b+1(t) = we +Rb (t)
b0(0) = 0; bt(t) = given; bT+1(t) = 0
c (t) > 0
b+1(t) > 0
for  = t; :::; T:
The aggregator ! shows a relative strength between the two discount parameters. Solv-
ing the consumer optimization problem implies that when the borrowing constraint is not
binding, the inter-temporal optimal rule yields that, for  = t; :::; T;
[! + (1  !) ]c  (t) = R[!+1 + (1  !)+1]c +1(t)
and the feasible consumption under the borrowing constraint is,
34As shown in the subsequent sections, this choice of preference representation has a better t to the
lifecycle consumption data than the simple quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
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ct (t) = ct(t) if ct(t)  t
ct (t) = t if ct(t) > t










3.4.1.3 Planned and Realized Consumption in Partial Equilibrium The con-
sumers optimization at t leads to a vector of consumption schedule for the T   t+1 periods
starting from t,
CP (t) = fct(t); ct+1(t); ct+2(t); :::; cT (t)g:
Initially the consumer intends to follow the planned optimal consumption stream and
consumes ct(t) at t and ct+1(t) at t+1. However at t+1, the myopic consumer realizes that
the planned consumption from t for t+ 1; i.e. ct+1(t) is now no longer desirable because he
wants to consume more due to his taste for immediate gratication. He has to rebalance
the consumption plan to incorporate this, rather than follow the planned consumption. He
keeps doing this as if he were reborn each time to optimize for the remaining periods of his
life.
Because each time he follows the planned path only at the initial time of a planning
horizon, the actual consumption is the envelope of all the planned consumption path over
the life time. That is, the realized consumption is,
CR(t) = fct(t); ct+1(t+ 1); ct+2(t+ 2); :::; cT (T )g:
Therefore the lifecycle consumption prole of the representative consumer with present
biased preference is
fctgTt=0 = f c0(0); c1(1); c2(2); ::: ; cT (T ) g
where each consumption is indexed by a planning time and a consumption time. Likewise,
the lifecycle asset demand prole is
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Figure 23: Planned and Realized Consumption Prole for the model with  = 1,  = 0:9;
 = 0:97, R = 1:035. The realized consumption is the envelope of the planned consumption
series.
fbt+1gTt=0 = f b1(0); b2(1); ::: ; bT+1(T ) g
and
b0(0) = 0; bT+1(T ) = 0 :
Figure 23 shows the planned and the realized consumption prole of model with Quasi-
hyperbolic. The realized consumption is the envelope of the planned consumption series in
partial equilibrium.
3.4.2 Technology and General Equilibrium
Adding production technology to the economy completes the model. Assume there are a
continuum(innite number) of identical perfectly competitive rms who operate the following
Cobb-Douglas production function:
F (K;N) = KN1 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Now dene a competitive equilibrium for the model.
Denition A competitive equilibrium in this economy is an allocation fctgTt=0, a set of
bond demands fbt+1gTt=0, an interest rate R and wage rate w such that given R and w, the
followings are satised:
i) fctgTt=0 and fbt+1gTt=0 solve consumers problem.
ii) Factors are paid out their marginal productivity:
w = FN and R  1 = FK   d:
iii) Labor market and bond market clear:
K =
PT
t=0 bt and N =
PT
t=0 et
The last market clearing condition species that consumption loans cancels out in the
aggregate so that the excess demand for bonds should be equal to the capital stock. Also the
aggregate labor supply that sums up over the labor supply of each cohort should be equal
to the aggregate labor demand. Therefore, by the above equilibrium condition ii),
















R  1 + d

:
Thus the capital-to-labor demand ratio is written as a function of the interest rate and
other parameters. Similarly, rewrite the capital stock as a function of the interest rate to get
K(R) = N















Once it is solved for an equilibrium interest R, then the real wage w is determined by
w(R) = (1  )





3.4.3 Extended General Equilibrium Model with Mortality Risk, Bequest and
Social Security
In this section, I want to extend the model by including social security, another source of the
retirement assets and analyze the e¤ect of social security, together with mortality risk and
bequests in the general equilibrium model. Consider the model economy in which agents
have present-biased preference and live to a maximum age of T . The agents survive until
age s > t; with a probability Qt, which is assumed to be generation (or cohort)-independent.
Then the agents of age t maximize the expected utility:
 if the agent follows a quasi-hyperbolic discounting:
U(t) = Qt
c1 t (t)


















Also let us assume that agents who do not survive up to t leave their assets to the other
remaining agents in the form of bequest Bt. The bequests are spread uniformly over the
surviving population. Now I introduce government in the model and assume the government
implements pay as you go (PAY G) Social Security system nanced by a payroll tax of s.35
Also the government is assumed to be in balanced budget each time. The agent receives the
social security benet St from retirement time TRET , where TRET is determined exogenously
by government policy. Therefore, an agent starts to receive social security benet if he
35The notation should not be confused with the saving amount in previous section, where I discuss about
the self control problem.
84













c (t) + b+1(t) = (1  s)we +Rb (t) +B + S1 (t > TRET )
b0(0) = 0; bt(t) = given; bT+1(t) = 0
c (t) > 0
b+1(t) > 0
where 1 (t > TRET ) shows the condition under which the social security is included to
the income of the agent.
The di¤erence now is the extra mechanism, than the personal saving, that transfers
income from the young to the old. This transfer will reduce the demand for saving by the
young so that the interest rate will be increased if there is no distortional e¤ect between
consumption and leisure. Because there is no leisure in the periodic utility in the model,
there is no relative price change from tax between the consumption good and leisure, i.e. no
substitution e¤ect arises in intra-temporal optimization.
To accommodate these modication to the model, I want to adjust our denition of
general equilibrium. So the competitive equilibrium condition in the model is modied to
K(R) = N






t=0Qtbt (R) = N






By the second equation, the market interest rate R is determined.











where s is the payroll tax rate, which is set by the government. If S = S for Tw 
t  T , then
s
PTw 1




The goal of the quantitative analysis is to assess how well a calibrated, general equilibrium
model of the constrained consumer with present biased preference can account for stylized
facts regarding consumption hump. Following many other works, I propose three standard
macroeconomic variables to be targeted for the US data. The targets are interest rate,
capital-output ratio and consumption output ratio. But the model has six scalar parame-
ters,36 of which three parameters are related to the discounting factor37, one parameter to
the risk aversion, and the remaining two parameters to the production38. In case of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting function, the model has only two time-preference parameters. Among
those time-preference parameters, I rst set the other parameter(s), except for the ; at cer-
tain values, and let all other three parameters of (; ; d) jointly set to match the target
variables given those parameter values. Then, the preference parameter(s) itself is calibrated
for the consumption prole produced by the model to t the mean consumption prole of
Gourinchas and Parkers (2002)[57] estimation. Because the equilibrium proles of consump-
tion, income, bond demand, and labor supply in the overlapping generation model can be
interpreted as economy wide cohort averages, these averages can be used for comparison to
US data. To asses the best matching planning horizon, I use a couple of standard measures,
which are MSE, Consumption Peak Age and Peak Consumption to Initial Consumption
Ratio.
36These are ; ; !; ; ; d in the model.
37These are ; ; ! in the model.
38These are ; d in the model.
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3.5.1 Targets in US Data
Three macroeconomic targets are proposed for the analysis and they are interest rate (R),
capital-output ratio (K=Y ) and consumption output ratio (C=Y ). Following Rios-Rull
(1996)[93], I rst set 2.94 as a target value for capital-output ratio and 0.748 for the target
ratio of consumption to output. The third macroeconomic target is the real interest rate,
which is independently determined in the lifecycle framework. Following McGrattan and
Prescott (2000)[81], I set the target real interest rate at 3.5%.39
In the context of lifecycle prole of consumption, the mean consumption prole in
Gourinchas and Parkers (2002)[57] estimation and its septic polynomial t by Feigenbaum
(2008a)[45] is adopted.
cGPt = 1:062588 + 0:015871t  0:00184t2 + 0:000109t3 + 0:00000413t4
 0:00000056t5 + 0:0000000163t6   0:0000000001475t7
According to this t, the age of lifecycle mean consumption peak is 45 years old and the
ratio of peak consumption to initial consumption is 1.1476. These values, as well as mean
squared errors for the t, are used to compare the consumption proles along the di¤erent
planning horizons. Also, regarding the income schedule, Feigenbaum (2008a)[45] suggests a
quadratic t for the US data. Since the labor is supplied inelastically in the model, income
is proportional to productivity. Therefore, Feigenbaums quadratic t to the income data of
Gourinchas and Parker can serve for the productivity prole as well. The prole is
et = 1 + 0:0181t+ 0:000817t
2   0:000051t3 + 0:000000536t4:
3.5.2 Calibration
The standard lifecycle model of general equilibrium has four parameters, two from consumers
optimization and the other two from technology; the risk aversion coe¢ cient  and the
discount factor  are from consumer side and the capital share  in production function
and the depreciation rate d are from production side. But in the present biased preference
39Similary, Gourinchas and Parker (2002)[57] estimate 3.44% for the rate .
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model, I should consider two more parameters, i.e. ; ! (or just one more parameter for
quasi-hyperbolic discounter; ), because the model assumes three parameters for the discount
factor. Following the recent experimental result for  ,from Laibson et al., in quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model, I set  = 0:7 initially and explore more results with  = f0:3; 0:5; 0:7;
0:9; 1g: For the double-exponential model, I set f = 0:7, ! = 0:5g initially and nd more
results with {x!g = f0:3; 0:5; 0:7; 0:9; 1gxf0:3; 0:5; 0:7g: Therefore, instead
of calibrating all of these six(or ve) parameters together, I set the  and ! as given and
explore how well the general equilibrium model ts to the data as the parameters change.
Among the remaining four scalar parameters f; ; ; dg, I rst nd that the model is
well calibrated with a function of the combined consumer parameters  (;  : ; !) and
the other two parameters of production side, i.e. the capital share  and depreciation
rate d, given the three target values. The optimal parameter function  (;  : ; !) that
minimizes the deviation from the target values has di¤erent values for each (; !) with two
production parameters. This leaves the model with four free parameters ; ; ! and  for
double-exponential model and three free parameters ;  and  for quasi-hyperbolic model.
Therefore, for a choice of  and (!; );  is set to match the target for each combination
of consumer parameters. The subsequent result section shows how the predictions of each
model of the di¤erent consumer parameters vary in equilibrium with a joint choice of ; !; 
and : Table [6] summaries the description of parameters and targets for double-exponential
model. Notice that there is no ! of the table for the quasi-hyperbolic model.
Another issue for consideration is to nd the discount factor(s) that best describes the
stylized fact of consumption data prole. For this purpose, I use both the quantitative and
qualitative comparison. For the quantitative t, I calculate the models deviation from the
consumption prole implied by the data using mean squared error (MSE).
For the qualitative t, I compute the consumption ratio; the ratio of the consumption
at the maximum to the consumption at the starting age. This is a common measure for
the size of the consumption hump, proposed by Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007)[16] and
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2006)[60]. Another measure for the qualitative t is the age of
the consumption peak. In the next subsection, I register the comparison of the consumption
ratio and the consumption peak age, indexed by di¤erent consumer parameters for general
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Table 6: Parameters and Targets with Double Exponential
Variable Description Target
 Risk Aversion Free
! Aggregation Parameter Free
;  Discount Factor Free
 Capital Share Free
d Depreciation Rate Free




Finally, for the computation of lifecycle prole, the model assumes the agents can live
up to maximum 100 years old with mortality risk. This corresponds to the model age from
t = 0 to T = 75. Also the model assumes the agent retires after completion of 41 years of
work to Tw = 40, i.e. he continues to work up to 65 years old and then retires. During the
working years, workers are paying payroll tax of s = 0:0765:40 When retired, the retirees
get social security benets of S each year as long as they survive: There is no other income
sources than the earnings from labor and social security, so the income prole sets et = S for
t > 40 and the agents live on both social security benets and savings from working years.
3.5.3 Results
In the following subsections, I report the main results into four model categories: General
Equilibrium with and without Mortality Risk, General Equilibrium with and without Social
Security. The simulation exercises reveal that the model with constrained myopic consumer
does produce a consumption hump, with similar size and location of consumption peak, in
partial equilibrium, and in a well-calibrated general equilibrium within reasonable parameter
40This choice is from current US payroll tax. If self-employed included, the overall tax rate is about 10%.
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ranges. In partial equilibrium, the featured consumption hump is easily obtained with most
sets of parameters. With a certain rage of parameters, the hump can be obtained even
without the borrowing constraint or mortality risk.
In calibrated general equilibrium, borrowing constraint and mortality risks help the model
conform to the hump-shaped data. The location of consumption peak falls within 30 to 54
years old for most of consumer parameters in general equilibrium. Details are below.
3.5.3.1 The Result for the Baseline Model Initially let us set the baseline parame-
ters of the double discounting model like the followings: The risk aversion  = 2 and the
discounting parameters  = 0:7; ! = 0:5. The value of  = 0:7 is chosen following recent
experimental literatures. Notice that the simulation sets only  and the other discounting
parameter  is not preset. Then given any choice of risk aversion parameter , the discount
factor  is set to match the macroeconomic targets. With these baseline model parameters,
I rst show how the consumption proles are varying following the risk aversion parameter
 in the baseline model without mortality risks or social security assumptions. The  values
I analyze are,  = f0:5; 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3g. I want to compare the di¤erent model parameters
based on the following criterion which are i) quantitative t, ii) location of the consumption
of peak age and iii) the value of peak to initial consumption ratio.
Figure 24 shows that when the value of  is greater than 1, the model tends to conform a
consumption peak, but at earlier age than the data. In term of quantitative t to the data,
MSE is used and by this criterion, it is shown that  = 0:5 induces the smallest MSE, which
is 0.005212. But with respect to the location of the consumption peak age, i.e. 45 years old
in the data,  = f2; 2:5; 3g gives closer t and the peak age is 42. Also, by the value of peak
to initial consumption ratio,41 lower  gives better t.
Second, given the risk aversion value at  = f2g I show how the consumption proles
are moving under di¤erent aggregators of the two discount factors. That is, I check the
model for ! = f0:3; 0:5; 0:7g. Figure 25 summarizes the result. Consumption peak age looks
closer to the data with lower aggregator, i.e., ! = f0:3g; but by other criterion, ! = f0:7g is
better.
41In GP, this value is 1.1476.
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Figure 24: Consumption and Gamma in General Equilibrium Model.
Finally I look for the best beta by setting  = 2 and ! = 0:5 for all di¤erent models.
Given each ; I let  adjust accordingly to match the three targets in the general equilibrium
setting. The  values I analyze are,  = f0:3; 0:5; 0:7g. Figure 26 summarizes the result.
From this simulation exercise I nd that in calibrated general equilibrium,  would not play a
signicant role to give a di¤erent conjecture to the consumption stream. This is a di¤erence
from partial equilibrium result, where I do not nd this sort of result. This is because, in the
general equilibrium the other discounting parameter is now adjusting accordingly to match
the macroeconomic targets, while in partial equilibrium, there is no possibility of this.
Table [7] shows the optimal  values for di¤erent  over the predetermined discount
parameters of f; !g in the baseline, which is f = 0:7; ! = 0:5g. Thus, for example, the 
value of 0:98661 in the rst cell is the optimal discount value when f = 0:5; = 0:5; ! = 0:5g
in the calibrated general equilibrium. Likewise, 0:94773 in the last cell is the optimal one
when f = 3; = 0:7; ! = 0:7g Notice that when f = 0:5; = 0:7; ! = 0:7g;  exceeds one,
which violates present biased preference assumption, implying the consumer cares for his
future more than now after the initial heavy discount.
The table demonstrates the following facts: First,  is inversely related with  for all
values of  and !: And given any ; the  is inversely related with , but positively related
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Figure 25: Consumption and Omega in General Equilibrium Model.
Figure 26: Consumption and Beta in General Equilibrium Model.
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Table 7: Optimal Beta Values over Discounting Factor Parameters
  = 0:5  = 0:7 ! = 0:3 ! = 0:5 ! = 0:7
0:5 0:98661 0:98549 0:97164 0:98549 1 :00045 42
1 0:97485 0:98217 0:95871 0:98217 0:99773
1:5 0:96648 0:96292 0:94637 0:96292 0:98621
2 0:95352 0:94936 0:93121 0:94936 0:97501
2:5 0:94123 0:93557 0:91634 0:93557 0:96283
3 0:92694 0:92175 0:90394 0:92175 0:94773
with !. Second, when  is relatively low, the  may have a chance of exceeding one so that
violating of present biased preference as  gets lower and ! gets higher. These facts help
understand how the value of  from lab experiments may be obtained: for example, Laibson,
Repetto, and Tobacman (2009)[71] estimate annual time preference parameters ( = 0:7;
 = 0:96) on lifecycle accumulation data. Thus  = 0.96 is from the following combination
of parameters in the model, f( = 0:5;  = 1:5; ! = 0:5); ( = 0:7;  = 1:5; ! = 0:5);
( = 0:7;  = 0:5; ! = 0:3); ( = 0:7;  = 1:5; ! = 0:5); ( = 0:7;  = 2:5; ! = 0:7)g:
3.5.3.2 Simulation Result for the Extended Model I set the same baseline parame-
ters and criterion as in the previous subsection and have the following result for my extended
model where it has both mortality risks and social security. First, like in baseline model,
I nd that when the value of  is greater than one, the model tends to conform to a con-
sumption peak, but at somewhat earlier age than the data, and than the baseline model, as
well. In terms of quantitative t to the data, the model with  = f2; 2:5; 3g induces smaller
MSEs, which are about 0.016. Like in baseline model, for models with these parameters,
the location of the consumption peak age is close to the GP. Also, by the value of peak to
initial consumption ratio,  = 1:5 gives best t, followed by the model with higher gammas,
i.e.  = f2; 2:5; 3g. In sum,  = f2; 2:5; 3g gives better t to the data when both mortality
risks and social security are introduced. Figure 27 demonstrates the result.
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Figure 27: Consumption and Gamma in Extended General Equilibrium Model.
Second, given the risk aversion value at  = f2g I show how the consumption proles
are moving under di¤erent aggregators of the two di¤erent discount factors. That is, I check
the model with ! = f0:1; 0:3; 0:5; 0:7g. Figure 28 summarizes the result. Consumption peak
age looks better when simulated with lower omega ! = f0:3g; but by other criterion, the
middle one ! = f0:5g is better. Third, like in the baseline model, I nd that consumption
does not change signicantly by the many di¤erent choices of . Figure 29 summarizes the
result.
Finally, I compare the four di¤erent model specications and show the result. By quan-
titative t, the model with both mortality risks and social security produces best result. By
the consumption of peak age, the model without either mortality risks or social security ts
best and the age is 42. Also by the value of peak to initial consumption ratio, the model
with both mortality risks and social security gives a closest t to the data. From this, it may
be inferred that inclusion of both mechanisms improve overall shape of the model. Figure
30 shows the comparison among the models. Remember that all of these results are from
model with double discounting function. If Q-hyperbolic discounting function is used, then
the result is in the Figure 31. From both gures, it may be demonstrated that overall the
models with generalized discounting t better than the ones with Q-hyperbolic discounting.
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Figure 28: Consumption and Omega in Extended General Equilibrium Model.
Figure 29: Consumption and Beta in Extended General Equilibrium Model.
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Figure 30: Comparison of the models regarding inclusion of mortality risks (M) and social
security(S): N implies No (Not included) and Y implies Yes (Included) of the specication.
Figure 31: Result with Q-Hyperbolic Discounting. Comparison of the models regarding
inclusion of mortality risks (M) and social security(S): N implies No (Not included), Y
implies Yes (Included) of the specication.
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3.5.3.3 Robustness Following the discussion in above subsections, I rst set the baseline
parameters to f = 0:5,  = 0:7; ! = 0:5;  = 0:289; d = 0:063g and then set them to
di¤erent  and !: Notice that  is going to adjust accordingly to these parameters for the
given discounting parameter set f; !g. However, ! is not considered here to be a parameter
for sensitivity check. For the three targets of macroeconomic variables, i.e. r = 3:5%;
K=Y = 2:94; C=Y = 0:748, I report a couple of sensitivity check around the best tting
calibrations.
Table [8] shows two sets of sensitivity check, one with baseline  = 0:5 and the other
one with  = 2: The results for the ! = 0:5 and ! = 0:3 are based on  = 0:5 and
 = 2: The second column Modelof the table shows di¤erent alternative calibration to
the baseline model, keeping other parameters intact. Thus, for example, the rst group of
the table represents the alternative calibration to the baseline model f = 0:289; d = 0:063;
 = 0:5,  = 0:7; ! = 0:5g; by changing only one parameter, except for !; and keeping others
constant.
3.6 CONCLUSION
In this essay, I consider consumers with present-biased preferences who are also credit con-
strained in asset markets and I explore the general equilibrium characteristics of an economy
that is populated by these myopic consumers. I show that reasonable parameterization of
my model generates a hump-shaped consumption prole among the other empirically plau-
sible features. I rst derive analytic solution for a simple model. Then using full model I
assess how well my model can account for the consumption hump, in a calibrated general
equilibrium.
I nd that in my model of myopic consumers, where their preferences are specied by
either a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function or a generalized double exponential function,
the general equilibrium result can be consistent with the known characteristics of the lifecycle
consumption data. In fact, the quantitative result from simulation exercises shows that the
model supports well the general equilibrium with discounting factors of f = 0:7;  = 0:96g,
coinciding with the eld data on the time preference. In the paper I document the set of
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parameters and their stylized facts for the general equilibrium model to match with the data.
Many observations on behaviors with myopia,dened by short-sightedness, a narrow
view and a lack of foresight in decision making, have interested many researchers who
study behavioral assumptions in economics modeling. Myopic decision maker, who has time-
inconsistent taste for immediate gratication or who optimizes period-by-period without
looking forward to the end, has become an important focus area, particularly for inter-
temporal dynamics. The merit of these non-traditional assumptions is not only to increase
the explanatory power of economics by providing its models with more realistic assumptions
about human behavior, but also to explain a variety of puzzling market outcomes. The
contribution of my work is to assess the reality, generality, and tractability of the assumption
of present-biased preferences in a realistic model economy, by predicting the well known
lifecycle features in a well-calibrated general equilibrium. My ndings in general equilibrium
result are encouraging for the view that analysis with behavioral assumptions may be an
alternative way to get insights into the lifecycle consumption dynamics.
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Table 8: Sensitivity to Alternative Calibration
Model r C=Y K=Y Age43 Cm=Co
=0:5; =0:7; =0:98549 3.50% 0.748 2.94 41 1.171
!=0.5  = 0:49 3.51% 0.749 2.93 42 1.182
 = 0:73 3.45% 0.746 2.95 40 1.179
 = 0:986 3.39% 0.743 2.98 40 1.174
=2; =0:7; =0:94936 3.50% 0.748 2.94 42 1.335
!=0.5  = 2:1 3.23% 0.735 3.02 41 1.325
 = 0:69 3.53% 0.749 2.93 42 1.337
 = 0:940 4.43% 0.788 2.68 44 1.354
=0:5; =0:7; =0:97164 3.50% 0.748 2.94 40 1.299
!=0.3  = 0:53 3.42% 0.744 2.96 40 1.301
 = 0:75 3.43% 0.745 2.96 40 1.305
 = 0:973 3.35% 0.745 2.98 39 1.294
=2; =0:7; =0:93121 3.50% 0.748 2.94 42 1.338
!=0.3  = 1:9 3.75% 0.759 2.87 43 1.349
 = 0:72 3.46% 0.746 2.95 42 1.338
 = 0:940 2.78% 0.713 3.19 41 1.315
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4.0 A GE MODEL OF DECISION MAKERS WITH BELIEF DEPENDENT
PREFERENCES
In this essay, I explore macroeconomic dynamics for a decision maker whose preference
depends not only on his actual consumption but also on comparisons to his beliefs about
optimal consumption. The standard decision maker is loss averse with respect to this belief-
dependent reference point. When loss aversion is low, the decision maker can deviate from
standard lifecycle consumption behavior. This deviation can help explain some puzzling
features of inter-temporal consumption data in general equilibrium. When the decision
maker has age-related time-varying degrees of loss aversion and rebalances his consistent
consumption through adjusted beliefs, the model generates hump-shaped consumption prole
that closely tracks the data in a well-calibrated general equilibrium.
Keywords: reference dependent preference, loss aversion, gain-loss utility, belief updating,
lifecycle consumption
4.1 INTRODUCTION
People tend to react di¤erently to the same situations (events) when they have di¤erent
expectations. It may often be observed that individual utility from an outcome that has met
ones expectation is quite di¤erent from an outcome that has not.1 As argued in K½oszegi
and Rabin (2006[64], 2007[65]), individuals may not evaluate utilities in absolute level of
outcomes but in gains or losses of the outcomes relative to their reference expectations. Ref-
1People see unknown risks di¤erently from the risks that are common (Matthey, 2005[79]), because the
common risk is anticipated while the unknown risk may turn out to be a surprise.
100
erence dependence of utility is widely conrmed in lab experiments2: it helps understand
why standard economic theory cannot explain such ndings as the failure of the indepen-
dence axiom in expected utility.3 It also explains a variety of eld data (Labor supply: Farber
(2008)[38], Fehr and Goette (2007)[40]; Housing market : Genesove and Mayer (2001)[54]; Fi-
nance: Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001)[14], Karlsson, Loewenstein and Seppi (2005)[63];
Insurance: Sydnor (2006)[100]). Inspired by this, I demonstrate that an individuals loss
aversion with respect to the reference expectation about optimal consumption can solve the
well-known consumption puzzle,4 by providing richer macroeconomic dynamics. The innova-
tive contribution of my work is to build the model around reference dependent utility, based
on prospect theory, instead of reference dependent consumption, the latter being well-
established in macroeconomics but has not yet explained the consumption puzzle.5 More-
over, the inclusion of the reference status is made through a forward-looking mechanism.
Loss aversion plays a key role to induce consumption dynamics that solve the puzzle.
The choice of expectation for the reference point follows from the recent development
in reference-dependent preferences models. A key issue in these models is what would be
the reference point, because as Pesendorfer (2006)[87] expressed, the reference point can be
anything and may be selected arbitrarily by researchers.6 Providing one way to solve this
problem, K½oszegi and Rabin (2006[64], 2007[65]) propose a model of reference-dependent
preferences where the reference point is the individuals rational expectation formed in the
recent past about outcomes. K½oszegi and Rabin provide a solution concept, by which the
reference point is determined endogenously as a function of the decision makers beliefs on
the available strategies combined with his planned action for each strategy. In another work,
2The original work is Prospect Theory (1979)[62] by Kahneman and Tversky. The key feature of the theory
is (1) reference dependence, (2) gain-loss utility with more weights on loss (loss aversion) (3) diminishing
sensitivity.
3Rabin (2000)[88] demonstrates that reference dependence is an important factor in explaining peoples
attitude toward risk.
4The consumption data is known to be a hump-shaped, which is not obtained from standard economic
theory because the theory predicts monotonic consumption.
5There have been long-standing literatures of external habit and recently, of internal habit formation.
These models are based on adaptiveevolution of reference points and thus are backward looking. Examples
of this type of reference dependence include: Caroll, Overland, and Weil (2000)[26]; Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005)[30]; Chetty and Szeidl (2009)[28].
6Many times the reference point is assumed to be the current status, such as current consumption,
position, or endowment.
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K½oszegi and Rabin (2009)[66] propose a dynamic reference-dependent model by which they
specically construct that the decision maker should meet the rational consistency condition:
given any expectation generated by a dynamic strategy, the strategy maximizes the decision
makers utility each period, under the condition that the continuation strategies must be
consistent with rationality.
Based on this solution concept, I develop an intertemporal choice model with reference-
dependent preference and examine its macroeconomic implication. Given any information
about the income stream, the decision maker forms beliefs on what should be the optimal
consumption over time if he follows the standard practice7 of utility maximization.8 The
optimal consumption here may be compared to the solution concept provided by a nancial
planner when he gives advice regarding consumption and saving plan to a client who is in a
specic wealth position with respect to lifetime income and assets/liabilities. The solution
serves as a guideline to which the client should refer in deciding his consumption over his
lifetime. This is the reference status that I postulate for my model. With this ex ante
optimal plan on hand, the reference-dependent decision maker decides whether he should
follow this rule or not.
A reference-dependent decision maker derives utility from comparison to the reference
status: it may be a gain to the reference point or a loss to it. A loss is assumed be more
important to decision maker than a gain of the same size.9 In two-period intertemporal
choice of consumption and saving, decision maker feels a contemporaneous gainutility if he
consumes more now than the suggested ex ante optimal solution. As a result, his consumption
is lowered next period and this yields a prospective lossutility relative to the reference
point. If the contemporaneous gain utility is greater than the prospective loss utility, then
he chooses not to follow the ex ante optimal rule but to deviate for more consumption now.
Likewise, if the prospective loss utility is greater than the contemporaneous gain utility, then
he sticks to the standard consumption rule. The decision makers greater concern for the
loss (high loss aversion) deters him from over-consuming.
This analysis can be applied the other way around: the decision maker may have a
7A rational, utility maximizing agent posited in the standard economic theory.
8A rational, utility maximizing agent posited in the standard economic theory.
9The property of loss aversionis a standard assumption in models with reference dependent preferences.
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contemporaneous lossutility if he consumes less and saves more than the ex ante solution.
As a result, his consumption is elevated next period and this gives him a prospective gain
utility. If his contemporaneous loss feeling is greater than the prospective gain one, then he
does not reduce his consumption but follow the suggested consumption plan. If, however,
his prospective gain utility is more than the contemporaneous loss utility, then he is willing
to reduce his consumption and save more now. In this case, the high loss aversion of decision
maker deters him from under-consuming. By both stories, it is clear that when the decision
makers loss aversion is high, the agent does not deviate from the ex ante optimal solution.
But if the decision maker cares more about the gain due to low loss aversion, then he deviates
from standard rules for his personal well-being. The deviation is possible in either direction
of more or less than the ex ante optimal consumption.
In the model, I assume that consumers utility has two preference components following
K½oszegi and Rabin.10 One is the usual consumption utility (absolute level) and the other
one is the reference dependent utility (contrast level) and these two payo¤s interact each
other through consumer optimization. The total utility is maximized by choosing the best
combination of current and future consumption points according to his intended consumption
plan.11 If a decision maker has high loss aversion, then the intended consumption is not
realized and he stays with the standard consumption. If a decision maker has low loss
aversion and wants to deviate, then an alternative consumption can be chosen to fulll
his intention and the consumption must satisfy the consistency condition: the alternative
consumption must be optimal in that it maximizes his ex post utility based on his intention.12
There are two main issues when constructing a macroeconomic model of intertemporal
decision makers with the reference-dependent preferences. One is how to construct the
multi-period reference points from overlapping layers of belief formation. The other is what
is a proper macroeconomic model that conveys the idea described above. This is because
the framework on which the model relies is a descriptive one and it admits many di¤erent
formats for a model. To tackle the rst issue, I rst restrict the dimension of commodity
10Classical prospect theory posits only comparison utility (gain-loss). Krähmer and Stone (2010)[67] also
proposes a model with two components; the comparison and the intrinsic characteristics of utility.
11In two-period model, it is described by fc0 > c0; c1 < c1g for an over-consumer and fc0 < c0; c1 > c1g
for a natural born saver, where fc0; c1g is the reference point.
12It should be the solution to a maximization problem of his intended consumption plan.
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space to be one13 so that the agent of an economy has only consumption space from which
both consumption utility and gain-loss utility are derived.14 For the second issue, I focus
mainly on the consistent consumption plans of two typical types of decision makers, assuming
that the agent is either an over-consumer or a natural born saver, but not both, if his loss
aversion is low. This implies that my model does not consider the case where decision maker
reverses his natural type of spending, such as from an over-consumer to a saver, although he
may change the degree of loss aversion over time within the same type of spending.
Then I construct intertemporal models of decision making, rst in two periods and later
up to T periods, searching the consistent consumption strategy for any intended plan. Unlike
in two-period model, in three or more-period models a decision maker can have several
alternative intended plans. For example, a deviator may want to consume more than the ex
ante optimal amount for the rst two consecutive periods and as a result he has to accept
a very low consumption amount for the last period. Alternatively, he may want to consume
more only in the rst period. The two intended plans yield two di¤erent outcomes and I
assume that the agent should select the most desirable plan between them.15 Therefore, I
propose the best consumption plan that a deviator employs because it gives him the highest
utility among all the available consistent consumption plans. In fact, it turns out that a plan
that keeps over- or under-consumption up to the middle point of the planning horizon gives
the highest utility for a deviator.16 This property implies that it may be necessary to follow
the consumption smoothing rule even among the deviators.
Based on the these preliminary works, I analyze the model of dynamic decision makers
for cases where the decision maker may or may not change his mind over time. When the
agents preference (loss aversion, in particular) stays constant, then because his expectation
is met, there are no gain-loss utilities in the subsequent periods. However, if the agents
preference does change, then depending on how the new reference points are formed, there
are di¤erent types of gain-loss utilities following his intended plan in subsequent periods.
13Many microeconomic applications assume two-dimensional commodity space where the agent trades
between the two goods.
14This restriction does not limit the application of the model to real economy, as consumption at two
di¤erent times is considered as two di¤erent goods.
15This corresponds to the preferred personal equilibriumin K½oszegi and Rabins models.
16Section 2 explains this in detail with utility comparison.
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I provide optimality condition, as well as closed form solutions for each of the alternative
paths that the decision maker may choose.
Next is the main topic: I propose a self-corrective Sub-period Perfect Reference Point
(SPRP) in the dynamic model and explore the consumption dynamics when the decision
maker changes his mind over time due to time-varying degrees of loss aversion. The deci-
sion maker rebalances his consumption based on the adjusted belief regarding the ex ante
optimal consumption through the SPRP for his remaining lifetime. Because the SPRP is
constructed based on current asset and liability position, whenever decision maker changes
his mind, he solves a new maximization problem relative to this updated reference point.
The resulting consumption prole reects his current nancial situation. Since the decision
maker rebalances the consistent consumption as he keeps adjusting his belief, the actual
consumption prole turns out to be the envelope of each planned path. I demonstrate that
age-related loss aversion that varies over time can produce a consumption hump similar to
the data under plausible parameter values.
Modeling belief dependent preference in general equilibrium is as follows. First, I develop
a basic lifecycle model of representative agent who may deviate from the standard consump-
tion rules. Then I study the consumption dynamics of those who have time-varying degrees
of loss aversion. A hump-shaped lifecycle consumption prole for a representative saver and
for an over-consumer are provided. If heterogeneity is introduced, a hybrid model improves
the overall t to the consumption data. Finally, I perform macroeconomic computation to
get optimal parameter values of general equilibrium in an overlapping generations economy.
The objective of this computation is to see whether the consumption proles generated by
the model can be consistent with many salient features of the consumption characteristics
in a well-calibrated general equilibrium.
4.1.1 Other Related Literatures
Because there are few works in macroeconomics that are directly related to this paper,
I refer instead to microeconomics literatures for conceptual liaison to reference-dependent
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preference.17 Matthey (2005)[79] provides a model of reference dependence where the risk
itself is included in the reference states. When the risk is included, it changes the evaluation
of contrast utility and this is named risk inclusion e¤ect, compared to endowment e¤ect
or attachment e¤ect in the usual model. Recent work by Krähmer and Stone (2010)[67]
discusses uncertainty aversion based on fear of regret. Unlike K½oszegi and Rabin (2006)[64],
their model posits that the reference point depends on the agents ex post beliefs about what
he should have done ex ante if he has the wisdom of hindsight and thus in their model the
loss aversion arises endogenously. Selecting a compound lottery reveals information, and
this alters the ex post assessment of what the best choice would have been. In fact, they
seek for psychological foundation of the uncertainty aversion and in line of this, a similar
work by Halevy and Felkamp (2005)[59] may be considered. About narrow framing (evaluate
decisions separately), another element of reference-dependence preferences, there is a work
by Baberis, Ming, Huang and Thaler (2006)[15], as well as Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009)[89].
If I turn to the models of non-traditional preferences for macroeconomic dynamics,
there are Hyperbolic discountingmodel by Laibson (1997)[69] and ODonoghue and Rabin
(1999)[84]. Hyperbolic discounting model, or Present-biased preference, formalizes the evi-
dence that people tend to value the immediate utilities di¤erently from distant future ones
and thus the preference induces time inconsistent optimization. The empirical implication of
these works is that the existence of the commitment device like illiquid asset (Laibson) or cost
(ODonoghue and Rabin) play a role that can produce a consumption prole which tracks
the income ows. The short term planning approach by Caliendo and Aadland (2007a)[20]
belongs to this time inconsistent preferences too.
Regarding the featured consumption hump which has been a central issue in lifecy-
cle data, several literatures should be mentioned. Borrowing constraint (Deaton, 1991[32];
Feigenbaum, 2009[48]), mortality risk (Feigenbaum, 2008a[45]; Hansen and Imrohoroglu,
2006[60]), consumption and leisure substitutability (Heckman, 1974[61]; Bullard and Feigen-
baum, 2007[16]), income uncertainty and precautionary savings (Carroll, 2009[25]; Feigen-
baum, 2008b[46]) are the main causes that can produce a consumption hump with standard
17Many experimental studies with prospect theory or reference-dependent models are not considered in
this review.
106
preference. Other mechanisms to show a hump are household size e¤ect (Attanasio et al.,
1999[12]) and consumer durables (Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2010[49]). They show
how the interaction between durable and nondurable consumption may work to explain the
hump in a model where durable goods serve as collateral for loans. Bullard and Feigen-
baums (2007)[16] calibration work with choice between consumption and leisure as well as
Heckmans (1974)[61] model produce the similar result.
4.1.2 Modeling Reference-Dependent Preference
I rst introduce a couple of short denitions about the reference dependent preference pre-
sented by K½oszegi and Rabin (KR hereafter) and induce a functional form to build my model.
The reference dependent utility is dened by,
U(cjr) = m(c) + (cjr)
where m(c) is classical consumption utility which is increasing, concave or quasi-concave,
and di¤erentiable. (cjr) is additively separable gain-loss utility related to deviation from
reference point r. It is specied by
(cjr) =Pk k(ck   rkjr)18
where k is the dimension of the state space. If it is stochastic, it is called the Reference-
Dependent Von Neumann-Morgenstern Preference, implying for each r; decision maker max-
imizes the modied expected utility19
P
c P (c)u(cjr):
For all k; the gain-loss utility k(xjr) satises the following:
 A0 Continuous, di¤erentiable except at x = 0: k(0) = 0
 A1 Strictly increasing
 A2 If y > z > 0, then k(y) + k( y) < k(z) + k( z)
 A3 00k(x) < 0 for x > 0 and 00k(x) > 0 for x < 0
 A4 limx!0+ 0( x)0(x)  k > 1
18Below the gain-loss utility is specied by
P
k (mk(ck) mk(rk)) using consumption utility m(c).
19This is one of the points that KR model is di¤erent from Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). In prospect theory, a subjective weight fucntion is used to evaluate a lottery.
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Figure 32: Value Function
A2 implies that losses get more weight than the same size of gains. By A3, it is assumed
that the utility function is concave in positive valuation and convex in negative valuation,20
implying diminishing sensitivity. Furthermore, it is assumed k to be proportional to mar-
ginal consumption utility @m
@ck
jc=r: All of these properties of the gain-loss utility can be sum-
marized by a hypothetical value function, the shape of which is like the following Figure 32.
One may nd that the two points in opposite direction of same distance from the origin give
two di¤erent values, higher absolute value for loss than for gain, due to the steeper value
function for loss.
Assume that there is only one dimensional state space so that k = 1: Then the refer-
ence dependent utility of the decision maker who has a functional form of CRRA for the
consumption utility is,
u(c; z) = c
1 
1  + (z)
where (z) is a gain-loss utility related to deviation from a reference point and  is
the relative weight of gain-loss utility to consumption utility.21 The gain-loss utility (z) is
dened by
20This explains why the often used functional form of (ct c
)1 
1  is not proper for gain-loss utility. The
main di¤erence between reference dependence of consumption and reference dependence of utility arises here.
21If  is very small, then the gain-loss e¤ect is negligible. Many researchers simply set  = 1:
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(z) =
8<: z if z > 0z if z < 0
9=; 22
in which
z : Deviation in outcome from a reference point, i.e. z = u(c)  u(r)
 > 1 : Coe¢ cient of loss aversion
Then the total utility in a static model is specied by the following, assuming the decision
































In a dynamic model of intertemporal decision making, it is necessary to modify the gain-
loss utility to incorporate decision makers psychological weight on the gain-loss utilities over
time.23 And it is natural to posit that the weighting is likely to decay as its e¤ect fades. To
simplify the model for multi-period analysis, I assume that the initial strength of the concern
for loss relative to gain is ! > 0 and that the decay follows standard time discounting.24
4.2 A SIMPLE MODEL
4.2.1 Two-Periods
To explore the implication of the decision making with reference dependent preference (RDP
hereafter), let us rst construct a simple model of consumption-saving in a standard way
and compare it with the RDP model. Consider a decision maker who lives two periods (t =
0; 1) and discounts the future utility by : He has a nonnegative income stream fy0; y1g and
his utility is specied by a CRRA functional form; u(c) = c
1 
1  ; where 
25 denotes the degree
22Following KR, I posit a linear gain-loss function to get closed form solutions. Other candidates for the
gain-loss functions may be power function and exponential function.
23KR propose, for  = t; :::; T; ut = m(ct)+
PT
=t 't;n(Ft; j Ft 1; ) where Ft 1; represents xed beliefs,
inherited from last period and Ft; represents new beliefs that decision maker forms. '; > ' 1; > ::: >
'0; > 0 are weights on gain-loss utilities.
24This is because the psychological discounting may or may not follow the usual time discounting. When
! = 0; there is no gain-loss utility and this returns to the standard model.
25CRRA utility is dened by u(c) = ln(c) when  = 1:
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of risk aversion.26 Assume that there is no borrowing constraint and the agent can borrow
or lend freely at the market interest rate 1 + r = R: In the standard model of two-period








c0 + b1 = y0
c1 = y1 +Rb1
where b1 is bond holding at t = 0 for the next period. Solving the maximization problem














where  1 = (R)1=R 1:27 In the standard model, it is clear that this ex ante solution is
optimal ex post, as well.28 Let us call this solution fc0; c1g the optimal consumption plan,
solved from the maximization problem of the standard decision maker given any income
stream.
Now turn to the model of reference dependent preference.29 To build a simple RDP
version of the consumption-saving model, dene ! the initial psychological weight on loss
relative to gain utility. Then at the beginning of the rst period t = 0; the decision maker
forms belief regarding the optimal consumption, as described in the introduction. Because
the optimal consumption plan above gives the decision maker ex ante maximum utility, this
outcome serves as the reference point to the agent. The main question here about RDP
26Or the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
27 = (R) 1=R: This notation is introduced by Feigenbaum (2005)[43]. A value of  contains a combined
e¤ect from three parameters: , R, and :
28This is easy to show: if otherwise, then there exists always at least one consumption point that can
increase the decision makers utility.
29I assume that both RDP agent and standard agent are rational decision maker.
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decision maker is, Would the decision maker choose the consumption which maximizes his
ex ante utility among all the strategies available to him?That is to say: would the ex ante
solution be optimal ex post for the decision maker with belief-dependent preference? To
answer this question, consider the following stories.
First, if the decision maker intends to consume more than the optimal plan at the rst
period t = 0, and as a result he ends up with consuming less than the optimal at t = 1; i.e.
fc0 > c0; c1 < c1g; then the situation of this decision maker at the beginning of the rst
period is described by the following maximization




















c0 + b1 = y0
c1 = y1 +Rb1
The total utility comes from consumption utility for each period, which is represented by
u(c0) and u(c1); and the gain-loss utility for each period. If the decision maker consumes
more than the reference point at the rst period, he has a contemporaneous gain utility for
that period, which is [u(c0)   u(c0)] when  = 1.30 As a result, his consumption is lowered
next period and this yields a prospective loss utility relative to the reference point. This is
described by ![u(c1) u(c1)]:31 Notice that there is no gain-loss utility in the second period
(t = 1): Because the decision maker is clearly aware of the consumption of the rst period,
he forms new expectation, based on his past behavior, that determines his next reference
point.32
Is consuming more than the ex ante optimal amount at the rst period is worthwhile to
this decision maker? To answer this, construct the following derivative to see if the deviation
is protable. Using the life-time resource constraint c1 = y1 +R(y0   c0)
30 : the weight of gain-loss utility relative to consumption utility
31 > 1 : coe¢ cient of loss aversion. ! > 0 : initial strength of the concern for loss relative to gain.  :
usual time discounting. Thus ! represents the prospectiveloss relative to contemporaneous gain.




= (1 + )c 0   R(1 + !)[y0 +R(y0   c0)] 














8<: 6 0 if ! > 1> 0 if ! < 1
9=; :
The condition implies that there is no incentive to deviate from the optimal consumption
level c0 if ! > 1; because the deviation does not increase the utility ex post. The ex post
optimal consumption of this RDP decision maker is the same as the one of standard decision
maker. In other words, the standard agents are those who care more about the prospective
loss utility than the contemporaneous gain utility. This is what KR noticed: prospective
loss from lowering future consumption tends to act as internal commitment device. This
implies that RDP agent would not over-consume even though he does not have any external
commitment device like illiquid asset.33
However, if ! < 1 then it may be better for the decision maker to choose another
strategy than the ex ante optimal.34 This comes from the fact that deviation from ex ante
solution does increase the utility ex post. Thus, to the decision maker whose concern about
loss is not very high, new optimality condition should apply and the condition is
(1 + )c 0 = R(1 + !)c
 
1























It is easy to see c0 > c0 and c1 < c

1 because
33The golden eggs in Laibson (1997)[69] is an external commitment device for over-consumers.
34Remember that ! > 0, thus 0 < ! < 1:































When decision maker cares more about contemporaneous gain utility than about prospec-
tive loss utility, his present consumption can be higher than the usual consumption of the
standard model solved earlier. This implies that RDP model yields the similar result as in
the model with present biased preference or hyperbolic discounting that is based on time
inconsistent preferences.36
However, the reference dependent preference model can be illuminated in another way.37
If the decision maker intends to consume less than the optimal plan in the rst period38 and
as a result he ends up with consuming more than the optimal amount in the next period,
i.e. fc0 < c0; c1 > c1g; then the situation for the decision maker is described by






















c0 + b1 = y0
c1 = y1 +Rb1
Because the decision maker consumes less than the optimal in the rst period, he has
contemporaneous loss feeling (utility) relative to the reference consumption behavior. This
loss utility is ![u(c0)   u(c0)]. As a result, his consumption is elevated next period and
this gives him prospective gain feeling, which is [u(c1) u(c1)]. Like in the over-consumers
maximization procedure, because the expectation is met, there is no gain-loss utility in the
second period. The solution to this problem is summarized by
36In fact, this result comes from the Hyperbolic discounting-like component in gain-loss utility.
37Few researchers, if any, have noticed this property.









































if ! < 1
Notice that unlike the previous example of over-consumer, the optimization of miser,
i.e. who has ! < 1 for contemporaneous loss, yields c0 < c0 and c1 > c

1: When the
decision maker cares more about prospective gain utility than about contemporaneous loss
utility, he would deviate, from standard prediction, for less consumption (more saving) in the
current period. This explanation justies the behavior of natural born saver. The savers save
because their expected gain feelings in the future outweigh the current loss feeling. Likewise,
the standard agents are those who care more about the contemporaneous loss utility than the
prospective gain utility.39 These two exercises show that the two-period RDP model induces
both ways of deviation: consuming either more or less than the level which is considered
optimal based on his belief formed at the beginning of the planning period.
4.2.2 Beyond Two-Periods
Constructing an intertemporal model of belief dependent preference for three and more
periods requires deeper understanding of how the decision maker forms expectation regarding
the reference status because there are potentially many reference points to consider.40 It is
also necessary to gure out what type of strategy gives the decision maker a highest utility
among all the alternative consumption plans because there are more alternative plans with
longer periods. In this section, I focus on the second issue and study the model with three
periods in detail and get implication of the model with longer periods.
39Combining with the previous example of over-consumer, the standard agents are said to be those who
care more about loss for any period.
40This is analyzed in detail in the next section of Dynamic Model.
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4.2.2.1 Three-Periods Following the two-period model, I rst explore if the belief de-
pendent decision maker (DM: hereafter) selects the consumption bundle that can maximize
his ex ante utility among all the choices available to him. I assume the same environment
as in the two-period model and the riskless bond can be sold or bought at riskless interest
rate R. First of all, notice that given any income stream of three periods fy0; y1; y2g; the ex
ante utility maximizer for the three-period consumption fc0; c1; c2g is








































Then choosing fc0; c1; c2gmaximizes both consumption utility and ex ante expected gain-
loss utility (which is zero), so this is the ex ante optimal strategy. Is this strategy consistent
with the agent who has belief dependent preference? To see this, let us construct the following
consumption plan. At the beginning of the rst period, DM plans a consumption prole for
the three periods fc0; c1; c2g that satises his intention of over-consumption for the rst two
periods: fc0 > c0; c1 > c1; c2 < c2g: Then the strategic situation of the DM at the beginning
of t = 0 is































c0 + b1 = y0
c1 + b2 = y1 +Rb1
c2 = y2 +Rb2
The total utility comes from consumption utility for each period, which is represented by
u(c0); u(c1) and 
2u(c2); and the gain-loss utility related with the consumption choice each
period. Because the DM consumes more than his reference point at the rst two periods,
he has the contemporaneous gain utility for the rst period, which is [u(c0)  u(c0)] and the
prospective gain utility [u(c1) u(c1)] for the second period, when  = 1. Likewise, the DM
feels a prospective loss for the third period because of his expected consumption which is
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lower than the reference point. This is described by 2![u(c2) u(c2)] if  = 1: Notice that
there will be no gain-loss utility in the second and the third period for this DM who plans
the consumption strategy at the beginning of the rst period.41 This is because DM forms
adapted belief on reference points for the subsequent periods following the plan. DM knows
the expectation is met those periods, if he follows the intended consumption plan. Let us
see again if the ex ante optimal consumption is consistent with this plan by evaluating the






























To examine the consistency condition, consider the following derivatives to see if the
deviation is protable. Because c2 = [y2 + Ry1 + R2(y0   c0)   Rc1]; the derivatives with
respect to the other two variables (c0; c1) are
du
dc0




= [(1 + )c 1   R(1 + !)[y2 +Ry1 +R2(y0   c0) Rc1] 
If these are evaluated at the ex ante optimal consumption fc0; c1; c2g; then
du
dc0





1 +  1 +  2
 
= (1  !)c 0









1 +  1 +  2
 
= (1  !)R 1c 0
8<: 6 0 if ! > 1> 0 if ! < 1
9=;
41Following many researchers who work on multi-selves model, this agent may be called self (0).
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2; the resource constraint satises c

2 = [y2 + Ry1 + R
2(y0   c0)   Rc1]: If
! > 1; there is no incentive to deviate from the ex ante optimal consumption levels, c0 and
c1; because the deviation does not increase the utility ex post. This implies that consuming
more than the optimal for the rst two periods would not pay o¤ for the agents who concerns
a lot about the loss feeling of the nal period due to the over-consumption of earlier periods.
However this does not apply to the agent who has lower weight on loss and cares more
about the gains. If ! < 1 then it is always better for the agent to choose another strategy
than the ex ante solution because deviation increases his total utility ex post. Those people
who cares more about the gain feeling because of their low weights on the prospective pain
from loss, would deviate from the ex ante solution for an alternative path following new
optimality condition.
Proposition 7. When the DM has a high weight (! > 1) on prospective loss; he would not
deviate from the optimal consumption plan. If, however, his weight on loss is low, then the












0B@ y0 + y1R 1 + y2R 2













1=0B@ y0 + y1R 1 + y2R 2






Again it is easy to see c0 > c0 and c1 > c






< 1 when ! < 1:
When DM cares more about gain utilities within near future than about remote loss utilities,
his earlier consumption can be higher than the usual one suggested by the standard model.
It is also a possible scenario that the DM with a low weight may intend to overconsume
only the rst period, but not the second period: DM intends to consume fc0 > c0; c1 < c1;
c2 < c

2g: Then the consistent consumption plan for this DM is
































Likewise, if DM with ! < 1 intends a consumption strategy, in which he clings to one
of the optimal consumption such as c1 = c1; then the consistent consumption for the plan
fc0 > c0; c1 = c1; c2 < c2g is


























Because the second period consumption is xed at the ex ante optimal c1; it is necessary
for the consumption levels of the other two (the rst and the third period) to be adjusted to
fulll DMs intention. It is interesting to notice that when the DM sticks to the intended plan
for the subsequent periods, the ex post life time total utility42 from the three scenarios has
the following ranking: fc0 > c0; c1 < c1; c2 < c2g  fc0 > c0; c1 > c1; c2 < c2g  fc0 > c0;
c1 = c

1; c2 < c

2g: In the next section, I describe this in detail, together with other intended
plans with longer periods.
4.2.2.2 Utility Comparison In this section I want to compare the overall utility from
alternative consumption plans and determine the ranking of the total ex post utility among
the plans.43 The key assumption for the comparison here is that DM follows the intended
plan for the subsequent periods without changing his mind over time.44 In a three period





























































DM has ex ante optimal consumption plan on hand as his reference point and his utility
comes from both consumption utility and gain-loss utility relative to the reference point.
42Total utility means consumption utility and gain-loss utility altogether over three periods.
43This analysis is necessary to get insight about the best strategy for the longer period model that I
consider.
44The changing mind is studied in the next section.
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From the above, it is easy to nd that there are ve possible consumption plans if he is not an
initial saver.45 In the Appendix B, there are solutions regarding the consistent consumption
strategies for these ve alternatives. From those solutions I have the following utility ranking
in Table [9]. Although the table shows the result from a specic income stream fy0 = 1;
y1 = 1; y2 = 1g and a set of parameter values fR = 1:05;  = 0:98;  = 0:9; ! = 0:8g,
this ranking is robust with almost all other parameter values given any alternative income
prole.46
Table 9: Three-period Plan and Utility Rank
Plan u(c) u(G=L) Total U Rank
c: c0 = c0 , c1 = c

1; c2 = c

2 29:4461 0 29:4461 4
A: c0 > c0; c1 > c

1; c2 < c

2 29:4421 0:0115 29:4536 2
B: c0 > c0; c1 < c

1; c2 < c

2 29:4419 0:0119 29:4538 1
C: c0 = c0 , c1 > c

1; c2 < c

2 29:3483  0:0766 29:2717 5
D: c0 > c0; c1 = c

1; c2 < c

2 29:4430 0:0088 29:4518 3
E: c0 > c0; c1 < c

1; c2 = c

2 29:3418  0:0823 29:2595 6
It is interesting that the best plan in terms of total utility does not provide a highest
consumption utility. In fact, the highest consumption utility, except for the ex ante optimal
solution, comes from the plan D which gives DM the smoothest consumption bundle among
all the deviation strategies. This implies that DM gets the highest consumption utility if he
follows the optimal plan but because of his gain-loss feeling, this is suboptimal to his preferred
choice. Notice also that plan C and plan E have negative gain-loss utilities, implying these
choices are not fullling his taste at all, as well as giving DM the lowest consumption utility.
Once DM intends to deviate, clinging to any part of the original plan would not help for the
new plan and this may explain the result of the table.
45In other words, the assumption here is that DM is an initial over-consumer.
46The plan of alternating consumption, fc0 > c0; c1 < c1; c2 > c2g, is excluded in this comparison
because the plan not only gives the lowest total utility but also it does not clearly characterize the type of
an over-consumer.
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Among the above ve, it may be proper to compare analytically those plans that do not
have any xed consumption (c) because it is clear from the table that those proles are
suboptimal to the strategies of free choice. Thus let us compare between the two plans, {A:
c0 > c

0; c1 > c

1; c2 < c

2g and {B: c0 > c0; c1 < c1; c2 < c2 }. From the work in earlier
chapters, it is obvious that if ! < 1; then deviation is justied. The deviation could happen
in a way of more consumption only at the rst period (B) or more consumption both of the
two periods (A). When DM deviates for more consumption in earlier periods, he should
accept the penalty of low consumption in later periods. Thus DM may consider whether
he consumes more for both periods and takes the burden of deep loss at the last period or
smooth the burden, by over-consuming only in the rst period. Then the question is: which
one is better for a deviator? Although the table shows direct answer to this question, it may
also be intuitive. Assume R = 1: Then because (R)1= = 1; it follows that c0 = c1 in
the plan A. Thus if ! < 1; then c0 = c1 > c2: If ! > 1; then no deviation occurs and
c0 = c1 = c2: In plan B, because c1 = c2; it follows that c0 > c1 = c2 if ! < 1: From






2 for the deviator
and thus plan B is more likely to give higher utility. The utility di¤erence between the two
plan is (1 + )[u(cB0 )  u(cA0 )] + [(1 + !)u(cB1 )  (1 + )u(cA1 )  (1  !)u(c1)] + 2(1 +
!)[u(cB2 )  u(cA2 )].
How about four-period model? In the Appendix, the alternative consistent consumptions
are derived for DM with ! < 1: The resulting utility order is:47 fc0 > c0; c1 > c1; c2 < c2;
c3 < c

3g  fc0 > c0; c1 < c1; c2 < c2; c3 < c3g  fc0 > c0; c1 > c1; c2 > c2; c3 < c3g 
fc0; c1; c2; c3g: This ranking is preserved for a general class of parameter values. With ve-
period model, I have the result in Table [10] for f = 0:95; R = 1:035;  = 0:9;  = 1;
! = 0:4g.
If I describe each plan using the notation of {1} for ct > ct and {0} for ct < c

t , the order
is described in this fashion: f1; 1; 0; 0; 0g  f1; 1; 1; 0; 0g  f1; 0; 0; 0; 0g  f1; 1; 1; 1; 0g 
f(Standard)g: This order is preserved for most values of parameters.48 As shown in the
tables, I nd that for general class of parameters, the overall utility culminates ex post when
47The plan with xed consumptions are excluded by the same argument.
48I have not found any violation for most of parameter values.
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Table 10: Five-period Plan and Utility Rank
Plan u(c) u(G=L) Total U R
c0 > c

0; c1 > c

1; c2 > c

2; c3 > c

3; c4 < c

4 46:6852 0:1258 46:8110 4
c0 > c

0; c1 > c

1; c2 > c

2; c3 < c

3; c4 < c

4 46:6562 0:2024 46:8586 2
c0 > c

0; c1 > c

1; c2 < c

2; c3 < c

3; c4 < c

4 46:6491 0:2178 46:8669 1
c0 > c

0; c1 < c

1; c2 < c

2; c3 < c

3; c4 < c

4 46:6707 0:1570 46:8277 3
DM keeps the over-consumption behavior up to the half of the whole periods. So if DM has a
consumption plan for S periods, shifting from high consumption (c > c) to low consumption
(c < c) at the middle point of the planning horizon, which is S=2; gives him the highest ex
post utility.49 Although I register the utility comparison only for the over-consumer here,
this rule also applies to the case of a saver, who gets the highest utility when he keeps the
under-consumption behavior up to the middle point of the planning horizon.
4.2.2.3 Consumption Hump in Simple Model Besides the utility ranking, there is
one more interesting topic that many researchers are looking for. It is known that the stan-
dard lifecycle theory cannot explain why the pattern of household consumption over life-time
is humpshaped: mean consumption is increasing while the consumer is young, reaching a
peak around middle age and then decreasing afterwards. The consumption hump is a well-
known feature of lifecycle consumption data. But this property is not obtained in standard
model with far-sighted rational agents with time-consistent preference because the model
predicts that consumption over lifecycle should be monotonically increasing, decreasing or
constant, but not hump-shaped.50
Thus the question is: can the model of belief dependent preference produce a hump over
lifecycle when deviation is desirable, i.e. ! < 1?51 Although I deal with this issue in depth
49For example, if S = 4; then f1; 1; 0; 0g is the best plan. If S is odd number, then over-consumption up
to one period less than the middle point gives the best result.
50This follows from the Euler equation in standard model: u0(ct) = Ru0(ct+1):
51When ! > 1; the model returns to the standard one and there is no room for a hump.
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Figure 33: The consumption is obtained with at income stream, for a plan of over-
consumption for the rst two periods. The gain-loss parameters are  = 1;  = 2; ! = 0:4:
The other parameters are R = 1:035;  = 0:99 and  = 0:9:
in later sections, introducing formal denition of the consumption hump, I want to show
here an exemplary result that demonstrates such property. With ! < 1; it is possible to
have a hump with three, four, or ve-period model as is seen in the following gure.52 What
would be the mechanism for a hump here? When ! < 1; this consumer is more like a
myopic (over-consumer) or a miser (saver). So he wants to consume more or save more than
the standard monotonic prediction. If this intention combines with time preference and the
market interest rate, then there is room for a consumption hump.
Although the hump-shaped consumption in 33 is obtained from an over-consumers be-
havior, the model of belief dependent preference can produce another hump with other
consumption plans as well. I want to discuss more on this in detail since this is one of the
most important features of reference dependent utility. So far I focus on the over-consumers
or the savers who are characterized by initial over- or under-consumption and who are not
changing their natural types of consumption behavior over time.53 However, it is possible to
imagine that a consumer may have both characteristic over the lifecycle. Thus let us assume
that there is such agent who plans for three periods t = 0; 1; 2. He intends to consume less
52Those specications that may produce a hump would not give the agent the highest welfare ex post in
general.
53Through the paper in later sections I assume this for simplicity as described in the introduction.
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than the ex ante optimal in the rst period, more than the optimal in the second period and
nally less than the optimal in the last period: fc0 < c0; c1 > c1; c2 < c2g. When deviation
is desirable (! < 1) for the DM, the consistent consumption is

























It is straightforward that c0 < c0; and c2 < c

2; but c1 > c

1 because ! < 1: I want
to demonstrate that this consumption prole produces the consumption hump even in the
simplest environment such as  = 1 andR = 1:54 The RDP consumption under this condition






























> 1 when ! < 1 for all values of the risk aversion parameter
 > 0; it is clear that c0 < c1 > c2: The hump is obtained with RDP agent. This result
is important because this prole is not dependent on any assumption about either income,
time preference, or the magnitude of interest rate. Only the loss aversion matters with this
specic consumption plan to produce a hump. In later sections, I assume the DMs have
xed intrinsic types of consumption behavior and derive conditions for the hump.
4.2.3 A Simple Lifecycle Model
If DM lives for T life-time periods, and if subsequent selves do not change the preference,























54It id easy to notice that when  = 1 and R = 1, the consumption prole of the standard model is
fc0; c1; c2gStandard =

y0 + y1 + y2
3
;
y0 + y1 + y2
3
;






ct + bt+1 = yt +Rbt
b0 = 0; bT+1 = 0
For example, if the DM has a plan of f c0 > c0; c1 > c1; :::: cT 1 > cT 1; cT < cT g;
then this plan is described by It = 1 8t = 0; :::T   1; except for IT = 0: It is also a standard
exercise that DM would not deviate from c when his loss feeling is grave at any period of
life time. Likewise, if ! < 1; it is always protable for DM to deviate from the ax ante
optimal consumption path c. In case of deviation, it must satisfy the following optimality
condition for all t :
c t + Itc
 
t + !(1  It)c t = R[c t+1 + It+1c t+1 + !(1  It+1)c t+1]
Combining with the resource constraint gives the consistent consumption prole for each
intended plan. However, which one gives the highest welfare over life time is not very
deterministic although it depends on the consumer parameters and the interest rate, as well
as the composition of the consumption plan itself. If the income is deterministic, the discrete
index for the gain-loss utility gives two-phase monotonic lifecycle consumption prole with
a kink. The following two gures show this.
In Figure 34, DM has a plan of over-consumption up to retirement, i.e. It = 1 for all
t, up to t = 65. It is interesting to see that the over-consumer enjoys just a tiny extra
consumption than the standard and as a result he has to accept substantial decrease in later
consumption after retirement. The Figure 35 shows the opposite. This gure is from the
savers consistent consumption and the saver enjoys high consumption in retirement years
at a small cost of consumption reduction during working years.
As shown in these examples, this model produces a graph with kink because of the
discrete index.55 The kink arises at the point when the DM shifts his plan from over-
consumption to under-consumption or vice versa. If income is deterministic, what would be
the It that is not discrete? As an exercise with this simple model, I propose the following
non-discrete index as a function of income level:
55In the next section, I introduce a dynamic model where the discrete index gives a smooth and hump-
shaped consumption prole.
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Figure 34: Two-phase consumption path for an over-consumer: R = 1:035;  = 0:98;  = 0:5;
! = 0:8:
Figure 35: Two-phase consumption path for a saver: R=1.035,  = 0:98;  = 0:5; ! = 0:8:
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Figure 36: Exemplary lifecycle consumption prole in a simple model (R = 1:035;  = 0:95;
 = 0:5; ! = 0:8).
It  yt   yminymax   yt
This simple specication gives continuous function between 0 and 1. Thus each index
gives the ratio of the consumers willingness to consume compared to the reference points.
At individual levels, this implies the likelihood of the overconsumption increases with higher
income. At an aggregate level, this implies that the portion of the population who consumes
ct > c
 is directly related with the relative income position. The next Figure 36 shows the
featured consumption hump over life.
4.3 DYNAMIC REFERENCE-DEPENDENT MODEL
4.3.1 Dynamic Decision Makers
As mentioned in three-period model, there are no gain-loss utilities in the second and third
period, because the decision maker thinks he would follow his plan in the subsequent periods
and this forms a new expectation that determines his reference point on those periods. If
the DM of the next period would not follow the rule he has intended in the previous period,
what would happen to the optimality? To analyze this, let us call the agent of each period
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in terms of decision time such as DM(0), DM(1), and DM(2).
4.3.1.1 Reference Points in the Dynamic Model The analysis of the rst scenario
in the three period model (section 2.2.1) is for the DM(0) (!0 < 1) who is at period zero and
who realizes a great pleasure for consuming more both the rst and the second period, but
also who knows he will feel sorry for not consuming as much at the third period. Thus DM(0)
expects that he would consume on the second period the planned amount he set, which is
more than the ex ante optimal (c1 > c1), and he would not have any gain or loss feeling
for the period because his expectation of high consumption is met with such consumption.
Likewise, DM(0) expects that the third period he would consume the planned amount which
is lower than the ex ante optimal (c2 < c2) and because of his already lowered reference
point, he expects he would not feel any loss regarding the low consumption.
At t = 1, however, the new DM(1), instead of following the whatever planned path for
the period, may change his mind and intend to plan a new strategy for the remaining periods.
Then the initial plan by DM(0) may not be consistent with the intention of subsequent DMs.
So far it is found that if the preference of DM stays the same, deviating in the subsequent
periods is not protable. Because the DM can have a di¤erent taste here, it is possible to
have di¤erent result than before. To construct an optimization problem for DM(1), it must
be claried what the reference point for the DM(1) is? Would the reference point be the
consumption utility that the DM(0) sets for the period to fulll his taste, which is u(c1)? Or
would it be the optimal consumption utility solved from the original problem for the period,
u(c1)?
To see this, assume rst that DM(0) has the usual high weight on loss (!0 > 1): Then
c1 = c

1 and there is no di¤erence between the two reference points regardless of the weights
of subsequent DMs. Thus deviating from the planned path is not consistent choice for the
DM(1) if he has also a high loss aversion (!1 > 1): But if DM(1) has a low weight (!1 < 1)
and wants to consume more; 56 then the consistent choice for the DM(1) is a new consumption
solved by himself c1(1) which should be bigger than c1. In summary, with the initial high
56Remember that an agent with (!1 < 1) can be a saver, too. Through out this analysis, I assume DM(t)
is an over-consumer, unless otherwise specied.
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weight !0 > 1; the two reference points are the same and the consistent consumption
proles are derived from optimality condition to the intended plan by each subsequent DM.
The bracket in the new consumption denotes the choice by DM(1)
Proposition 8. When DM(0) has a preference (taste) of !0 > 1 and made a plan of
fc0; c1; c2g; if DM(1) has a preference of !1 > 1; then it does not pay o¤ for him to
deviate from DM(0)s plan.
Proposition 9. When DM(0) has a preference (taste) of !0 > 1 and made a plan of
fc0; c1; c2g; if DM(1) has a preference of !1 < 1, then it pays o¤ for him to deviate from































c1: Thus c1(1) > c

1:
Assume secondly that the initial DM(0)s weight for loss is low (!0 < 1) and he wants to
deviate with a plan of fc0 > c0; c1 > c1; c2 < c2g: Then the ex ante optimal consumption for
t = 1 is no more optimal and the planned consistent consumption by DM(0) for the period is
not equal to c1: Thus the two specications of the reference point are di¤erent: u(c1) 6= u(c1).
To analyze further, assume that the consistent consumption choice by DM(0) for t = 1 is
c01: Then, with respect to the loss utility, the second denition of reference point measures
the utility loss of the new plan which deviates from the original plan: u(c1(1)) u(c1), while
by the rst one, the loss feeling arises from not fullling the adjusted plan recently revised
by DM(0): u(c1(1))  u(c01). Although in the next section I dene a proper reference point
that can be applied to any subsequent period in dynamic model, I want to explore here the
implication of dynamic decision making based on the notion of both reference points.57
First, let the reference point be dened by the second notion u(c1): Consider an opti-
mization problem of DM(1), at the beginning of t = 1, who has cash on hand58 and who is
supposed to consume c01 which is more than the ex ante optimal initially set for the period.
This consumer may or may not want to keep the high consumption for this period. DM(1)
57For the reference point, the proposal by K½oszegi & Rabin (2009)[66] vaguely suggests the most recent
past expectation,which is more likely to indicate the latter. But I nd the rst one is more appealing in
this application.
58It consists of current labor income and the nancial wealth accrued from last period.
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may regret his over-consumption of the rst period and want to go back to the optimal path
by reducing his consumption when he has a reference point of fc0; c1; c2g. Thus DM(1)
realizes that he would have a prospective loss utility if he ends up with consuming much less
than the optimal for the next period as a result of consuming more this period, as well as
the rst period.59 The situation for DM(1) who has gain-loss utility by deviating from the
original plan c, is described by




















c1 + b2 = y1 +Rb1
c2 = y2 +Rb2
Notice that the new utility is indexed by the time of decision making, t = 1. Also notice
that the cash on hand is dened by x01 = y1 + Rb1 = y1 + R(y0   c00): Because c00 > c0; it
is true that x01 < x

1 incorporating the over-consumption at the rst period. The preference
of DM(1) is represented by !1: When DM(1) consumes more than the ex ante optimal at
t = 1, he has a contemporaneous gain utility for the period but a prospective loss feeling for
the next period. Is it protable for DM(1) to deviate from the optimal plan? To see this,




= (1 + )c 1   R(1 + !1)[y2 +Ry1 +R2b1  Rc1] 
where

















The bracket in the notation of derivative denotes the choice by DM(1). Remember that
the bond demand (or borrowing) is a result from DM(0)s plan of fc0 > c0; c1 > c1; c2 < c2g
59Notice that in this exercise, DM(0) has !0 < 1 and he over consumed at t = 0.
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i8<: 6 0 if !1 > !0> 0 if !1 < !0 < 1
9=;
The rst condition says that deviation for any larger amount than the planned c01 is not
protable if DM(1) cares the future as much as DM(0).60 The second says that it pays o¤
to consume more than the planned if DM(1) has a lower weight. That is to say, as long as
DM(1) has a lower weight than DM(0), deviation from the new plan revised by DM(0), i.e.
c01 for even larger consumption is possible. Because !0 < 1, if DM(1) cares a lot about
his future (!1 > 1); it is always better for him to choose a consumption strategy other
than the one set by DM(0). Also, even though DM(1) does not care his future as much
(!1 < 1), as long as his weight is higher than DM(0), then it is still protable for him
not to follow DM(0)s plan of overconsumption. Solving the maximization problem yields
















































> c01(0) if !1 < !0 < 1
The bracket in the consumption notation denotes the choice by DM(t). Now look for
the same analysis with an alternative scenario: DM(0) with a taste of !0 < 1 has a three-
period plan by which he wants to consume more than the predetermined value initially and
less for the later two periods, fc0 > c0; c1 < c1; c2 < c2g: The derivative evaluated at the











8<: 6 0 if !1 > 1> 0 if !1 < 1
9=;
60Although the condition says about just loss aversion, I assume an over-consumer (or a myopic consumer)
due to low loss aversion through this analysis. The other case of saver is analyzed later.
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Notice that unlike the rst scenario, the sign of this derivative does not depend on !0;
implying only the attitude of DM(1) matters.
Proposition 10. When DM(0) has a plan fc0 > c0; c1 < c1; c2 < c2g from his taste of !0 <








if he cares about future (!1 > 1). If however, DM(1) also has a low weight (does not care
about the future, or the last period), then it is good for DM(1) to deviate from the plan by









1 if !1 < 1: It is clear
that c1 > c01 when !1 < 1:
The proposition implies that when DM(0) is myopic and spends a lot in the rst period,
not caring about future, DM(1), who wants to correct this, should accept the lower con-
sumption amount set by his precedent self because it is optimal. But this would not apply
when DM(1) is also myopic.
Now for the second specication of the reference point: The reference point is the con-
sumption utility from the solution that the DM(0) solves for the period to fulll his taste
of !0 < 1: Assume that fc0g  fc00; c01; c02g is the solution to the consumption schedule of
DM(0) who intends to consume more for the rst two periods: fc0 > c0; c1 > c1; c2 < c2g:
DM(1) may or may not want to keep the high consumption for the second period. Should
he regret his over-consumption of last period, can he go back to the lower consumption?
Because the reference point is now u(c01), the deviators solution, DM(1) realizes that he
would have a contemporaneous loss utility if he consumes less than this solution, but would
have a prospective gain utility for the next period as a result of consuming less this period.
Then DM(1) who has gain-loss utility by deviating from the predetermined consumption
fc0g for an alternative plan fc1 < c01; c2 > c02g; maximizes




















c1 + b2 = y1 +Rb1
c2 = y2 +Rb2
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This may be called reverting savers optimization problem. Remember that the con-
sumer at period one inherits the nancial wealth, positive or negative, from period zero.




= (1 + !1)c
 
1   R(1 + )[y2 +R(y1 +Rb1   c1)] 
where











































The rst condition tells that because !0 < 1; deviation from c01 for smaller consumption
is not protable whenever DM(1) is myopic, !1 6 1:61 The condition is also satised even
if !1 > 1 as long as it is not too high. Therefore, deviation for a lower amount is good only
if !1 1; which is what the second condition says. This means indirectly62 that if DM(1)
does not have a strong attachment to DM(0)s plan then he could reduce the consumption
for the period. If however, DM(1) cares strongly about the DM(0)s intention, then he would
not deviate from the plan. Only if DM(1) overcomes the strong attachment to DM(0), in
vision of remote gain, it is possible for DM(1) to lower his consumption. The new consistent




















1(0) if !1 1 > !0
c001(1) > c01(0) if !1 6 1
61There is one technical issue here: to compare the two weights in a consumption plan, the weights should
be related to the same reference point. Here this is not satised. Because of this, I explain indirectly the
loss aversion to the new reference point in terms of the initial reference point.
62The implication here follows from DM(1)intention of reverting the DM(0)s choice.
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It is clear that the new consumption c001(1) is smaller than c
0
1(0) only if !1 is much greater
than one. As an exercise, let us extend these analyses for T period optimization problem
where there are (T + 1) selves of DM(0), DM(1),..., DM(T ).63 Assume that the initial DM
sets a T -period plan and the reference point fc0; c1; :::; cTg is known to all the subsequent
DMs and their consistent consumption plans are revised based on this reference status each
time. Assume also that all DMs up to period    1 have high loss aversion, !0 > 1; !1 >
1; :::; ! 1 > 1; and thus fc0; c1; :::; c 1g has been chosen. If at t =  , DM() has a low
loss aversion ! < 1; then it pays o¤ for the DM() to choose an alternative consumption
path to fulll his taste and a new plan fc ; c+1; ::; cTg starts. The rst proposition below
tells the equilibrium dynamics when DM() intends more consumption just for the current
period and the very next period: (c > c ; c+1 > c

+1):Then I have the following.
Proposition 11. If there is a deviation by DM(), who has a preference of ! < 1 and sets
an alternative consumption c0t() for t =  ;  +1; :::; T; then the deviation by the DM( +1),
from c0+1 for a larger consumption would not pay o¤ if !+1 > !: His choice is c0+1 at
most. If however, !+1 < ! < 1; then it is possible for DM( + 1) to deviate from c0+1
for even larger amount, c00+1 > c
0
+1.
This implies that as long as DM( + 1) has a lower weight than DM(), deviation from
the plan of DM(), i.e. c01 is protable. Because ! < 1, it is always better for DM(+1) to
choose a consumption strategy which is lower than the intended plan of DM() if DM( +1)
cares more about the future: (!+1 > 1): Even though DM( + 1) does not care about his
future as much (!+1 < 1), as long as his weight is higher than DM(), it still pays o¤
for him to abandon DM()s plan and reduce current consumption. The next proposition
describes the alternative dynamics when DM() intends more consumption at the cost of
the very next period: (c > c ; c+1 < c

+1):
Proposition 12. If there is a deviation by DM(), who has a preference of ! < 1 and sets





if !+1 > !. If however, !+1 < ! < 1, then DM( + 1) would deviate from c0 for a
larger consumption c00+1 > c
0
+1:
63A formal T -period model with dynamic reference points is presented in section 4.
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The second proposition says: when DM() over consumes for the period from his taste
(! < 1); and lower subsequent consumption as a result, then DM( + 1) should not
increase his consumption from the predetermined value of c0+1 if he cares about future more
than previous DM (!+1 > !). If however, DM( + 1) has also a lower weight than
DM(), then it is good for DM( + 1) to deviate from the plan by consuming more. Thus,
c+1 = c
0
+1 if !+1 > ! and c+1 = c00+1 > c0+1 if !+1 < ! < 1: The proposition
implies that when DM() with ! < 1 consumes more than the optimal for the current
period, not caring about future, DM( + 1), who wants to correct this, should accept the
low consumption amount set by his precedent self because it was optimal. But this would
not apply when DM( + 1) has lower loss aversion than the precedent self.
4.3.1.2 Savers Dynamic Optimization So far the analysis focuses on the optimiza-
tion rule of an initial over-consumer (!0 < 1) who intends to deviate for more consumption
than the ex ante optimal. In this section, I examine the optimization procedure of an initial
saver (miser: !0 < 1), who plans to consume less for the rst two periods, fc0 < c0; c1 < c1;
c2 > c

2g: It is easy to nd the ex ante optimal solution to the initial savers problem. That
is


























Contrary to DM(0)s intention, DM(1) may not want to keep the low consumption for
t = 1. Then can he deviate from the plan of DM(0) and replan to increase consumption?
Following the above analysis, let his reference point be the DM(0)s solution. Because the
reference point is now u(c01), the savers solution, DM(1) realizes that he would have a
contemporaneous gain utility if he consumes more than this, but would have a prospective
loss next period as a result of consuming more this period. Then the utility status for DM(1)
when he has gain-loss utility by deviating for fc1 > c01; c2 < c02g, is described by




















This may be called reverting plungers optimization problem. To see if it is protable
























By the second condition, it is clear that the deviation for a larger consumption amount
is always protable if he does not care much about the next period (!1 < 1): The condition
follows from 1+
1+!1
> 1 > 1+!0
1+
because !0 < 1: This implies that if DM(1)s attachment
to the plan of low consumption is not too strong he can deviate and replan. Now consider
the second story: If DM(0) is a saver (!0 < 1) and his plan is to save only in the rst
period, fc0 < c0; c1 > c1; c2 > c2g; then the ex ante optimal strategy is




































Instead of enjoying high consumption, if DM(1) desires to save again for t = 1, then
DM(1)s utility position for fc1 < c01; c2 > c02g is described by
































=  (1  !1) (c01) 
8<: 6 0 if !1 6 1> 0 if !1 > 1
9=;
The deviation for less consumption is protable if DM(1) cares more about the future
consumption than about current consumption (!1 > 1): This implies that if DM(1) has low
attachment to the previous plan of high consumption, then he can reduce the consumption
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again to save more. However, if DM(1) cares strongly about the DM(0)s intention of high
consumption, then he would not deviate from the plan.
4.3.2 The Sub-Period Perfect Reference Point
The main result so far can be summarized as follows: if DM does not change his mind over
time and thus the subsequent reference points stay on the same track as the initial conjecture,
then deviation for more or less consumption is not protable at any time when DM has high
loss aversion (! > 1). In two-period model this can be explained by simple mechanism that
whenever DM tries to consume more today than the optimal, he ends up with giving up this
intention because of the high pain from loss related with the low consumption next period.64
But when ! < 1; deviation for more consumption is justied because DM cares more about
the current pleasure of extra consumption than the concern about less consumption in the
next period. The deviation is also possible in the direction of less consumption (save more)
now for more consumption next period. In fact, these are the cases where deviation from the
standard norm is a better choice: whenever DM tries to consume more (or less), it turns out
that this deviation is the the best strategy for the DM in that it gives him highest utility.
Thus a deviator is deviating for good. He could be an over-consumer or an under-consumer if
his loss aversion is low. But whatever he intends, he should be consistent with his intention.65
In dynamic model, where the subsequent reference points are changing over time because
DM changes his mind, there is no universal way to describe DMs behavior as is analyzed in
section 3.1. Because there can be many reference points to consider at any time of decision
making, the consistent consumption proles are many based on each of the alternative refer-
ence points. Here I introduce a novel way to solve this problem and suggest a reference point
that can be applied to any period of dynamic model. Assume that there is no uncertainty
and the deterministic income stream is known.
Denition Given any income stream, a Sub-Period Perfect Plan at time t is the optimal
solution fct ; ct+1; :::; cTg to the maximization problem of DM whose preference follows the
standard model (or RDP with ! > 1 ) and whose preference is not changing over the
64DM is an over-consumer here.
65The resulting behavior should be consistent with his plan.
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planning horizon of T   t+ 1 periods:





c + b+1 = y +Rb
 = t; t+ 1; :::; T
bt = given
b0 = 0
At any time t, given any debt or saving inherited from last period, the sub-period perfect
plan gives DM a clear notion of what the standard consumption looks like for the remaining
period.66 I postulate this plan serves as the reference point (sub-period perfect reference
point: SPRP) to which DM should refer.67 The merit of this denition is that the current
asset/liability of DM directly a¤ects the optimal consumption stream for the remaining
lifetime so that the plan itself is self-corrective over the subsequent periods.68 SPRP should
be a proper reference point in the dynamic model in which DM may change his degree of loss
aversion and revise the strategy following his new taste. Whenever DM changes his mind,
the reference point is updated and the updating reects his current nancial situation.
Notice that if there is no deviation at time t-1, then the new reference point for the
next period is exactly the same as DM(t-1) sets for the period because DM(t) does not
have any extra debt or saving than the planned from last period. Likewise, if there is no
deviation at all up to time t-1, then the reference point for the next period is exactly the
same as the initial DM sets for the period. Because of this, the initial sub-period perfect
plan, c(0) = fc0; c1; :::; cTg may be called the super plan. Any plan other than the c(t) is
called an alternative plan c0(t) = fc0t; c0t+1; :::; c0Tg:
Proposition 13. If DM(t) has a taste of !t > 1; then there is no deviation from the optimal
plan at t. If DM(t) has !t < 1; then it pays o¤ for the DM(t) to choose an alternative
66The plan is a sort of nancial blueprint that DM with any wealth (positive or negative), may get from
a nancial avdisor regarding his lifecycle consumption and saving project.
67When DM is not deviating, this corresponds to the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
68For example, if there was over-consumption by the previous DM, leaving great debt, then the new plan by
subsequent DM automatically incorporates this debt. By SPRP, the new reference point has been adjusted
accordingly to this debt.
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consumption path other than the sub-period perfect plan and c0(t) 6= c(t): If DM(t) is an
over-consumer, then he consumes more at t, c0t > c

t .
Proposition 14. Assume that all DMs up to period  have high loss aversion, !0 >
1; !1 > 1; :::; ! 1 > 1; and thus fc0; c1; :::; c 1g has been chosen based on the reference
point of the sub-period perfect plan up to  -1. If at  , DM() has low loss aversion ! < 1;
then it pays o¤ for the DM() to choose an alternative consumption path to fulll his taste




It)[u(ct)  u(ct )]g; 69 where the reference point is the sub-period perfect plan at time  .
4.4 A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH DYNAMIC MODEL
4.4.1 A Dynamic Lifecycle Model
In this section, I study a dynamic model in which DM is allowed to change his mind over
lifetime. Each time DM decides either to follow the consumption rule determined by earlier
selves or to start new plan following his current taste. Once DM decides to change his mind,
he re-optimizes for the remaining periods. The reference point where DMs new belief is
formed, is now the optimal consumption to the maximization problem over the remaining
lifetime, the Sub-Period Perfect Reference Point, which reects that DM has inherited
a nancial wealth from previous consumption. Because DM rebalances his consistent con-
sumption as he re-optimizes following his new belief on the ex ante optimal plan for the
remaining periods, the actual consumption prole is the envelope of the initial consumption
set by each DM.
4.4.1.1 A Simple Dynamic Model First lets solve a simple model where the DM who
lives for four periods,70 equipped with a dynamic loss aversion parameter !t and optimizes
for t = 0; 1; 2; 3: Because DM is allowed to have di¤erent weight each time, it may be useful
to denote each agent with time index, DM(t): If, any time t, DM(t) changes his mind, he
69Notice that ! is xed and does not change over time within the planning horizon of DM():
70To show the consumption hump, it is enough to have three period model.
138
has to replan for the remaining lifetime following his new taste. And the reference point
is the SPRP dened in section 3.2. Assume that the agent may want to deviate from the
optimal path for more consumption for the half of the lifetime, lowering his consumption in
the subsequent half of the lifetime.71 At t = 0, the agent maximizes his lifetime utility for
t = f0; 1; 2; 3g:























ct + bt+1 = yt +Rbt
b0 = 0; b4 = 0
It = f1; 1; 0; 0g







3) is not protable if !0 > 1. But if !0 < 1; then deviation is desirable
and his consistent consumption is







































Notice that 0 < 1 for the deviators, corresponding to !0 < 1 and 0 = 1 for non-
deviators. In fact, t is the parameter that captures the main implication of gain-loss utility
and this may be called the relative loss aversion parameter. For DM with 0 < 1; it
is also obvious that c0 > c0; c1 > c

1 but c2 < c

2; c3 < c

3: Thus he consumes c0 at the
rst period and intends to consume c1 in the next period. At t = 1; if DM(1) changes
his mind and decides to deviate from this plan, then he must re-optimize for the remaining
periods following his current taste !1 as well as the nancial debt from last period.72 The
71This premise comes from the result (utility comparison) in section 2.2.
72This is an extra debt beyond the scheduled bond holding. This debt arises from the over-consumption
of the rst period.
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reference point of DM(1) is the optimal solution to the standard maximization problem of
the remaining three periods. So at t = 1, he re-optimizes his consumption plan following the
new reference status for the remaining periods t = f1; 2; 3g:























ct + bt+1 = yt +Rbt
b1 = y0   c0
It = f1; 0; 0g:73
Notice that b1 is given at time t = 1 by the consumption behavior at t = 0. The solution
for a deviator is,
































This solution is the consistent consumption prole for t = f1; 2; 3g; starting from t = 1:
Notice that the solution c1 to the maximization problem of DM(1) is di¤erent from what
DM(0) calculated last period. To emphasis the di¤erence, it is convenient to call this c11
by denoting the new consistent consumption plan starting from t = 1: Likewise, c12 is the
consistent consumption for the next period, i.e. t = 2; planned at t = 1:
Similarly, at t = 2 DM(2) replans for the remaining two periods, following his new taste
and when !2 < 1; the consistent consumption plan is












73In case of odd number of periods, I = 1 for the highest integer less than (T   t)=2: This specication








All together, following each DMs taste of !t; the consistent consumption prole for the
entire four periods is74
























































4.4.1.2 The Consumption Hump In this section, I show that if the taste of DM rep-
resented by !t is changing over time, then it is possible to obtain the featured consumption
hump even with a at (or monotonic) income prole. This is important because the prop-
erty of hump-shaped consumption prole is not expected at all in standard theory unless
there exists extra assumptions like friction or uncertainty.75 The consumption hump can be
obtained with model of time-inconsistent preferences, but even with this, the model usually
requires certain properties of income.76
To derive analytically the condition for a Hump, I want to dene the consumption hump
as follows:77
Denition A consumption hump for T-period model is a consumption prole fctgTt=0
that satises
i) There is a consumption peak at time t 2 (0; T ):
ii) Consumption is monotonically increasing up to t.
74The fourth consumption of the bracket is the residual from the plan of the third period. DM(4) does
not have any his own choice.
75In the literature review, I include other mechanisms that can induce a hump prole under the standard
preference.
76For example, a hump-shaped income prole can generate a consumption hump in certain models.
77This is a strong sense of the denition. In a weak sense, it may allow having any wiggle over the horizon
with many local peaks.
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iii) Consumption is monotonically decreasing beyond t.
For example, if there are four periods t = 0; 1; 2; 3, the hump condition requires either f
c0 < c1 < c2 > c3g or fc0 < c1 > c2 > c3g depending on whether the peak occurs at c1 or c2:
Can the hump be obtained with the four-period model above? In the previous section, the
























































Solving recursively for bond demand in each period and substituting into the above
consumption equations pins down the entire consumption prole. For further analysis, let

































































































































Notice that when DM is not deviating, the consumption prole is obtained by letting
t = 1: To characterize the consumption property of this simple version of the dynamic
reference dependent preference (RDP) model, I want to compare this with the standard
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lifecycle consumption prole of DM who does not have reference dependent utility. The
optimization for standard model predicts that the marginal utility of consumption between
any two-periods conforms to the Euler rule and thus the consumption prole over all periods
exhibits monotonic movement. By monotonicity the consumption prole is either increasing,
decreasing, or stay constant over the entire lifetime. The consumption prole of standard
agent is characterized by
fc0; c1; c2; c3gStandard = fc0; c0; c0; c0g; if R = 1
and
































The monotonicity of these consumption proles is preserved across any choice of income
processes. By comparing the consumption of the RDP agent with this monotone consump-
tion prole, it may be seen that for the RDP agent, this monotonicity holds for a special
case of t = 1. In fact this is the situation where DM does not deviate from the optimal
path because of the high loss aversion. Therefore, by letting t = 1 for all t = 0; 1; 2; 3, the






















































This comes from the fact that for any t;




Now turn to the main question of whether the consistent consumption prole of the RDP
agent can generate a consumption hump. To explore this assume about the gross interest
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rate that 1 + r = R > 078 and that the risk aversion parameter  > 0:79 For the four-period
model, it is shown above that a consumption hump is obtained if the consumption stream
follows fc0 < c1 < c2 > c3g or fc0 < c1 > c2 > c3g: In either case it is enough to show that
c0 < c1 and c2 > c3:
























; then the consistent consump-
tion is increasing initially, i.e. c0 < c1, regardless of the income stream of the agent. The







It is easily noticed that if DM is not deviating, 0 = 1 = 2 = 1, the condition returns
to the simple condition of 1 < R

, which implies that R > 1: This is the characterization
for any increasing consumption in standard model. Therefore, it can be inferred that when
DM deviates, increasing property of consumption may be obtained without the condition
that R > 1: To see clearly the meaning of the condition, rst look at the condition with

















This condition implies that 1 < 0: Whenever the loss aversion of DM(1) is less than
the one of DM(0),81 the consumption is increasing. When R > 1; the restriction on loss
aversion parameter can be relaxed due to the time preference. Only if R < 1; it requires







The next proposition describes the decreasing property of the consumption hump.






2 < 1, then the consistent consumption is decreasing later periods, c2 >
c3; regardless of income stream of DM.82
78r is the usual net interest rate. This notation should not be confused with the notation for reference (r)
introduced in the begining of this paper.
79These assumptions are just for the computational purpose. In fact, these assumptions are not restrictive
at all and easily satised.
80t represents the preference of DM: given other parameter values, t is directly (one to one) related to
!t:
81The loss aversion parameter is !t and t is positively related to !t:
82The preference of DM(3) does not a¤ect this condition because his consumption is residual.
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Figure 37: The consumption is obtained with at income stream, for a dynamic over-
consumer. The gain-loss parameters are  = 1;  = 2; !t = f0:45; 0:4; 0:35g: The other
parameters are R = 1:035;  = 0:98 and  = 0:9:
Again with  = 1=R; the condition says 2 < 1: If  6= 1=R, then the time preference
and the loss aversion jointly operate to yield the decreasing property. This result contrasts to




< 1. However, with RDP model, it is no more a necessary condition.
Even though R > 1, it is possible to get the result if 2 is su¢ ciently small. Finally
combining both conditions yields the consumption hump.
Proposition 17. Given R and ; if the preference of RDP dynamic agent, f0; 1; 2g;
satises the above two conditions, then the consumption prole of the agent produces a hump.
Figure 37 shows the consumption hump for a dynamic decision maker who deviates from
the optimal plan to over consume. So far I have addressed the condition for a hump with the
four-period model of an initial over-consumer. For a three-period model, the hump condition
is simpler than these propositions. For an agent with f0; 1g; the increasing condition for















1 < 1: The
implication of these conditions is straightforward. How about the savers hump? In a
four-period simple model, it is obvious that the consumptions are
83Remember that when DM is not deviating, the result is the same as the one in the standard model.
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Figure 38: The consumption is obtained with at income stream, for a dynamic saver. The
gain-loss parameters are  = 1;  = 2; !t = f0:35; 0:45; 0:5g: The other parameters are







































































































84This is necessary because s > 1:
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Although these conditions look to be mirrors to the over-consumers, its interpretation
is the opposite. For example, the increasing condition is satised 1 < 0 whenever R > 1:
Because s (relative loss aversion of saver) is inversely related to !s; the consumption is
increasing for the saver when the loss aversion of the subsequent DM is greater than the
precedent one. In this case, DM can reduce his saving by consuming more than before.
Likewise, the decreasing property is obtained when the saver reduces his intention to save.
Figure 38 shows the consumption hump for a dynamic decision maker who deviates from the
optimal plan to save more.
4.4.2 An Overlapping Generations General Equilibrium
In this section I propose a general equilibrium based on overlapping generations economy.
The consumers are the dynamic decision makers who has low loss aversion and plans to
deviate from the standard consumption norm. Moreover the consumer can change the degree
of his loss aversion over time. Although each consumer optimizes following his dynamically
inconsistent taste, the consumer keeps the rule of middle-point shiftin any consumption
plan because this type of planning gives the consumer highest utility among all the deviation
strategies available to him.85
4.4.2.1 The RDP Consumer Time is discrete and denoted by  : At each time, a
generation of identical cohorts is born. The population is constant over time and each agent
who is indexed by age t, lives for T periods in a (T + 1) - period overlapping generations
economy. During working periods agents are endowed with one unit of labor productivity,
measured in e¢ ciency units, which is supplied inelastically. There is no borrowing constraint
and the agent can borrow and lend freely under market determined interest rate. There is no
government, and there exists a single good which can be either consumed or saved. Finally,
the retirement occurs exogenously at t = Tw + 1 where Tw < T and the consumer has no
whatsoever income during the retirement years.
The representative RDP consumer initially plans for lifetime T +1 periods with his taste
85In other words, consumer keeps over- or under-consumption up to the half of the planning periods. In
section 2, we have seen why this is desirable.
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of !0: A deviator from the optimal consumption of the standard lifecycle problem, is assumed
to consume more than the ex ante optimal for the rst half of his remaining lifetime.86 At any
time if the consumer changes his mind, which is the degree of loss aversion, his subsequent
self replans for the remaining lifetime. Then the consumer maximizes for t = 0; 1; :::; T;























c (t) + b+1(t) = wet +Rb (t)
b0(0) = 0; bt(t) = given; bT+1(t) = 0
I = 0; 1
where c (t) is consumption planned at t for time  and b+1(t) is bond demand purchased
at  for the next period, indexed by planning time t. The consumer has a lifetime stream
of productivity prole so that he supplies et e¢ ciency units of labor at t to production and
earns labor income of wet each time, where w is the market determined real wage rate which
is assumed to be stationary over time. The weight on loss is represented by ! (t), which
is assumed to be constant within the planning periods T    + 1 of each self. Therefore
! (t) = !t:
Solving the consumer optimization problem implies the rst conjecture that if !t > 1
for all t; then no deviation occurs and the consistent consumption prole is not di¤erent from
the optimal solution of the standard model and the model does not produce a consumption
hump. If the consumers weight on loss is low !t < 1; then deviation would occur and there
are many scenarios for a consumption plan. The solution to the above maximization at any
time t yields a consumption plan for planning horizon T   t+ 1 starting from t. Initially the
consumer intends to follow the planned consistent consumption by consuming ct(t) at t. At
t+1, however, the consumer realizes that the planned consumption for t+1; which is ct+1(t);
is now no more agreeable based on his new loss aversion. He has to replan to incorporate
this. Because each time he follows the planned path only at the initial time of a planning
86This is the over-consumers maximization problem. The analysis for the saver can also be considered.
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horizon, the actual consumption follows the envelope of all the planned consumption path
over the entire periods. Thus the realized lifecycle consumption prole is
fctgTt=0 = f c0(0); c1(1); c2(2); ::: ; cT (T ) g:
And the realized lifecycle bond demand is
fbt+1gTt=0 = f b1(0); b2(1); b3(2); ::: ; bT (T   1) g
b0 = 0; bT+1 = 0:
These are the actual consumption and bond demand that constitute the partial equi-
librium, as well as the general equilibrium I consider in the next subsection. In partial
equilibrium, the prole gives a lifecycle consumption for the representative RDP consumer.
In general equilibrium, because (T + 1) types of cohorts from each age group coexist at
any time, the aggregate consumption is obtained by summing up the consumption from all
age groups.87 Likewise, the aggregate bond demand is obtained by summing up the bond
demand of each cohort.
The next gures (Figure 39, Figure 40) show a set of realized lifecycle consumption and
bond demand of a RDP consumer in partial equilibrium. The result is from a dynamic
deviator (over-consumer) who relocates his reference point each time following his new taste
(degree of loss aversion: !t). For simulation exercises, I propose a simple linear weight
function for the loss aversion parameter over age:88
!t :
8<: !t = K   0:01(t  25) for 25 6 t 6 45!t = !t 1 + 0:01 for 45 < t 6 80
9=;
where K is a constant between 0 to 0.5.89 Consumers loss aversion keeps increasing
after the age of 45 until the retirement. This weight function is specied from US retirement
survey (Retirement Condence Survey, 2007) which shows that many people start planning
the retirement around age 45. This implies that from this age people are likely to curb their
over-consumption behavior. In the gure, K is set to 0.5.
87Because I consider stationary equilibrium and the population is conststant over time, the aggregate
consumption must be the same over time.
88In general equilibrium, the consumer is assumed to live from age 25.
89Because I set  = 1;  = 2 for simulation exercises, the deviators preference !t < 1 implies !t < 0:5:
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Figure 39: Loss aversion parameters:  = 1;  = 2; and !t = 0:5   0:01(t   25) for t 6 45
and !t = !t 1 + 0:01 for 45 < t 6 80: Other parameters: R = 1:035;  = 0:5;  = 0:976:
Figure 40: Loss aversion parameters:  = 1;  = 2; and !t = 0:5   0:01(t   25) for t 6 45
and !t = !t 1 + 0:01 for 45 < t 6 80: Other parameters: R = 1:035;  = 0:5;  = 0:976:
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In partial equilibrium, changing the parameter values like the interest rate and time
preference give di¤erent result in realized consumption and bond demand. In general equi-
librium, however, this does not apply and not all parameters are independent. I set !t and
 to be free. All other variables are jointly set to match the macroeconomic targets of the
economy.
4.4.2.2 Production and Calibrated General Equilibrium In general equilibrium,
I assume there is a continuum of identical perfectly competitive rms whose production












Then I dene the following competitive equilibrium.
Denition A competitive equilibrium in this economy is an allocation fctgTt=0, a set of
bond demands fbt+1gTt=0, an interest rate R and a wage rate w such that given R and w,
the followings are satised: (i) fctgTt=0 and fbt+1gTt=0 solve consumers problem, (ii) Factors
are paid out their marginal productivity, w = FN and R   1 = FK   ; (iii) Labor market
and bond market clear, K =
PT
t=0 bt and N =
PT
t=0 et.
The last market clearing condition species that the bond demand among the consumers
cancels out in the aggregate and that the excess demand for bonds should be equal to the
capital stock. Also the aggregate labor supply that sums up over the labor supply of each
cohort should be equal to the aggregate labor demand. Then, by substituting the marginal











w(R) = (1  )
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To get a calibrated general equilibrium, three macroeconomic targets are proposed: the
interest rate (R), capital-output ratio (K=Y ) and consumption output ratio (C=Y ). Follow-
ing Rios-Rull (1996), I set 2.94 as a target value for capital-output ratio and 0.748 for the
target ratio of consumption to output. The third macroeconomic target is the real interest
rate, which is independently determined in the lifecycle framework. Following McGrattan
and Prescott (2000), I set the target of real interest rate at 3.5% (R = 1:035). For simulation,
the model assumes that agents live for sure to T=65 (Age = 80) and when the agents die
there will be no bequest left for the next generation. In the context of lifecycle prole of con-
sumption, the mean consumption prole in Gourinchas and Parkers (2002) estimation and
its septic polynomial t by Feigenbaum (2008a) is adopted. According to this estimation,
the ratio of peak consumption to initial consumption is 1.1476. For the income schedule, I
use Feigenbaums quadratic t to the income data of Gourinchas and Parker (2002). The
income schedule is90
et = 1 + 0:0181t+ 0:000817t
2   0:000051t3 + 0:000000536t4
The next two gures, Figure 41 and Figure 42, show the general equilibrium result. A
dynamic model in which consumers deviate for more consumption due to low loss aversion
(!t < 1); can reproduce the hump-shaped consumption prole which closely tracts the data
in a well-calibrated general equilibrium. In the rst gure, three loss aversion proles are
proposed with the same risk aversion parameter (), which is 0.5. Using the same weight
function !t specied above in partial equilibrium, I set K = 0:5 for Prole A, K = 0:4 for
Prole B and K = 0:3 for Prole C. Among these, the best quantitative t to the data
in terms of mean squared error is Prole A (mse: 0.0014). Regarding the ratio of peak
consumption to initial consumption, Prole A also gives the best match (1:1340) to the data
(1:1476). Risk aversion bigger than  = 0:5 does not improve the overall t. For  = 0:9;
the best prole is K = 0:4 in terms of quantitative t (mse : 0:0022) and K = 0:3 in terms
of the consumption ratio. The second gure summarizes the result.
90The labor e¢ ciency replaces the income prole.
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Figure 41: GE result with over-consumer. Parameters are  = 1;  = 2;  = 0:5:
Figure 42: GE result with over-consumer. Parameters are  = 1;  = 2;  = 0:9:
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4.4.2.3 General Equilibrium with both Savers and Over-consumers If the RDP
consumer is not an over-consumer but a saver, then the consumer deviates from the ex
ante optimal level for more saving (under-consumption). Assume the agent consumes less
than the optimal for the rst half of his lifetime. Thus the consumer expects losses for the
beginning half of the planning horizon and gains for the other half of it. At any t; if the
consumer changes his degree of loss aversion, he re-solves the maximization problem starting
from t for the remaining lifetime years. All other economic assumptions remain the same as
in the over-consumers case. For the purpose of simulation exercise, I propose a very simple
weight function of the representative saver as follows:
!t : f!t = K + 0:01(t  25) for 25 6 t 6 80 g
whereK is a constant term. This specication shows a linearly increasing weight function
over the whole life-time. This implies that a savers propensity to save due to low loss aversion
is getting moderate as he gets old. For example, when K = 0:2; the savers loss aversion gets
bigger than 0.5 from age 55, implying his consumption behavior converges to the one of the
standard agents from this age. Even with this simplest version of the parameter, the model
produces a consumption hump in general equilibrium. Figure 43 summarizes the result. In
the gure, K is set to 0:2. And the risk aversion parameters () are 0.5 and 0.3. By all of
the criterion, prole with  = 0:5 ts best (mse : 0:0031). Risk aversion parameter higher
than 0.5 does not help the overall t and the hump-shaped gure is disappearing when 
is very high. Unlike in the the equilibrium of over-consumer, the savers consumption peak
usually comes later in life than the data in this exercise.
If both the savers and over-consumers coexist in the economy, then I have the following
result of general equilibrium in gure 11. The weight functions are the same as before with the
constant term of K(saver) = 0:2 and K(over-consumer) = 0:5. Introducing heterogeneity
of consumers improves overall t and the result is quite robust to alternative parameter
values.
154
Figure 43: GE result with saver.  = 1;  = 2; K = 0:2:
Figure 44: GE result with both saver and over-consumer with ratio of 0.2 for saver. Para-
meters:  = 1;  = 2; and saver (K = 0:2;  = 0:9) and over-consumer (K = 0:5;  = 0:3).
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4.5 COMPARISON WITH BOUNDED RATIONALITY MODEL
Park (2011)[86] proposes a general equilibrium model of boundedly rational agents who
maximize their utilities only over shorter than lifetime planning horizon. The main result
is that no mechanism other than the short term planning horizon produces a consumption
hump in a well-calibrated general equilibrium. The hump in the model is closely related
with hump-shaped income stream.91 In this section I address the implication of the short
term planning model when the consumer has a reference dependent preference and deviate
from the standard norm for over-or under-consumption. Specically I want to focus on
the condition of the consumption hump for this modied model and examine how the new
condition interacts with the one presented in Park (2011)[86].
4.5.1 A RDP Model of S-Period Updating
The short term planning model assumes that DM foresees only S < T periods and optimizes
only S periods. DM updates his belief on the optimal consumption through forward looking
as new information arrives and unfolds his future income each year. The reference point
where the agents belief is formed, is now the optimal consumption to the maximization
problem over shorter than lifetime planning horizon. Because DM re-optimizes each year by
updating his beliefs on the optimal consumption as his income evolves over time, the realized
consumption tracks the initial consumption of each planned path for the S periods.
Following the similar steps as in the dynamic model,92 I derive a closed form solution
to a simple model in which DM lives four lifetime periods while he is updating only for two








































91The hump-shaped income stream is the necessary condition for the hump in consumption.
92Section 4.1.
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The last term in the bracket follows from the fact that the DM at the last period has no
choice but consume whatever left for him because no more income is to be realized. Solving
recursively for bond demand for each period and substituting into yt + Rbt for t = 0; 1; 2


















Then the entire consistent consumption fc0; c1; c2; c3g is obtained by substituting the

















































It is clear that when the DM is not deviating at any time (0 = 1 = 2 = 1),
94 the
consumption prole collapse into a simpler version. This is the case where DM, because his
loss aversion is high, does not deviate from the optimal path of S-period maximization with
updating. Regarding the consumption hump the model provides the following propositions.95
Proposition 18. Given R and ; if the belief-updating DMs preference f0; 1; 2g and













then the consistent consumption is increasing initially, i.e. c0 < c1.













Furthermore, if the DM is not deviating, this returns to

















94s is the relative loss aversion parameter.
95For computational purpose, I assume that 1+r = R > 0 and  > r; as well as the risk aversion parameter








This inequality implies that if y2 is greater than y0 and if either y2 is as good as y1 or,
in case y2 is big enough relative to y0, if not too small compared to y1; then the increasing
property of the consumption at early stage of life is obtained, i.e. c0 < c1. Notice that this
condition is always satised with increasing income prole up to t = 2: But this condition
may not be satised if y2 is much smaller than y1: Therefore, the proposition implies that
with RDP agent, it is possible to have an increasing consumption prole even though the
income is not increasing.
Proposition 19. Given R and ; if the belief-updating DMs preference f0; 1; 2g and
income stream fy0; y1; y2; y3g jointly satisfy that, either the relative loss aversion parameter




















; then the con-
sistent consumption is decreasing, i.e. c1 > c2. The su¢ cient condition is y2 > 0 and
yT = y3 = 0.







































It is easily seen that if the DM is not deviating, then income property is the sole deter-
minant of the inequality and that small income at the end of life such as social security is
required to get the decreasing property. However, with RDP agent, it is no more a neces-
sary condition. Even though yT = y3 6= "; it is possible to get the result if the (0; 1) is
su¢ ciently small. This means that if young DM does not care much about the future, then
his consumption of later years can be low even though his income is not tiny in those years.
This is because he has to pay o¤ the large amount of borrowing he made when he was young.
Finally, combining both conditions yields the consumption hump.
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Figure 45: Planned and realized lifecycle consumption for an over-consumer: planning hori-
zon = 10 years, ! = 0:6; R = 1:035,  = 0:96;  = 0:9:
Proposition 20. If the belief-updating DMs preference f0; 1; 2g and income stream
fy0; y1; y2; y3g jointly satisfy above two conditions, then the consumption prole of the agent
produces a hump.
Example Suppose fy0; y1; y2; y3g = f1; 1; 1; 1g: Then the consumption prole of a RDP
DM who is forward-looking only for two periods and has 1=R as his time preference, and
f0 = 0:8; 1 = 0:4; 2 = 1g as his loss aversion parameter is characterized by










Using the standard interest rate Rann = 1:035; and per length  = 15 year, this yields
fc0; c1; c2; c3gDeviating = f1:081; 1:179; 0:669; 0:669g:
Clearly, c0 < c1 > c2 and the hump is achieved because of the preference structure.
This result contrasts to the example in Park (2011)[86], where the hump is achieved
because of the income structure. Figure 45 and Figure 46 show two di¤erent types of
lifecycle result from this updating model. It may be an interesting question if the consistent
consumption prole in Section 2 still preserves the utility ranking in the same model with
updating. In fact, the ex post utility ranking is not preserved with the updating for the
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Figure 46: Planned and realized lifecycle consumption for a saver: planning horizon = 20
years, ! = 0:6; R = 1:035,  = 0:98;  = 0:9:
consumer with !t < 1. For example, in three period model, the consumption prole of
plan A fc0 > c0; c1 < c1; c2 < c2g has a higher utility than the plan B fc0 > c0; c1 > c1;
c2 < c

2g in the original model of no-updating. But with updating, the second one (Plan B)
gives higher utility than the rst (Plan A) ex post. This reversion of ranking is explained by
the fact that in the updating model, fc0 > c0; c1 > c1; c2 < c2g implies the consumer cannot
spend a lot for each of the rst two periods because he spreads the total over-consumption
amount over the two periods. The opposite happens to fc0 > c0; c1 < c1; c2 < c2g so that
the consumer can plunge into one big over-consumption at the rst period at the cost of two
subsequent under-consumption later. Thus the plan B yields more asset accumulation than
Plan A and pays o¤ later.
By the same logic, the next simulation result in partial equilibrium can be justied. This
simulation exercise is obtained with  = 0:9 and S = 10. Remember that any plan for a
consumer with !t < 1 can be represented by a binary index It = (0; 1): Then I have the
following result in Table [11]for an over-consumer.
The table shows that when R > 1, that is the market interest rate is high relative
to the consumers time preference, most plans induce a hump. In fact, in the plan of
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Table 11: Utility Rank for a Over-consumer
Initial Plan Utility Rank Prole
(1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0) 1 Hump
R > 1 (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 2 Mild Hump
(1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 3 No Hump
(1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0) 1 Hump
R = 1 (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 2 Mild Hump
(1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 3 No Hump
(1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0) 3 No Hump
R << 1 (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 2 No Hump
(1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 1 No Hump
(1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0), even the consumption prole of an over-consumer can induce a big
hump. Because the plan implies that the consumer spreads the resource over long periods,
he does not spend a lot in each of the rst nine periods. Thus the consumption envelope
stays low, yielding more wealth accumulation later. However, as the interest rate is getting
lower relative to consumers time preference, the mechanism that induce a hump becomes
weaker. Thus when R < 1 , the humps are gone for all and the ranking reverses.
Turn to the savers case. In partial equilibrium, it is shown that a plan shifting of
plan in about half and half, (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1); gives DM the highest ex post utility
when there is no updating.96 But with updating, the plan of (0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) gives
the highest consumption utility ex post for most of parameter values. Also the plan of
(0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1) gives the lowest consumption utility ex post, as shown in Table [12].
When R > 1 all plans produce a hump. And the hump is more apparent with the plan
of (0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) because the plan implies an initial heavy saving to a¤ord higher
consumption for the rest of the nine periods and thus the saving should be high. DM would
96Although it depends on parameters.
161
save in the same manner for the remaining planning periods. Thus in this case the consumer
saves a lot at the rst period and enjoys high consumption in the subsequent years. With
the case of (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1); the consumer spreads his pains of saving over long (9)
periods and he doesnt need to save much at the rst period so that his saving is not much
for each time and thus less wealth accumulation occurs. The consumption envelope tracks
this implication.
With case of (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1), he spreads his pains of saving over long (9) periods
and he doesnt need to save much at the rst period so that his saving is not much for each
time and thus less wealth accumulation occurs. For saver, the hump is obtained with R = 1
and even with R < 1, although the hump intentness is weaker. However, when R << 197
the ranking is reversed and the plan of (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1) provides best consumption
outcome.
Finally, when I apply the same concept of general equilibrium of the previous section,
I have the following result: (1) If the preference of representative DM is staying constant
over lifetime, i.e. !t = !; (2) If the deviator consumes more (less) for the rst half of the
S periods and consumes less (more) for the remaining half periods,98 (3) Then a hybrid of
two types of consumers with ! < 1 can reproduce the hump-shaped consumption data in
a well-calibrated general equilibrium. The result in the Figure 47 comes from the hybrid of
saver and over-consumer, with a ratio of 0.4 for the saver.
4.6 UNCERTAINTY AND PRECAUTIONARY SAVING
In this section I introduce a RDP model under uncertainty. I specically study risky choices
with an endogenous reference point, under the two schemes of state-independent and state-
dependent stochastic references points. The former posits that the decision maker evaluates
every possible outcome of a prospect with all possible outcomes of the reference point, while
the latter assumes that the decision maker evaluates them only in the same state. Therefore,
the decision maker experiences a loss if the outcome of the prospect in a state falls short
97 = 0:92 for R << 1, while  = 0:96 for R < 1:
98This follows from the previous analysis that the utility culminates when the shift occurs in the middle
of the planning horizon.
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of the outcome of the reference point in the other states in the state-independent world,
while in the state-dependent world, losses are experienced only if they happen in the same
state. In this section I derive a two-period general equilibrium result with two agents who
are di¤erent from each other in their attitudes toward losses.
4.6.1 Stochastic Reference Points
An important question to ask here is what is the reference point in the model of uncertainty.
Unlike in deterministic RDP model, where the reference points are the solutions to the
dynamic maximization over time for a forward looking agent, with uncertainty, it may be
necessary to dene the reference point over di¤erent states of the world for a state contingent
agent.99
To introduce uncertainty model formally, let us dene a couple of notations rst. Let 
 =
f1; 2; :::; sg be the state-space with nitely many elements. Let X be the collection of feasible
prospects X : 
 ! R and P[A] for the probability that event A  
 occurs. Following
K½oszegi and Rabin (2006[64], 2007[65], 2009[66]), let us dene the reference-dependent utility
of X 2 X given the reference point Y 2 X as follows:
U(XjY ) = R R u(xjy)dFY (y)dFX(x);
where FX(x) = P[X  x] and FY (y) = P[Y  y] are the probability distribution
functions of X and Y: With discrete case,
U(XjY ) =PsPs0 psps0u(X(s)jY (s0))
And u(xjy) is dened by
u(xjy) = m(x) + (m(x) m(y))
where m is a continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing consumption utility and  is
a gain-loss utility function, with relative importance of ; which satises the four properties
dened in the chapter introduction. And the expected gain-loss utility over the probability
distribution is,
99It is possible to deen the reference point over both state and time. Because the main focus here is
uncertain outcome, the reference point over di¤erent states has priority.
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G(XjY ) = R R (m(x) m(y))dFY (y)dFX(x):
This specication implies DM considers all combinations over every possible outcome
of the prospect with all outcomes of the reference point, evaluating all combinations at the
product of the two marginal probabilities.100 The DM is therefore indi¤erent to the statistical
dependence between the prospect X and the reference point Y :
U(XjY ) = U( eXjeY )
Assume that the DM lives for two periods t = f0; 1g and he is subject to face uncertainty
at the second period. Thus he receives income ey1 following a known probability distribution
of F (y1) for the second period, but receives certain income y0 at t = 0. Having the
consumption utility from di¤erent states of the world as his reference points, the DM forms
an expectation about the optimal consumption with probability distribution F: Then his
utility is described by the reference-dependent expected utility formalized above. Let the
maximization problem be
max u(c0) + E [u(ec1) j u(cr1)]
subject to
c0 + b1 = y0
c1 = y1 +Rb1
If there are only two states of the world with respect to second period income (H or L)
with probability p; then the DM expects either high consumption or low consumption with
the probability and these two consumption outcomes serve as the reference points: u(c1h)
and u(c1l): The gain-loss utility relative to these reference points arise in the second period.
When the consumption is high due to high income, DM has a gain feeling relative to the low
possible consumption utility that he might have, but zero gain feeling relative to the high
consumption utility since the expectation is met. Likewise if the consumption utility is low
due to low income, he has a loss feeling relative to the high possible consumption utility, but
zero relative to the low one. There is no gain-loss utility in the rst period, because there is
no uncertainty. Thus the total utility is given by












































Notice that only two terms survive from the four contemporaneous expected gain-loss
utility components: there will be one gain utility and one loss utility at t = 1. However at
t = 0; there is no gain-loss utility. Solving the model returns the consistent consumption
as well as the bond holding for the DM in partial equilibrium given the interest rate and
income distribution. In the next subsection, I derive a closed form solution for a simplied
version of the model.
Lets turn to the general equilibrium in which there are two di¤erent types of RDP agent.
In partial equilibrium, where the interest rate is xed, the policy variables (consumption and
bond demand) are derived given any parameter values. However, in general equilibrium, the
bond demand is a function of the equilibrium interest rate and the net bond supply should
be equal to zero in equilibrium: b1+b2=0 is the market clearing condition. The candidates
for the two di¤erent agents of GE are many.101 Because the main issue of the work with
RDP is about the strength of concern about loss, the rst step may be to build a general
equilibrium with two di¤erent types of DMs with respect to their degrees of loss aversion.
4.6.2 A Two-Period Uncertainty Model
With this section, I analyze a simplied 2-period model of RDP under uncertainty that can
be solved analytically. The purpose of this step is to demonstrate the implication of gain-loss
utility (loss aversion) and disentangle partial equilibrium from general equilibrium. I want to
consider an economy with two types of DMs who are receiving the same stochastic income at
their second period but di¤erent from each other in their attitudes toward loss. Assume that
one DM follows standard model (! > 1), while the other one follows RDP model (! < 1).
101DM with i) two di¤erent time preference (); ii) two di¤erent risk attitudes (); iii) two di¤erent
weights for loss (!); iv) two di¤erent wealth or income positions (y):
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First I construct a simple model in which DM faces uncertainty of his income in the
second period. Assume that y0 = 1 and y1h = 1+" and y1l = 1 " with probability p = 1=2.
For simplicity, I assume logalithmic utility function and the gross interest rate is xed at
1= in partial equilibrium. As before DM has consumption utility for both periods102 and
may have gain-loss utilities depending on his references. As described above, the reference
point is the outcome of the other state of the world and DM has gain-loss utility for the
second period. The situation for the DM who has gain-loss utility due to uncertain outcome,
is summarized by














 (ln c1h   ln c1l) +  12 12! (ln c1l  ln c1h)
subject to
c0 + b1 = y0
c1 = ey1 +Rb1
The second term is expected consumption utility and the third and fourth terms are
expected contemporaneous gain and loss utilities for the second period. The optimality
condition leads to
c 10 = Rf12c 11h + 12c 11l   (!   1)12 12(c 11h   c 11l )g:
Except for the third term, this condition coincides with the standard Euler equation.
For those who have high loss aversion (! > 1), the marginal utility of the second period
is lower than the one in the standard model. To equate the marginal utilities over the two
periods, DM has to reduce his consumption of the rst period.103 In fact, the last term
reects the DMs intention to save more due to loss aversion. DM may have a gain sense
when high outcome realized but a loss feeling when low outcome realized. Because the loss is
more painful than the gain is pleasant, his overall utility is negative when the bad outcome
happen. Thus he saves more to compensate this loss feelings for bad situation. This explains
how the precautionary saving is obtained in RDP model.
102The consumption utility for the rst period is deterministic but for the second period it is expected
utility.
103This is because the marginal utility is decreasing.
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Before solving this further, let us turn to the other DM who follows the standard model
under uncertainty and look for the closed form solution. The two-period maximization
problem of the standard model is
max Eu(c) = ln c0 + E ln c1
Assume for simplicity, R = 1= = 1 and the income is given by y0 = 1 and y1h = 1 + "







1 + 2"2 < 1 if " > 0;
which is decreasing with uncertainty parameter ". The bond demand is
b1 = 1  c0 =  12 + 12
p
1 + 2"2 > 0 if " > 0;








Thus, it is clear that the expected consumption at the second period is greater than the
one with uncertainty " > 0. When there is uncertainty, DM consumes less at the rst period
but more at the second period, via increased saving. This property of consumption under
uncertainty is well known and the saving is called Precautionary Saving. The precaution-
ary saving may be dened better with Cash on Hand,which is x = y0 + Rb0: Then the





















(x2+2x+ 1)=4 + 2"2:
Notice that both directions of the consumption and saving remain the same in "; while
the increase in cash on hand leads to mixed result. However, saving itself increases in both
" and x. Also it is apparent that
c0(x; " > 0) < c0(x; " = 0) =
1+x
2
b1(x; " > 0) > b1(x; " = 0) =
x 1
2





These imply that with uncertainty, the expected bond demand is always greater than the
one without it.104 The precautionary saving is dened by P (x; ") = b1(x; ")   b1(x; " = 0):
Thus,





(x2+2x+ 1)=4 + 2"2
The precautionary saving increases as income uncertainty increases. However the e¤ect
of cash on hand is mixed. Figure 48 shows the precautionary saving P (x; ") (for x > 0) as
functions of x for ":Let us go back to the RDP maximization problem. In RDP model, the

























K(x; "; !) =
pf3(1 + x)=2 + "(!  1)g2   2[1 + 2x+ x2   "2]:
The following gures (Figure 49, 50, 51, 52) show c0, b1 as functions of x for " for RDP
consumer with three specications of loss aversion parameter (! S 1). Remember that
when ! = 1; this represents the standard model. And the precautionary saving is







Next gures (Figure 53, 54) show PRDP (x; "), and PRDP=x (for x > 0) as functions of x
for ":
It is easily noticed that if ! = 1 or  = 0; this yields the solution to the standard model










1 + 2"2 + 6"(!   1) + "22(!   1)2
bRDP1 =  12   "(! 1)2 + 12
q









1 + 2"2 + 6"(!   1) + "22(!   1)2:
104Below I compare the standard model with RDP model regarding consumption and bond demand under
uncertainty.
105Unlike the intertemporal optimzation, the loss aversion arises here with respect to bad outcomes due to
uncertainty. Thus high loss aversion ! > 1 implies people save more than the standard uncertainty model
(! = 1). Likewise, low loss aversion ! < 1 implies people save more than the standard uncertainty model.
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First look at the bond demand. If ! = 1 the expected bond demand is b1 = 12 [
p
1 + 2"2 
1] > 0 and it is increasing with ": How about ! > 1? When ! > 1, high " decreases the
second term but increases the third term. Because 6"(!   1) > 0, bond demand increases
unambiguously more in RDP model than in the standard model. This implies that given
the same uncertainty parameter ", DM with loss aversion saves more than the DM without
this feeling. If however, ! < 1 (loss-loving: low pain from any loss), the overall e¤ect is
ambiguous depending on on the magnitude of " and z:
Second, look at the rst period consumption cRDP0 with respect to ". If ! = 1;then
high " decreases current consumption. If ! > 1; then high " increases the second term but
decreases the third term. By the same argument as in bond demand, current consumption
decreases unambiguously more in RDP than in the standard model. If ! < 1;then high " in-
duces lower current consumption when " > 6=(1  !) but higher c0 when " > 6=(1  !).106
This suggests that with usual income uncertainty without huge uctuation, then the e¤ect
is positive with ! < 1: Loss loving people who care less about the pain from loss may not
save but consume more now.
4.6.2.1 Market Clearing and General Equilibrium In this section, I consider a
general equilibrium model of agents with two di¤erent degrees of loss aversion. Although it
is possible to construct a general equilibrium of a loss averse agent and a standard agent,
f!A > 1 and !B = 1g; it is more agreeable to assume f!A > 1 and !B < 1g because in
a two-agent economy, one must save while the other must borrow to clear the market. The
rst specication would not generate this structure. Therefore, the optimality conditions are
c 10 = Rf12c 11h + 12c 11l + (1  !A)12 12(c 11h   c 11l )g
c 10 = Rf12c 11h + 12c 11l + (1  !B)12 12(c 11h   c 11l )g
How can we compare this? Because the gain-loss utility is negative for !A > 1 and
positive for !B < 1 it is expected
(1  !B)12 12(c 11h   c 11l ) > (1  !A)12 12(c 11h   c 11l )
106With the assumption of y = 1, it is easy to infer that this condition(" < 6=(1  !)) is satised more
easily than the opposite one. For example, if ! = 0:6; then the latter requires " > 10; which is not very
realistic, while the former requires only " < 10:
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This implies that MU(ct+1) > MU(ct) for the DM with !B < 1 and thus he would not
save more than DM with !A > 1: Unlike in the partial equilibrium, the bond price or the
interest rate is not xed in general equilibrium and it is determined by the term that the net
supply of bond equals to zero. Bond price clears the market at equilibrium. Therefore it is
necessary to get the bond demand as a function of interest rate. (But still assume  = 1=R
for simplicity)

















Now with market clearing condition for the economy where only two types of agents
exist:
bA1 + (1  )bB1 = 0:
Figure 55 shows the general equilibrium result with two di¤erent DMs. The uncertainty
specication is " = 0:2; and  is adjusted accordingly to set an equilibrium.
4.6.3 State Dependence
In this subsection, I examine the case where the reference points are state-dependent and
the reference point may be chosen endogenously due to this dependency. Let us consider the
following state-dependent RDP. Assume the same state space as above. Let Y  X . For a
risky prospect X  X and a reference point Y  X , the state-dependent RDP valuation of
X relative to Y is given by
V (XjY ) = R R u(xjy)d2JX;Y (x; y);
where JX;Y (x; y) = P[X  x;Y  y] is the joint c.d.f of X and Y: The state-dependent
expected utility V (XjY ) evaluates the outcome of prospect X and reference point Y not
by the product of the marginal distribution, but by their joint distribution. Through this,
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it incorporates the statistical dependence between the prospect and the reference point. In
a discrete case with S states of the world, this allows DM to compare the outcomes of the
prospect with those of the reference point in the same state, but not with those in other
states. Thus,
V (XjY ) =Ps psu(X(s)jY (s))
According to this state-dependent utility, the DM does not experience loss feeling from
the fact that bad states yield worse outcomes than good states, as in the previous subsection
of the state-independent reference points. In fact, DM experiences loss feeling when the
utility from selected prospect falls below the reference point in the same state.
If two random variables X and Y are independent, then the joint c.d.f of X and Y is the
product of the corresponding marginal distributions functions.
JX;Y (x; y) = FX(x)FY (y)
In this case, the two specications of reference-dependent RDP coincide. The expected
utilities are,
U(XjY ) = R R u(xjy)dFY (y)dFX(x) = V (XjY )
However, the two specications generally di¤er if the prospect and the reference point are
dependent. Compared to the state-dependent utility V (XjY ), the state-independent utility
U(XjY ) generally overestimates the true occurrence of gains or losses in the case of positive
dependence between X and Y and underestimates it in the case of negative dependence.
In the example of two-period consumption-saving model, the state-dependent RDP is
given by












 (ln c1h   ln c1l) +  12! (ln c1l  ln c1h)
subject to
c0 + b1 = y0
c1 = ey1 +Rb1
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Notice that the gain or loss utility arises with p = 1=2 instead of p = 1=4 although
it is the same as in the state-independent case that only two terms survive from the four
contemporaneous gain-loss utility components. The optimality condition leads to
c 10 = Rf12c 11h + 12c 11l   (!   1)12(c 11h   c 11l )g:
Except for the third term, this condition is equal to the one for state-independent RDP
in previous subsection. Compared to state-independent RDP, for those who have high loss
aversion (! > 1), DMs intention to save more due to loss aversion is slightly weaker with
























K(x; "; !) =
p
x2 + 3x"(!  1) + f"(!  1)=2g2 + 2"2:
Likewise, the precautionary saving is obtained by







However, it is still true that if ! = 1 or  = 0; this yields the solution to the standard


















K(x; "; !) =
p
1 + 3"(!  1) + f"(!  1)=2g2 + 2"2:
Figure 56 displays RDP consumption when x = 1 for both state-independent and state-
dependent specications. As seen in the gure, state-independent case gives lower consump-
tion at the rst period with stronger precautionary saving motivation.107 Figure 57 displays
RDP bond demands when x = 1 for both state-independent and state-dependent specica-
tions. From the gure, it is clear that state-dependent RDP exhibit more moderate saving
or over-consumption intensity than one in the state-independent RDP world.
107This is the case for ! > 1: In case of ! < 1; the opposite is true.
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4.7 CONCLUSION
Reference-dependent preferences help explain many phenomena: excessive aversion to small
risk, the reluctance to sell a houses at a loss, equity premium puzzle, insurance against
small risk and target earnings in labor supply decision. Yet, there are few works, if any,
that demonstrate that this type of preferences can help in explaining consumption dynamics
in macroeconomics. Based on this motivation, I develop a macroeconomic model of belief
dependent preferences for intertemporal decision making and examine its macroeconomic
implication when the reference status is the consumers belief on the optimal consumption
for current and future given any information about income stream. To dissolve the key
issue of the determination of reference points in these models, I take the solution concept of
rational expectation equilibrium by K½oszegi and Rabin.
The main subjects in this essay are those decision makers who have low loss aversion
with respect to the standard consumption rule. Through this paper I look for the consistent
intertemporal optimization rule for a decision maker when he has a certain degree of loss
aversion, or weight on loss relative to gain. Any decision maker who cares future is considered
to have a high weight since this agent would not over consume early in life at the cost of low
future consumption, because he does not want to have severe loss feeling later. Likewise,
any decision maker who cares more of the current pleasure in extra consumption is said to
have a low weight since this agent has tolerance of the pain from loss in the future. In any
of these cases, the choice strategy of decision maker should meet the rational intertemporal
consistency. Any choice of consumption strategy should belong to the consistent plans of
the decision maker.
Because decision makers or consumers who are expecting age-dependent average life-
cycle income stream should form expectation regarding his future consumption from the
income realization each period, the uncertainty in income stream can give greater depth in
consumption dynamics. In this context, the model species two alternatives regarding the
consumers belief formation from future income stream. The rst one is the usual determin-
istic/or stochastic income stream and its individual realization. And the second one is the
non-stochastic income stream but visible only in a certain period ahead but not earlier. Both
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cases give greater insight on how the news about the distribution of future income would
generate multiple layers of consumption dynamics.
The main result of my work is that the reference dependent preferences helps a lot in
explaining many noted features of consumption dynamics in lifecycle theories, like the con-
sumption hump and precautionary saving, as well as providing multi-layered understanding
of dynamic decision making for the agents who may change his mind over lifetime. Be-
cause my model targets a calibrated general equilibrium, the result from my model should
closely resemble the actual macro economy. Therefore my ndings with reference-dependent
preferences are meaningful in that they are consistent with the known macroeconomic char-
acteristics from data.
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Table 12: Utility Rank for a Saver
Initial Plan Utility Rank Prole
(0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) 1 Hump
R > 1 (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) 2 Hump
(0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1) 3 Hump
(0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) 1 Hump
R = 1 (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) 2 Hump
(0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1) 3 Hump
(0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) 1 Hump
R < 1 (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) 2 Hump
(0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1) 3 Hump
Figure 47: Realized consumption with hybrid: ! = 0:6;  = 0:5; S=18.
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Figure 48: Precautionary Saving in standard model (! = 1): darker lines represent the
savings when the cash on hand (x) is lower.
Figure 49: RDP plots of c0 when x = 1: The loss aversion parameters are ! = 0:8; ! = 1;
and ! = 1:2:
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Figure 50: RDP plots of c0 when " = 0:4: The loss aversion parameters are ! = 0:8; ! = 1;
and ! = 1:2:
Figure 51: RDP plots of b1 when x = 1: The loss aversion parameters are ! = 0:8; ! = 1;
and ! = 1:2: When ! < 1; the bond demand can be negative.
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Figure 52: RDP plots of b1 when " = 0:4: The loss aversion parameters are ! = 0:8; ! = 1;
and ! = 1:2: Each bond demand cuts b1 = 0 at x 6 1.
Figure 53: RDP precautionary saving: ! = 0:8: The darker lines are from lower cash on
hand (x).
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Figure 54: RDP precautionary saving rate: ! = 0:8: The darker lines are from lower epsilon
(").
Figure 55: The two agents are represented by !A = 2 and !B = 0:2: The uncertainty is
given by " = 0:2:
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Figure 56: RDP plots of c0 when x = 1 for both state-independent and state-dependent
specications. The loss aversion parameters are ! = 0:8; ! = 1; and ! = 1:2:
Figure 57: RDP plots of b1 when x = 1 for both state-independent and state-dependent
specications. The loss aversion parameters are ! = 0:8 and ! = 1:2:
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5.0 A LIFECYCLE MODEL OF CHARITABLE GIVING: A
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES
I develop a lifecycle model of warm glow for consumers who derive utility from the act of
giving both goods and volunteering time and explore the general equilibrium characteristics
of an economy that is populated by these pro-social consumers. By separating charitable
deduction rate from income tax rate together with occupying non-separable utility between
consumption and charitable giving, the model unambiguously determines welfare direction
from any change in a tax system, enlightening the role of policy in private provision of
public goods. I rst derive analytic solutions that dene the optimal resource level com-
mitted to spend on giving and consumption each period with respect to leisure or volunteer
constraint. In the full model where consumers are subject to mortality risks for charitable
bequests and choose endogenously their retirement age, I demonstrate that the model fea-
tures salient facts regarding lifecycle giving/volunteer and consumption/leisure behaviors in
an empirically plausible, calibrated overlapping-generations general equilibrium. Reasonable
parameterization of my model generates an inverse U-shaped consumption and labor, an in-
verse J-shaped giving, similar to the data, while it confers highest welfare (CV) for the tax
rate of 23% when the rate is equal to charitable deduction rate.
Keywords: social preferences, charitable giving, warm glow, constrained optimization,
mortality risks, charitable deduction, general equilibrium.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.1.1 Charitable Giving and Warm Glow
The standard economic theory is based on the core assumption that individuals are self-
interested and a¤ected only by their own well-being.1 However, as seen in many lab and
eld experiments (Fehr and Gächter, 2000[41]; Charness and Rabin, 2002[27]), individuals
show a great concern for the welfare of others. Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007)[50]
show that there exists well-behaved rationalizing preference ordering conrmed by the data
for majority of subjects who lean towards a social welfare conception of preferences.2
One example of such observation that individuals exhibit social preferences3 is charita-
ble giving. The size and frequency4 of charitable giving, qualitatively consistent with the
experimental ndings, suggests that the individuals utility depends also on the payo¤ or
well-being of other people, providing evidence of social preferences in the eld. In the US,
$240.9 billion were donated to charities in 2002, representing an approximate 2 % of GDP
(Andreoni, 2006)[3]. By recent data the number arises to $290.89 billion in 2010.5 Donations
of time in the form of volunteering are also substantial. In 2002, 44 % of respondents to a
survey report giving time to a charitable organization in the prior year, with volunteers av-
eraging about fteen hours per month (Andreoni, 2006[3]). This represents nearly 84 million
individuals. The volunteer workforce give approximately 15.5 billion hours, representing the
equivalent of over 9 million full-time employees at a value of $239 billion.6
Although several demographic characteristics have been found useful in predicting char-
itable giving, income is by far the most important predictor of giving behavior (McClelland
and Brooks, 2004). With data from 1995, Andreoni (2006)[3] shows that giving as a function
of income is a U-shaped pattern, implying people in the lowest and highest income groups
1The standard model, in its rigid form, assumes purely self-interested decision makers. Decision theorists
argue that many lab evidences suggest possible deviations from the standard theory in roughly three ways:
nonstandard preferences, nonstandard beliefs, and biased decision making.
2Fisman et al. (2007)[50] estimate CES utility functions to demonstrate this.
3This is one of the deviations from the standard model with respect to self-interested preferences. Other
deviations may be with respect to time preferences and risk preferences.
4Every year 90% of Americans give money or time to charity (DellaVigna et al., 2009[34]).
5Giving USA 2011 : The Annual Report on Phylanthropy for the Year 2010.
6Giving and Volunteering in the US,2001.
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give larger proportions of their incomes to charity than individuals in middle-income groups.
McClelland and Brooks (2004)[80] who analyze 1997 data,7 nd that this U-shaped pattern
persists even when accounting for additional variables associated with income. However,
with more recent data of 2001, the pattern is shown to be more like inversely-related with
income, implying the right hand side of the U-shaped pattern is disappearing or mitigated.
This may come from the rapid income expansion among the high income level groups in later
data. But both old and new data sets show that charitable giving generally increases with
age except for the very old age.8
Despite its size and its close relationship with macroeconomic variables like income and
tax widely conrmed in data, charitable giving has not been rigorously studied in macroeco-
nomics. The majority work on charitable giving has been on lab or eld studies searching
for the motivation of giving or instrumental devices to enhance giving. However, like many
other lab ndings regarding social preferences, the prediction of giving in the lab usually
overpredicts the actual amounts shown in data. That is why a quantitative analysis that
correctly predicts the giving behavior with respect to other variables is needed. Moreover,
it is shown in data that individual giving varies signicantly with age, although the giving
pattern over lifecycle is stable across income level. Motivated by this, this paper aims to de-
velop a lifecycle model of charitable giving that incorporates a social preference and study its
macroeconomic implications in general equilibrium. Specically, I study the giving behavior
in both goods (money) and time (volunteering) among the economic agents over lifecycle
and perform the welfare analysis of charitable deductions, the rate of which is modeled to
be separate from income tax rate.
To analyze the giving behavior, which is the main issue related with how to construct
the model of a social preference among individuals, it is necessary to understand why people
give. Regarding giving of time, it is important to understand what happens to economic
agents when they undergo constrained optimization due to their limited time availability.
Regardless of income level, all agents are constrained by their physical time endowment.
Like borrowing or credit constraint, the time constraint is important in analyzing optimal
7Consumer Expenditure Survey.
8Details are shown with data in the next subsection.
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choices between consumption and leisure (and volunteer) to induce conditions for retirement
behavior. I want to address each of these.
First, why do individuals give? Although there are di¢ culties with eld studies due to
limited control, the motivation of giving has been well-studied in lab oriented game situa-
tions.9 The motivation may be summarized by (i) intrinsic motivation (altruism, warm glow),
(ii) extrinsic motivation (tax breaks, thank-you gestures), (iii) image motivation (social ap-
proval, status). Along with these candidates, many researchers argue that while intrinsic
social preferences are a leading interpretation for giving, charitable donations may also be
motivated by other factors, such as desire for status and social pressure by the fund-raisers
(DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier, 2009[34]).
Regarding intrinsic motivation, substantial researchers suggest that individuals are not
entirely altruistic when they give. Individuals seem to derive more benets from the act
of giving itself than from the benets that their givings generate for others. This nding is
conrmed by simple explanation: an individual giver is indi¤erent between giving a dollar to a
charity and the charitys receiving the dollar from someone else. His preference is represented
by a type of pure altruism,10 u(x;G) where x is consumption of private good and G is sum of
contributions to the public good G =
P
gi and gi is individual contribution by i: Thus the
individual increases utility from what others receive. This model of perfect altruism implies
that individual donations can be completely crowded out by government contributions, which
is not supported by the empirical evidence on private charities (Andreoni, 1988[4]). Studies
like Steinberg (1989)[98] nds that the crowding out is only partial because individuals get
more benet when they contribute on their own. This suggests an alternative:11 impure
altruism, or warm glow denoted by u(x; g) if it is pure warm glow and u(x; g;G) if partial
warm glow.
Under the proposition of warm glow, individuals derive internal satisfactions from giving
itself, although the nature of these satisfactions is not very clear.12 By this specication,
9For example, Dictator game (one giving to one other) and Public good games (many giving to many
other).
10According to Becker (1974), the pure altruism may be dened by a desire to improve the general
well-being of recipients.
11Andreoni (1990)[6] and others has develped this.
12It is hard to know whether givers may care about the objective of the charities or they simply enjoy the
act of giving.
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givers view the contributions of others as imperfect substitutes of their own ones. That is,
they prefer that the contribution for someone elses well-being come from themselves rather
than from others. This implies that the crowding out by government provisions in public
goods should be incomplete. Likewise, government taxation does not reduce private contri-
butions by the same amount.13 By Andreoni (1990[6], 2006[3]), the ndings in warm glow
also apply to giving of time, i.e. volunteering. If individuals were perfectly altruistic, there
should be little volunteering observed, which fact is not true as seen by the data. Substantial
portion of individuals provide their time to charitable or public activities. Thus, it may be
reasonable to think of volunteering as having some independent warm glow component as
well.
Recent works, however, are more focusing on the third explanation, an element com-
plementing the rst. Signaling (Vesterlund, 2003[105]) or status (Kumru and Vesterlund,
2009[68]) are among those, as well as social information in eld study (Frey and Meier,
2004[53]; Shang and Croson, 2009[94]). Status is an example of a private benet from giv-
ing. Likewise, image can be an incentive: individuals concern for what others think as a
driver for pro-social behavior. Thus, people may give without any true concern for the
receivers welfare. By these arguments, individuals preference may be represented by a gen-
eral social norm like u(x; g; s):14 In this paper, I want to explore macroeconomic modeling
from both types of explanation with the choice variables of consumption, giving, leisure and
volunteer.
Regarding the second issue, i.e. the time constraint, I want to emphasize that in choice
between consumption and leisure, for example, it is important to know if any optimal choice
variable is obtained as an interior solution or not. This also applies to the case of choice
between charitable goods and charitable time. Because I consider individuals of warm glow
who care the four components simultaneously, it is necessary to understand the intrinsic role
of constraint in the model. I explain this in detail with analytic works next section.
Lastly, regarding lifecycle perspective, to solve the intertemporal optimization problem
with four simultaneous choice variables, I take three steps of optimization. The rst is to
13See Andreoni (1988)[4].
14Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (AER, 2009)[10], suggest a simpe form of this like the following: u = (1  
a)log(c+ s) + alog(g):
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induce two selective optimal variables from the four variables via intra-temporal optimization.
Next is to analyze the choice between the two composite variables, examining whether the
constraint is binding or not. Finally, by dening an optimal expenditure as a value from the
second step, the model generates optimal solution over time.
5.1.2 US Giving Reports
There are two major sources of data regarding US charitable givings.15 The rst one is
household surveys16 and the second is samples from tax returns. Charitable givings mainly
come from individuals, charitable foundations, corporations, and bequests. While all are
signicant, by far the dominant source of giving is from individuals. Table [13] shows the
2010 US giving features from both collected and estimated data. By this in 2010 individuals
give over 211 billion dollars to charity, or 73% of the total dollars donated. Foundations,
which is the second biggest source, is responsible for 14% of all donations. By the source,
the combined charitable giving by individuals, bequests, and family foundations amounts to
an estimated $254.10 billion or 87% of total.
The major recipients sectors are: Religion (35%), Education (14%), Foundations (11%),
Human services (9%), Health (8%), Public society benet (8%), Arts-culture (5%), Interna-
tional A¤airs (5%), Individuals (2%). Over time, total giving has been on a steady rise, but
when measured as a percent of income, giving is much more stable and it is around 2% to
income. The average rate between 1970-2000 is 1.9%18 and between 2000-2005, it is 2.3%.
In 2010, by the above source, giving is 2% of GDP. Figure 58 shows the trend of total giving
from 1970 to 201019 and Figure 59 shows it as percentage of GDP.
Next is the giving statistics with respect to income level of the contributors. The pro-
15In US, the contribution is usually made through 1.23 million charitable nonprot organizations and
religious congregations.
16For example, Giving and Volunteering in the United Statesis the one that produces a series of biennial
national surveys that report trends in giving and charitable behavior. The survey mainly asks about the
followings: 1. What are the characteristics of individuals who volunteer? How much time do they give and
to whom do they volunteer? 2. What are the characteristics of the households that give to charities? How
much do they contribute and to whom? 3. What variables are associated with volunteering and giving
behavior?
18Authors calculation from annual percentage rate.
19From the Figure 1, one may notice a shift around 1997 reecting a tax reform favorable to charitable
giving.
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Table 13: Giving Statistics by Contributors






Source: Giving USA, 201117
portion of households making formal contributions increases as household income increases.
Table [14] shows both the average amount and the percentage of income contributed by level
of income.
Table [14] explains the following: household income is strongly and positively related with
the likelihood of giving. This likelihood ranges from a low of 76.8 percent for households with
incomes under $25,000 to a high of 97.2 percent for households with incomes of $100,000 or
more. Average household contributions also increase signicantly with household income.
Households with an annual income under $25,000 contributed $587, on average, while those
with an annual income of $100,000 or more give $3,976 on average. Conversely, average
contributions as a percentage of household income is inversely related to household income.20
In Figure 60 and Figure 61, I show the relationship between giving contribution and income
level.
Table [15] illustrates the amount and percent of giving contributed by age group. From
the table, the followings are noticeable. First, the composition of givers are almost equally
distributed along the main age groups, i.e. {30-39, 40-49, 50-64}. Second, the average
household contribution increases with age, with the exception of the over-65 age group. The
proportion of households making formal contributions is signicantly lower in the 21 to 29
age group, compared to all other age groups. In summary, giving varies signicantly with
20Notice that this nding is a deviation from the U-shape pattern of giving explained in the Introduction.
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Figure 58: Total Giving from 1970 to 2010 in Millions of Dollars (Ination-adjusted). Source:
Giving USA, 2011.
Figure 59: Total Giving as Percentage of GDP from 1970 to 2010. Source: Giving USA,
2011.
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Under $25,000 76.8% 24.4% 587 439 4.2 3.2
$25,000-$49,999 87.5% 32.0% 1027 891 3.0 2.6
$50,000-$74,999 93.1% 21.4% 1766 1633 3.0 2.8
$75,000-$99,999 96.9% 9.8% 2109 2038 2.7 2.5
$100,000 or more 97.2% 12.4% 3976 3854 2.7 2.6
Total 89.0% 100.0% 1620 1415 3.1 2.7
Source: Giving and Volunteering in the United States, 2001
the age.21 As people get older, they are typically more likely to give to charity and to give
a greater fraction of their incomes. However, the average contribution as a percentage of
household income also varies with age: those in the 65 and over age group give signicantly
more than all other age groups (4.7%), while the 21 to 29 age group give signicantly less
(2.1%). In summary, older households contribute more as a percentage of household income,
compared to their younger counterparts. Figure 62 shows the amount of giving by age
groups. From the data, it is easily seen that the pattern of giving over lifecycle is inverse-J
shaped, increasing over age with decreasing rate. Also it describes the giving as percent of
income is increasing over age. As households get older, they give more portions from their
income.
Regarding volunteering time, from Table [16], it is shown that, 34.4 percent of those in the
youngest age group volunteered in the past year, compared to the 30 to 39 (48.3%), 40 to 49
(48.4%), and the 50 to 64 (44.9%) age groups. According to this survey, although data is not
shown here, it is also found that volunteering results display di¤erences between employed
21By the data source, giving also varies signicantly with educational attainment of the givers, although
this part is not reported here. Those with more education give more often, give more dollars, and generally
give a higher fraction of income.
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Figure 60: Average Dollar Amounts of Giving Contributed by Income Level.
Figure 61: Percent of Income for Giving Contributed by Income Level.
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and unemployed respondents. Employed respondents are more likely to have volunteered in
the past year, compared to unemployed respondents (46.1% vs. 39.6%). Among past-year
volunteers, however, employed respondents volunteer signicantly fewer hours in the past
month, compared to their unemployed counterparts (13.8 hours vs. 18.2 hours).
5.1.3 Literatures
Although there is no directly linked paper that I can refer to, there are two lines of related
literatures. One is the literatures on charitable giving both in lab and eld experiments and
the other one is literatures related with lifecycle models from macroeconomic perspective.
Regarding charitable giving, Andreoni (2006)[3] surveys many earlier lab models of charitable
giving and provides evidence for warm glow dominance explained in the beginning of this
paper.
Other than the motivation of giving, there are eld research works that evaluate the e¤ect
of other variables like seed money22 (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002[74]), or the identity of
the solicitor (Landry et al., 2006[72])23 as an instrumental e¤ect on giving. DellaVigna et
al. (2009)[34] revisit the motivation of giving and perform a eld experiment designed to
distinguish intrinsic motivation from instrumental device, specically social pressure from
the solicitors. In their model, the social pressure yields negative utility. This implies that
individuals donate because the cost of saying NO to a solicitor is very high. They conrm
a clear role of social pressure in charitable giving, but also approve indirect evidence of
intrinsic motivation among givers. Unlike the social pressure due to an unknown solicitor,
Rege and Telle (2004)[91] examine the e¤ect of social approval among peer groups in public
good games. Frey and Meier (2004)[53] show that social information inuences participation
rates in fund-raising campaigns in mail fund-raising campaign.
Another consideration related with charitable giving, is the policy issue, especially the
e¤ect of tax treatment in charitable giving. From panel data, Auten et al. (2002)[13] estimate
the income tax e¤ect on giving and show that persistent income shocks have substantially
22Accoding to List and Lucking-Reiley (2002)[74], charitable giving increases in the seed money because
of the signaling e¤ect from quality of the charity.
23Accoding to the authors, in door-to-door fund-raising, charitable giving is a¤ected by the type of solici-
tors.
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larger impacts on charitable behavior than transitory shocks. They also show that the price
elasticity is greater than income elasticity in giving behavior.24
Regarding the second line of macroeconomics literatures, there are two main topics:
choice between consumption and leisure (Heckman, 1974[61]; Bullard and Feigenbaum,
2007[16]) and mortality risk (Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 2006[60]; Feigenbaum, 2008c[47]).
Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007)[16] examine whether the inclusion of leisure in the utility
function can help explain the hump-shaped lifecycle consumption pattern and related phe-
nomena. It is Heckman (1974)[61] who demonstrates that a theoretical possibility exists in
a lifecycle context when household productivity follows a hump-shaped lifecycle pattern, as
it does in the data. Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007)[16] extend Heckmans partial equilib-
rium into general equilibrium and verify Heckmans ndings in quantitative theoretic general
equilibrium analysis.
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2006)[60] explore the quantitative implications of uncertainty
about the length of life and a lack of annuity markets for lifecycle consumption in a general
equilibrium model in which markets are otherwise complete. Their model exhibits lifecy-
cle consumption pattern which is consistent with data. In a lifecycle model with mortality
risks, Feigenbaum (2008a)[45] shows that the equilibrium parameters of his model is close
to the estimated ones in a bu¤er-stock saving model by Gourinchas and Parker (2002)[57],
where borrowing constraints primarily account for the consumption hump. In Feigenbaum
(2008a)[45], borrowing is virtually eliminated by the mortality risk and thus mortality sup-
plants borrowing constraint as the explanation for the hump.
Regarding consumption pattern over lifecycle due to other mechanisms: Borrowing Con-
straint (Deaton,1991[32]), Income Uncertainty and Precautionary Saving (Carroll, 1997[24],
2009[25]; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002[57]; Aiyagari, 1994[1]; Feigenbaum, 2008b[46]), Con-
sumer Durables (Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2010[49]).
24I revisit this issue with models prediction.
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5.1.4 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I present closed form solution for
a warm glow model, solving three steps of intra-temporal and intertemporal optimization.
Using these results, I derive analytic conditions for the endogenous choice of time between
leisure (or volunteer time) and labor supply. Then in the subsequent section, I present a
full model and describe the baseline general equilibrium for the model of warm glow pref-
erences in an overlapping generations economy. In the fourth section, quantitative analysis
follows. Target variables with US data, calibration method and the results are addressed.
The result section discusses the main questions addressed in the model. Thereafter, the
chapter concludes with the emphasis on the implication of social preferences, as well as of
the employment of the non-standard preferences to complement the standard ones.
5.2 A MODEL OF WARM GLOW
This section introduces a tractable version of the warm glowmodel that a closed form solution
can be obtained. The main purpose of this section is to get insight into the structure of
optimization procedure for a utility specication of warm glow through analytic solution.
Consider an agent with warm glow25 who gets utility from the act of giving in the form
of both goods and time. This agent receives utility from consuming his own consumption
goods and leisure, as well. He lives for T -period and each period he has one unit of time
endowment, as well as a stream of productivity measured in e¢ ciency units. Each time, the
agent can choose freely a portion of time endowment to work for consumption or charitable
goods at market-determined real wage rate w per e¢ ciency unit and enjoy the remaining free
time either in leisure for himself or volunteering for charitable works. He discounts future
period utility with rate of  2 (0; 1). Finally, there is no borrowing constraint so that the
agent can borrow or save freely at market determined interest rate R which is exogenous.
25As explained in the Introduction, the preference of warm glow agent is represented by u(x; g) where x
is private consumption and g is private giving: In this case, the warm glow is pure warm glow.
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tu(xt; gt; lt; vt) (5.1)
subject to





1  lt + vt  0
where xt is consumption, gt is charitable giving, lt is leisure, and vt is volunteering time.
Also et is productivity unit of labor supply and 1 is the normalized endowment of time.
There are three tax rates: t1 is tax rate on charitable deduction, implying 1   t1 is the
price of giving, while t2 and t3 are the tax rates on labor income and nancial income,
respectively. Thus (1   t2)wet, the opportunity cost of leisure, is the price of volunteering.
Given the productivity prole, the agent provides 1  (lt+ vt) units of time for labor so that
he earns (1  t2)wet(1  lt   vt) of labor income each time. Because he can save or borrow
freely under market determined interest rate R, he earns nancial income of (1   t3)Rbt if
he carries the bond to next period. Rewrite the budget constraint to get
xt + (1  t1)gt + (1  t2)wet[lt + vt] + bt+1 = (1  t2)wet + (1  t3)Rbt (5.2)
The RHS of the equation implies all the explicit and implicit resources in monetary
value. The LHS consists of two parts: (a) expenditure on goods and time and (b) saving
(borrowing) for the next period. It may be convenient to separate (a) from (b). Let Mt be
dened for (a) by Mt  xt+ (1  t1)gt+ (1  t2)wet[lt+ vt]. Thus, Mt implies the monetary
resource necessary for both goods expenditure and time spending for each period. Then the
maximization problem is decomposed into two sub-problems:
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(i) Intra-temporal optimization
V (M;we) =Maxx;l;g;vu (x; g; l; v) (5.3)
subject to
x+ (1  t1)g + (1  t2)we[l + v] =M
x; g; l; v  0





tV (Mt ; wet) (5.4)
subject to
Mt + bt+1 = (1  t2)wet + (1  t3)Rbt
b0 = 0
bT+1 = 0
By solving the rst problem one gets optimal consumption-giving and leisure-volunteer
level as a function of total resource level M committed to spend each time, given the price
of good and time.26 The indirect utility function is determined by the four choice functions,
fromwhich the agent derives utility. Given this value function, by solving the second problem,
the optimal expenditure level and bond demand over time are obtained. From now on, the
within-period utility is specied by the following CRRA utility function which satises Inada
condition:




h1 ]1  if  6= 1




26Here it is assumed that the price of consumption goods and price of giving goods are equal to each other,
other than the tax deduction on giving.
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represents total good consumption and the total hour spending other than labor is
h = lv1 
with (0; 1); (0; 1); (0; 1) and  > 0: Notice that with this specication, the non-
negativity constraint of the consumption, giving, leisure, and volunteer would not be binding.
The rst step to tackle the problem for closed form solution is to reduce the four choice
variables into two variables. Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas utility specication, this can be










These conditions dictate relative importance of the two arguments in each utility com-
ponent of goods and time: c = xg1  and h = lv1 . Once giving (g) and volunteer (v) are
written in terms of consumption (x) and leisure (l), or vice versa, it is convenient to rewrite











]x+ (1  t2)we[1 + (1 ) ]l =M
  l  0
for some constant D = (A












that the leisure is constrained by a xed variable : Once again the budget constraint can be
reduced to simpler form of 1

x+(1  t2)we( 1 )l =M: Therefore, the maximization problem
of four choice variables is reduced to that of two choice variables only. With this preliminary
work, the model is analyzed via intra-temporal and inter-temporal optimization.
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x+ (1  t2)we( 1 )l =M
x  0
  l  0
The objective of intra-temporal optimization is to allocate consumption and leisure level,
given any expenditure level and wage rate, subject to leisure constraint. The last line implies
that when the agent does not work at all, he can enjoy full leisure of  (and thus, full volunteer
of 1  ) and if he ever works, it should be less than : From FOC, when leisure constraint











This shows that if the leisure is not binding, then the market value of consumption
and leisure is equalized by their utility shares which are  and 1   . Likewise, if the
leisure is binding to the constraint, then the market value of leisure would be less than
that of the consumption, relative to their utility shares. Using the resource constraint,
1

x + (1   t2)we( 1 )l = M; the optimal consumption and leisure levels are derived for any
specic resource level and wage rate. Because it is satised (1 t2)we < (1 )M when leisure
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binds, the solution is determined by the threshold level M  (1 t2)we
(1 ) : Thus, depending on
whether the leisure is binding or not, the optimal choice sets are:
x (M;we) =
8>>><>>>:
M if M M





 (1  ) M
(1 t2)we if M M
 if M > M
9>>>=>>>; (5.13)
The rst line of each term is the optimal consumption and leisure when the constraint is
not binding. The second line of each term implies that when the market value of his time is
low relative to its optimal value, then the agent would not work at all but spend all his time
for leisure and volunteer. From the two choice functions, two facts are noticed: rst, the risk
aversion parameter  does not a¤ect any of the optimal choices intra-temporally. Second, as
 increases, the threshold resource levelM increases for a given wage rate. This implies that
as the utility share of consumption (and giving) relative to leisure (and volunteer) increases,








(1 t1) if M M

1 




(1  ) (1  ) M
(1 t2)we if M M
1   if M > M
9>>>=>>>; (5.15)
27M > M implies (1  )M > we(1  t2):
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Figure 63 and 64 show the four choice functions over the domain for certain values of
parameters by which binding occurs within the domain range. The parameters are f = 0:5;
 = 0:5;  = 0:8;  = 0:8; t1 = 0:1; t2 = 0:1; we = 15g: It is easy to notice that
consumption and giving are increasing functions of the expenditure, although the increasing
rate is not same for all expenditure domain. Likewise, leisure and volunteer are increasing
functions of the expenditure up to the point where the agent decides not to work but enjoy
full leisure and volunteer.28 The indirect utility function, i.e. the value function of the
















[M   (1  t2)we]1 ]1  if M > M
9>>>>=>>>>; (5.16)
Now let us explore several properties of the value function, together with those of con-
sumption, giving, leisure, and volunteer. First, regarding the value function:
Proposition 21. The value function V (M;we) is continuous in M all over the domain
including threshold M.
Proof. See Appendix C-1.
Second, it is useful to know if the derivative of the value function is continuous. This prop-
erty is important for further analysis in inter-temporal problem. The derivative of V (M;we)
is obtained by
28Beyond the threshold, any increase in resource is fully absorbed into the consumption and giving because














M  if M M
D(1 ) [M   (1  t2)we](1 ) 1 (1 )(1 ) if M > M
9>>>>=>>>>; (5.17)
















if M > M
9>>>>=>>>>; (5.18)
Proposition 22. The value function is continuously di¤erentiable all over the domain M
including threshold and is strictly concave in M .
Proof. See Appendix C-2.
The value function is continuous, continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave with
respect to M . How about the behavior of its derivative dV (M;we)
dM
? Although dV (M;we)
dM
is
continuous at the threshold and thus continuous all over the domain, it has two di¤erent
slopes along the threshold. Thus the agent does not work, i.e. retire endogenously and









Third, let us check the properties of consumption, giving, leisure and volunteer functions:
Proposition 23. The optimal consumption, giving, leisure, and volunteer choices are con-
tinuous at the threshold.
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Proof. See Appendix C-3.
However, it is easy to see that none of the policy functions are continuously di¤erentiable


















(1 t2)we 6= 0 = limM# (1 t2)we1 
dl(M;we)
dM
for the leisure.29 It is clear to see that the value function is continuous and smooth, and
thus di¤erentiable over all area of M . Likewise, the marginal value is continuous, although
it is not di¤erentiable at the threshold.




















































Source: Giving and Volunteering in the United States, 2001
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Figure 62: The Amounts of Giving by Age Groups.
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21-29 34.4% 16.9% 15.5 5.3
2.4% 1.7%
(49,880) (45,705)
30-39 48.3% 22.0% 15.1 7.2
3.3% 2.4%
(67,990) (60,099)
40-49 48.4% 21.3% 15.5 7.4
3.4% 2.5%
(73,596) (63,712)
50-64 44.9% 22.7% 13.7 6.1
3.9% 2.8%
(66,352) (57,636)
over 65 40.6% 17.1% 16.2 6.5
5.7% 4.1%
(42,829) (35,958)
Total 44.2% 100% 15.1 6.6
3.8% 2.7%
(62,375) (53,432)
Source: Giving and Volunteering in the United States, 2001
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Figure 63: Optimal Consumption and Giving. Both Consumption and Giving increase as
the resource level increases.
Figure 64: Leisure and Volunteer increase up to the full leisure/volunteer level as the resource
level increases.
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5.2.2 Solving Inter-temporal optimization





lt and let V (Mt; wet) be the in-
direct utility function obtained from the analysis in previous section. Then the maximization




tV (Mt; wet) (5.20)
subject to
Mt + bt+1 = (1  t2)wet + (1  t3)Rbt
b0 = 0
bT+1 = 0
Solving for the rst order condition to get30









where  is Lagrangian multiplier and VM = dVdM : Because for a value of wet; the derivative
of value function VM (Mt; wet) is strictly decreasing in Mt,31 there exists an inverse function
over the domain. Let 	 = V  1M (Mt; wet) be the inverse function. Then from rst order









































31This is proved in Proposition 2 where V (M;we) is strictly concave in M .
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; where  is the value solved from the constraint equation. Once Mt is
obtained, the next step is straightforward. In earlier section, the intra-temporal optimization
produces the optimal consumption, giving, leisure, and volunteer levels that depend on Mt.
Therefore, given the optimal resources schedule over time, the expenditure portion for each
of these is obtained by those equations.
5.2.3 Endogenous Retirement
As seen above, the agent chooses freely his optimal working hours, and thus optimal leisure
and volunteer hours each period. If the agent optimally chooses full leisure, l =  and
thus full volunteer v = 1   ; this implies that he retires endogenously from his life time
optimization procedure. In this section, I want to explore the conditions under which the
agent chooses either to retire early or postpone entering into the labor market. Assume
t3 = 0 for notational simplicity and revisit the equation (22), the optimality condition of the
inter-temporal problem above.
VM (Mt; wet) =

(R)t




























. Combining this with the budget constraint




































The Lagrangian multiplier  in the inter-temporal optimization is the key value that
determines the marginal value function and thus Mt; which is obtained via inverse image
of the marginal value. Therefore the optimal resource schedule is obtained through this
term. When the agent is working, the marginal value of one unit of resource spending is
greater than its implicit value (threshold) and he is not working, the marginal value is less
than the threshold. Thus the optimal resource schedule is represented by the two functional
forms of  subject to the marginal value area relative to the threshold. Therefore the
optimal resource commitment schedule for work and partial leisure/volunteer, f > l > 0;







































1    (1  ) : Next two gures (Figure 65 and Figure ??) show the marginal value and
optimal resource over time when income has an inverse-U shaped schedule. Both functions
are obtained from choice functions solved above when binding occurs. From those, it is clear
that the agent keeps working until the marginal value gets lower than the threshold as in
Figure 65. The parameters are f = 0:5;  = 0:5;  = 0:8;  = 0:8;  = 0:98; t1 = 0:1; t2 =
0:1; w = 15; R = 1:045g:
Now let us explore some properties for special cases. It may be interesting to look for
necessary condition for endogenous choice of leisure or work for specic cases of R condition.
Assume that the agent has a schedule of constant productivity et = 1 over time, thus wet = w.
Proposition 24. It is impossible to have full leisure and full volunteer all the time.
Proof. See Appendix C-4.
The proposition implies that the agent has to work in some period of his life time.
Proposition 25. If R = 1, then the agent never gets full leisure nor full volunteer all the
time.
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Figure 65: Marginal Value Function and Threshold Function with Non-Fixed Income.
Proof. See Appendix C-5.
The proposition implies that the agent works all the time without retirement under this
specic condition, together with constant productivity.
Proposition 26. If R > 1, then once the agent reaches full leisure and full volunteer stage,
then he never reduces them.
Proof. See Appendix C-6.
This is because the scheduled resource level keeps increasing over time and never reduces.
In other words, if he stops working then he never comes back to work again, i.e. permanent
withdrawal from work force or retirement.34 Therefore, together with R > 1, the early
retirement (or full leisure and volunteer) condition is






34Remember that this is obtained with the special condition of R; together with constant labor income.
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Thus an agent retires early and enjoys full leisure and full volunteer at T  if and only if

(R)T
  !: (5.30)





(1 )(1 ). On the other hand, If R < 1, then
VM (Mt; w) =

(R)t
is increasing and Mt is decreasing over time. So if he ever enjoys full
leisure and volunteer without working, then it should be at the beginning of life. Therefore
the agent delays entering into the labor force as long as
VM  !: (5.31)




  !: (5.32)
where ! is dened above.
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5.3 A LIFECYCLE MODEL OF CHARITABLE GIVING
In this section a lifecycle model of agents with warm glow preference is introduced rst in
a partial equilibrium, then in a general equilibrium. There are (T + 1) types of identical
cohorts, who consume goods and time, save or dissave, and supply labor for production every
period in an overlapping generations (OLG) economy.
5.3.1 Consumer
5.3.1.1 Environment Time is discrete. At each time a generation of identical cohorts
is born. The population is constant. Each agent lives to a maximum age of T in a (T + 1) -
period overlapping generations economy. Agents are subject to mortality risks and survive
until age s > t; with a probability Qt, which is assumed to be generation (or cohort)-
independent. The agents who do not survive up to t leave their assets in the form of bequest
Bt to charity B1t and to the remaining o¤springs B2t. Thus Bt = B1t + B2t. The bequests
to o¤springs are spread uniformly over the surviving population. Agents with a warm glow
preference get utility from both consuming goods and leisure and act of giving goods and time
to charity. Over lifecycle agents are endowed with one unit of labor productivity, measured
in e¢ ciency units et, which is supplied elastically at the market determined real wage rate
w which is assumed to be stationary over time: There exists a composite good that can be
either consumed by agents themselves or given to charity. The remaining portion is saved for
next period, in which case it is called capital, each unit of which earns market determined
gross return R = r + 1.
5.3.1.2 Consumer Optimization Behavior Because a member of each cohort maxi-
mizes his expected utility following the survivor function Qt, the consumers problem is to
























xt + (1  t1)gt + bt+1 = (1  t2)[wet(1  lt   vt) +B2t] + (1  t3)Rbt
1  lt + vt  0
where t1; t2 and t3 are tax rates on charity, labor income, and nancial income respec-
tively. Parameters satisfy (0; 1); (0; 1); (0; 1) and  > 0: Solving the problem follows









lt; then the intra-temporal result is same as before. Because of Qt




tQtV (Mt; wet) (5.34)
subject to
Mt + bt+1 = (1  t2)[wet +B2t] + (1  t3)Rbt
Notice that the rst order condition is now tQtVM (Mt; wet) = [R(1 t3)]t : Similarly, the






































Figure 66: Lifecycle Consumption and Giving for An Individual in Partial Equilibrium.
where t and t, as well as  are dened in section 2.
Once solved for Mt for each t in partial equilibrium, then the policy variables are de-
termined within each period as shown in Intra-temporal optimization. Figure 66 and 67
show the optimal consumption, giving, leisure, and volunteer over lifecycle for an agent who
survives up to T in partial equilibrium with a productivity schedule described later. Figure
68 and 69 demonstrate the expected value of them over life time. Because the model assumes
homogeneous cohort other than age, the expected consumption, giving, leisure, and volun-
teer can be interpreted as economy wide policy variables when its population is normalized.
The parameters for all of these gures are f = 0:9;  = 0:4;  = 0:8;  = 0:9;  = 0:978;
t1 = 0:1; t2 = 0:1; t3 = 0; B2 = 0:05; w = 1; R = 1:035g:
5.3.1.3 Extended Preference with Status or Social Pressure As explained in In-
troduction, recent research works regarding charitable giving in experimental economics are
dealing with image motivation, social approval or social status as a motivation for giving.
Wether it comes from social pressure by solicitors or from status/image concern, the out-
come is the same: increase in giving. Therefore, regardless of its specication, a general
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Figure 67: Lifecycle Leisure and Volunteer for An Individual in Partial Equilibrium.
Figure 68: Expected Consumption and Giving in Partial Equilibrium.
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Figure 69: Expected Leisure and Volunteer in Partial Equilibrium.
social preference form u(x; g; s) may be utilized. Here let us introduce a simple version of it
in that the agent is indi¤erent to whether he consumes more private good or gives more to
charity, replacing consumption into giving from whatsoever s motivation. If this type of




















xt + (1  t1)(gt + st) + bt+1 = (1  t2)[wet(1  lt   vt) +B2t] + (1  t3)Rbt
1  lt + vt  0
Now, it is not the MRS between x and g in intra-temporal choice, but x + s and g
that is equated to its relative price. Accordingly, the condition for threshold should be
related not with x but with x+ s: Moreover, it is easy to see that @u
@x@s
> 0 for 0 <  < 1;
implying x and s are complementing to each other. However, if the total committed resource
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is dened accordingly, the intertemporal optimization follows the same steps as before. By
simple guessing, one may expect an increasing in total giving, accompanied by reduction of
consumption by the agent. This is discussed later.
5.3.2 Technology, Government and General Equilibrium
To explore a general equilibrium model, let us add a production side to the economy and
assume there are a continuum (innite number) of identical perfectly competitive rms who
produce the consumption and giving goods. Specically, this model introduces the following
Cobb-Douglas production function for the representative rm:
F (K;N) = KN1  (5.37)












Finally, there is a government in this economy, running a balanced budget all the time.





t=0Qt[wet(1  lt   vt) +B2t] + t3
PT
t=0Qt[Rbt]
To close the economy, I assume that the three sectors of consumption, government ex-
penditure and the total giving jointly contribute to the income composition. Let us dene a
competitive equilibrium for the model with mortality risks and bequest.35
Denition A competitive equilibrium in the economy of warm glow is an allocation
fxt; gt; lt; vtgTt=0, a set of bond demands fbt+1gTt=0, a bequest function fBtgTt=0; government
35The model economy does not include public sector for equilibrium. The charitable bequest and other
variables like volunteer time are measured for calibration purpose in quantitaive analysis.
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policy ft1; t2; t3g; an interest rate R and a wage rate w such that given R; w; ft1; t2; t3g; and
Bt; the followings are satised;
i) fxt; gt; lt; vtgTt=0 and fbt+1gTt=0 solve the consumers problem;
ii) Factors are paid out their marginal productivity;
w = FN and R  1 = FK   
iii) Labor market and bond market clear:
KD =
PT
t=0Qtbt and ND =
PT
t=0Qtet(1  lt   vt)




v) Government budget constraint is satised.
The market clearing condition in (iii) species that consumption loans will cancel out
in the aggregate so that the excess demand for bonds should be equal to the capital stock.
Also the aggregate labor supply that sums up over the labor supply of each cohort should
be equal to the aggregate labor demand. Therefore by the above equilibrium condition ii),

















R  1 + 

: (5.40)
Thus the capital-to-labor demand ratio is written as a function of the interest rate and













Qtbt (R) = N






Qtet(1  lt   vt): (5.42)
Once it is solved for an equilibrium interest R, then the real wage w is determined by
w(R) = (1  )








The objective of the quantitative analysis is to assess how well a calibrated, general equi-
librium model of the consumer with warm glow preference can account for stylized facts
regarding charitable giving and consumption, as well as leisure and volunteering. In other
words, the question I examine is whether a stationary competitive equilibrium of the model
can be calibrated to be consistent with characteristics of the macroeconomic data and the
giving data. Following many other works, I propose three standard macroeconomic variables
to be targeted for the US data. The targets are interest rate, capital-output ratio and con-
sumption output ratio. Regarding charitable goods and time, two targets can be proposed
and they are giving to output and volunteer hours to leisure hours (or working hours). But
the model has seven scalar parameters, of which ve parameters are related to the preference,
36 and the remaining two parameters to the production.37
5.4.1 Targets in US Data
Three macroeconomic targets are proposed for the analysis and they are interest rate (R),
capital-output ratio (K=Y ) and consumption output ratio (C=Y ). Following Rios-Rull
(1996)[93], let us rst set 0.748 for the target ratio of consumption to output. For the
target value for capital-output ratio, I set 3 which is close to Rios-Rull (1996)[93].38 The
third macroeconomic target is the real interest rate, which is independently determined in
the lifecycle framework. Following McGrattan and Prescott (2000)[81], I set the target real
interest rate at 3.5%.39 The two targets from charitable giving data is the total giving-output
ratio (G=Y ) and volunteer to work hours (v=N). From giving data over time, the ratio G=Y
is found to be stable and I set this for the fourth target which is 2%. Regarding fth target,
Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007)[16] suggest 30 hours of market work per person per week
from CPS data. That is labor N = 120 hours per month. Because volunteer hours are about
15 hours per month among the volunteers and about half of it among the whole population,
36These are ; ; ; ;  in the model.
37These are ;  in the model.
38The value in Rios-Rull is 2.94.
39Similary, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate 3.44% for the rate .
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the working hours to volunteer hours is 16. Thus, I set the v=N = 0:0625:40 Related with
this, it is also noticeable that the individuals work about 30/168 = 17.8 % percent of their
available time based on a 24 hour day. These ratios are most directly a¤ected by the para-
meter  and ; and these parameters play important roles in the lifecycle consumption and
labor/volunteer supply proles described earlier. Table [17] summarizes the description of
targets for the model.
Table 17: Targets
Variables Description Target




v=N Volunteer-Labor 6:25 %
5.4.2 Calibration Method
The model assumes that consumers are born at actual age 25, which corresponds to the
model time of zero: t = 0. Because the model assumes charitable bequest over lifecycle,
it induces a mortality model which is represented by a survivor function. According to
actuarial life tables (Arias, 2004), a maximum life span of individuals is 100. Thus, T = 75
is set in the model. I obtain the survivor probabilities from Feigenbaums (2008a[45]) sextic
polynomial function of t; t to the mortality data in Arias (2004)[8], which is given by the
following:
Qt = exp( 0:01943  0:00031t+ 0:000006t2   0:00000328t3   0:0000000306t4 +
0:000000003188t5   0:00000000005199t6)
40The labor data is conditional on working population while volunteer data is from all population. The
ratio is proposed assuming the di¤erence is not big among the retired population.
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Figure 70: Productivity Schedule over Life
Because the households age-dependent productivity endowment measured in e¢ ciency
unit is di¢ cult to observe, I adopt average cross-sectional hourly income rate from the 2001
CPS as a proxy for this.41 The usual method for linear interpolation to induce average hourly
earnings up to 65 and polynomial interpolation beyond that, gives the following productivity
schedule over life.
Table [18] summarizes the description of parameters for calibration in the model. Among
these parameters,  and  are directly related with the last two targets from giving statistics.
The economy-wide total giving G is given by
P75
t=0Qt(gt + B1t)] +  where  is corporate
contribution to charity and B1t is charitable bequest at each age or contribution from each
age group. Following the description of 5% for corporate contribution to overall giving, I
set  = 0:05G. This implies that the corporate contribution to output is 0.1%. Likewise,43
B1 =
P75
t=0QtB1t = 0:08G and this implies that the charitable bequest to output is 0.16%.
Also from volunteer-labor ratio, it is clear that  is determined via v=N = 0:0625. Therefore,
among the remaining ve parameters I can determine four values given a parameter value.
41This is the conditional productivity prole, measured conditional on working agents. It is assumed that
the di¤erence between the conditional and unconditional proles is small.











t1 Charitable deduction 20%, 15%, 10%
t2 Income tax rate 15%, 10%
t3 Capital gain tax rate 0%42
Moreover, for the baseline calibration in the following section, I set the bequests from all age
groups to be charitable bequests and none for o¤springs: that is B = B1 and B2 = 0.
5.4.2.1 Results I parameterize the baseline stationary competitive equilibrium of the
model using empirical evidence mentioned above. Because it is very di¢ cult to dene prop-
erly the empirical evidence regarding , I allow it as free variable among the ve parameters
for the calibration, although it is desirable to have it lower than 0.5.44 Thus, I choose the
best discrete {; } combination that makes, along with other targets both  and  closest to
the historically observed values:  2 [0:25; 0:39] and  2 [0:5; 0:9]. The baseline calibration
is shown in Table [19].
These parameters jointly match all the targets while all the value of standard variables
{; ; ; } are in desirable range. By this calibration, it is found that given , the value of
risk aversion parameter () matters to support proper range of  and  values. With high
, other things being equal, the value of {; } runs below its historically observed ones and
44This is because Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007)[16], suggest 0.17 or 0.33 for the consumption share to
leisure.
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Table 19: Summary of Baseline Calibration
t1 = 0:20       
t2 = 0:15 0.80 0.970 0.28 0.981 0.988 0.30 0.064
t2 = 0:10 0.85 0.971 0.28 0.981 0.988 0.34 0.079
t1 = t2       
t2 = 0:15 0.81 0.969 0.27 0.980 0.988 0.29 0.060
t2 = 0:10 0.88 0.970 0.30 0.979 0.988 0.31 0.067
vice versa. Also given the risk aversion parameter, increased  returns a higher .
Based on this, I want to explore how the model features with respect to the lifecycle
giving/volunteer and consumption/leisure evidence. In terms of consumption, it is well-
known that consumption over a lifecycle exhibits a hump-shaped prole. By Gourinchas
and Parker (2002)[57], along the hump, the maximum consumption is obtained at age 45.
By the calibrated model, it is found that the maximum consumption is achieved at age 54
conditional on the premise that the agent survives full lifecycle length, while it is around 41
years old when economy-wide average or expected consumption is calculated. Therefore, it
is inferred that the model reasonably replicates the consumption data.
How about giving? Although there is no specication data attainable regarding lifecycle
giving, the survey mentioned in the Introduction gives us proper interpretation. By the
survey data, charitable giving is increasing with age up to (50-64) age group and reduces
beyond that. This fact is true for both measure of givers only and all. In the calibrated
model, the giving increases with age and peaks around 54, which fact conforms to the data.45
One more important feature is that giving has an inversely related pattern relative to
the income level. The portion of giving out of income is higher for those of low income and
the portion of it is lower for with higher income. Although there is no direct quantitative
method to measure this from the model, the following giving ratio may explain such prop-
erty. Because e¢ ciency can be interpreted as income when equilibrium wage is xed at its
45The peak age comes sooner and the giving ratio measured for the amount at peak to initial one looks
smaller than the data: this can be corrected by adding social pressure or status in next subsection.
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stationary value in the model, the giving to e¢ ciency can proxy giving to income level shown
in the data. Because the e¢ ciency is inverse-U shaped over age (low when young and old,
and high during the middle age), the U shaped giving ratio implies that giving to income
(wage) is inversely related. By this graph, it may be alright to say that the model exhibits
such property also. The following Figure 71 summarizes this nding.
Figure 71: Giving to Productivity Ratio
The next topic is time allocation over the lifecycle. It is well-known that the leisure
is U-shaped and labor is mildly hump-shaped over age. Figure 72 demonstrates this nd-
ing.46 Moreover, Figure 73 demonstrates the economy-wide population average. Erosa et
al. (2010)[37] estimate labor supply over the lifecycle for male workers using heterogeneous
agent model with non-linear wages.47 According to this estimation, the annual hours worked
peaks around age 38. The following graph exhibits the comparison of their estimation and
the model.
When time endowment is given by (a) 24x7x52=8736 and (b) 24x5x52=6240, the esti-
mated prole lies between the two model proles with almost same peak age. Volunteer time
is generally increasing with age. In the next graph, Figure 75when average volunteering time
46Although it is not clearly visible here, the volunteer prole is mildly increasing over age, except at the
very young age. See the next gure.
47Their estimation is obtained on PSID (1968-1996). See Also Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007)[16].
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Figure 72: Individual Lifecycle Time Allocation in General Equilibrium.
Figure 73: Population Time Allocation over Age in General Equilibrium.
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Figure 74: Annual Labor Hours over Age
is calculated over age groups, the model reasonably tracks the survey data. Remember that
a volunteer in the survey should be the one surviving up to the age prole in the model.
This explains why the data prole stays between the individual and population prole at
older age groups.
5.4.2.2 Experiments and Sensitivity In this subsection, I want to explore the general
equilibrium result when the consumers exhibit both motivation of warm glow and social
norm. As seen in the result section, the peak age in the baseline model comes sooner than
the one in the data. Also the giving ratio measured for the peak amount to initial one is
smaller than the data. This part of the baseline model can be improved by introducing
social pressure or status. I assume ct = (xt+ st)g1 t as proposed in earlier section following
Ariely, Bracha, and Meiercation (2009)[10]. Thus consumers are indi¤erent to whether they
consume more xt or give more st by reducing private consumption xt. Furthermore, I assume
that over age the intensity of st is increasing and consumers are willing to replace their private
consumption goods into giving as they get older. The following is the giving result when the
consumers replace their private consumption into giving by the intensity of 0:00005Age(= t).
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Figure 75: Data and Model Prole of Volunteer Hours among Volunteers.
In the Figure 76, the peak ages is around 60 and the giving ratio is higher than the baseline.
Thus the time of giving peak comes later than the one without this specication. By this
transfer, consumption gets lower and its peak comes sooner than the baseline. From this
experiment, it may be inferred that the existence of st allows more degree of freedom to
improve overall tting, suggesting the complementing e¤ect of the this type of motivation
to the intrinsic one. The next graph of Figure 77 summarizes this result by demonstrating
its close track to the data.
Some argue that tax rate48 on charitable giving matters in increasing individual con-
tribution to charity. This argument is important especially in line of tax reform regarding
estate tax. The estate tax encourages charitable giving at death by allowing a deduction for
charitable bequests. It also encourages giving during life. However, in the baseline model
the agent does not plan for the bequest in advance. In the model, the bequest is made upon
accidental death. Therefore the tax here does not include estate tax.
As explained in earlier sections, one may argue the consumers with warm glow would not
be dramatically a¤ected by the change of tax rates. However it is important to understand
48Or the deductible rate on taxable income.
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Figure 76: Giving with Social Incentive or Social Pressure.
Figure 77: Data and Model of Giving with Social Incentive among Givers.
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the giving direction when an increase (decrease) in both of income tax and deduction rate
occurs simultaneously. In this subsection, I want to experiment on this topic with the cases
when the two tax rates are equal to each other, i.e. t1 = t2. For the initial income tax rate
of 15%, when the deduction rate is increased to 30%, giving is increased by 2% in general
equilibrium and 14% in partial equilibrium.49 Likewise, for the initial income tax rate of 10%,
when the deduction is increased to 30%, giving is increased by 1.7% in general equilibrium
and 14% in partial equilibrium. Two facts are noticeable. Unlike in partial equilibrium,
the general equilibrium result shows that the tax e¤ect toward higher rate on charitable
giving is not substantial. This may be direct from the fact that when the tax rate increased,
this means a lesser disposable income as well as lower price of charitable giving. Therefore
considering the income e¤ect and price e¤ect are working in opposite direction here, the
result implies that the price elasticity is greater than the income elasticity. This nding is
qualitatively conforming to the empirical result by Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002)[13]
who estimate the price elasticity and income elasticity and show that income elasticity is
lower than price elasticity.50
Another issue is regarding welfare change due to a tax change. As in the giving, it is
also important to determine a welfare direction when there is a simultaneous increase or
decrease in both of income tax and deduction rate. Although the welfare can be measured
by a change in life time utility, it is more desirable to use compensated variation, which
measures the expenditure increment to achieve the same utility level due to price change.
The following Figure 78 shows the welfare changes in partial equilibrium where there is a
simultaneous increase in income tax (t2) and deduction (t1). By the gure the peak CV
arrives at the tax rate of 23%.
Next one in Figure 79 shows the welfare changes in partial equilibrium and general
equilibrium when deductible tax rate is increasing while the income tax rate is xed at
baseline rate. The parameter in the partial equilibrium is set at { = 0:8,  = 0:28,
 = 0:984,  = 0:988,  = 0:97, t2 = 0:15, t3 = 0, B2 = 0:05, w = 1, R = 1:035}.
Following the discussion in calibration, I rst set the baseline parameters to { = 0:8,
49The parameters are set to the same values as in the general equilibrium.
50Their estimation is -1.26 (-0.40) for permanent (transitory) price elasticity and 0.87 (0.29) for permanent
(transitory) income elasticity.
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Figure 78: Non-Distorionary Deductible Rate and Welfare Change (CV).
Figure 79: Deductible Rate and Welfare Change in GE relative to PE.
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 = 0:28,  = 0:981,  = 0:988,  = 0:970,  = 0:30,  = 0:064} for the model with t2 =
0.15 and { = 0:85,  = 0:28,  = 0:981,  = 0:988,  = 0:971,  = 0:34,  = 0:079} for
the model with t2 = 0.10. Notice that  is xed by initial calibration and is going to adjust
accordingly to any parameter set. Thus and are not considered here to be parameters for
sensitivity check. For the three targets of macroeconomic variables, i.e. r = 3.5%, K=Y =
3, C=Y = 0.748, and two targets from giving data, G=Y = 2%, v=N = 6.25%, I report a
couple of sensitivity check around the best tting calibrations. The next result in Table []
shows two sets of sensitivity check, one with t2 = 0.15 and the other one with t2 = 0.10.
The second column Model of the table shows di¤erent alternative calibration to the baseline
model, keeping other parameters intact. Thus, for example, the rst group of the table
represents the alternative calibration to the baseline model with t2 = 0.15 by changing only
one parameter and keeping others constant.
Table 20: Sensitivity
Model r C=Y K=Y G=Y v=N
Baseline 3.50% 0.748 3 2.00% 6.25%
 = 0:290 2.56% 0.689 3.43 1.98% 6.75%
t2 = 0.15  = 0:801 4.32% 0.780 2.78 2.06% 7.03%
 = 0:330 4.44% 0.705 2.83 1.92% 6.12%
 = 0:060 4.38% 0.751 2.77 2.10% 6.38%
 = 0:968 2.61% 0.721 3.28 1.93% 6.87%
Baseline 3.50% 0.748 3 2.00% 6.95%
 = 0:245 4.56% 0.768 2.79 2.05% 6.61%
t2 = 0.10  = 0:899 3.46% 0.720 3.08 1.95% 5.98%
 = 0:300 3.14% 0.772 2.98 2.06% 6.83%
 = 0:065 3.57% 0.748 2.89 2.01% 5.87%
 = 0:971 4.43% 0.759 2.82 2.03% 5.96%
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5.5 CONCLUSION
The essay in this chapter studies charitable giving from warm glow motivation and performs
quantitative analysis on a social preference in macroeconomic perspective. Shown in many
lab studies, social preferences help explain certain phenomena: giving to charities, the re-
sponse of workers to wage cuts in strikes, the response of giving to gifts in fund-raisers,
and the response of e¤ort to non-monetary gifts. However, the models of social preferences
that match the laboratory results do not apply to elds but tend to over-predict the data.
Motivated by this, this paper aims to develop a quantitative model for a social preference,
specically a model for giving behaviors to charities. The key feature of the giving data is
1) it is positively related with income and 2) individual giving varies signicantly with age,
although the giving pattern over lifecycle is stable across income level. Encouraged by this
fact, in this essay, I construct a lifecycle model for consumers with warm glow preferences
who get utility from giving both goods and volunteering time and I explore the general
equilibrium characteristics of an economy with warm glow.
I nd that the model features salient facts regarding lifecycle giving/volunteer and con-
sumption/leisure behaviors. Like in the data, in my model, charitable giving increases with
age except for the very old age and giving in terms of income (productivity) is inversely
related. I also show that lifecycle giving follows an inverse J-shaped pattern similar to data
while volunteer time is nearly at till retirement, beyond which it increases with age among
surviving population. Moreover, by the scheme of charitable deductions, separated from
income tax treatment, together with non-separable utility between consumption and char-
itable giving, my model unambiguously determines welfare direction from any tax change,
enlightening the role of policy in private provision of public goods. The model shows that an
increase in deductible tax rate improves the welfare among the consumers faster in general
equilibrium than in partial equilibrium. Moreover, it confers highest welfare (compensated
variation) for the tax rate of 23% when the rate is not distortionary. This implies that the
price elasticity of giving is greater than the income elasticity when tax rate is not very high.
I believe this paper is the rst serious work that studies a general equilibrium model of social
preferences in aggregate level of analysis.
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6.0 CONCLUSION
Through this dissertation, I demonstrate that behavioral approaches to inter-temporal choice
have many merits in explaining macroeconomic dynamics. One good reason for pursuing this
type of approach is that the predictions by standard models are found to be a subset of the
predictions of the behavioral models in this dissertation. Moreover, as a by-product, each of
my dissertation essays can solve the consumption puzzle introduced in the Introduction, by
generating the empirical consumption hump, without any other mechanism than preferences,
that may account for the hump.
In the rst essay, I prove that there is an income structure that leads to a consumption
hump for each time preference. That is to say, the hump in consumption is closely related to
hump-shaped income, as the data shows, regardless of the time preferences of the consumer.
Searching via simulation, I nd the best planning horizon that is compatible with matching
data for the US economy. I also nd the exhaustive inner relationships among the main
parameters, i.e., time preference, risk aversion, and the planning horizon, that is necessary
to be supported in the calibrated general equilibrium. Finally I show this result is quite
robust to alternative choices of parameters.
In the second essay, I nd that the consumption hump is obtained even without the
credit constraint if the agent is naive and keeps re-optimizing over time. In fact, the hump is
directly related to his time preference, interacting with the market interest rate, regardless
of the income structure. For a constrained agent, I show that the hump-shaped prole for
consumption relies not only on preferences, but also on an income condition. Finally when
I include social security, bequests, and mortality risks to the baseline model, I nd that the
results are not conclusive in terms of thebest model specication that outperforms the
others by several criteria altogether, but the results are consistent in each specication with
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respect to each criterion.
The rst two essays above explore the possibility that individuals behave myopically
rather than rationally, each in di¤erent way. When I combine the two model specications
into one framework, I nd that the combined model is not better in contribution than each
model alone: one of the mechanisms tends to lose its key characteristic by adding the other
one and vice versa. Moreover, the result is not very appealing or conclusive relative to its
many parameters. This implies that more is better approach is not applicable to the
models of my dissertation.
In a third essay, I demonstrate that reference-dependent preferences can also generate a
hump-shaped consumption prole. I nd that the consumption hump is closely related to
loss aversion, by itself or at most combined with time preferences, regardless of the income
structure: in a static model when the deviator has a hump-shaped consumption intention
and in dynamic model when the deviator has age-dependent loss aversion. To do this I rst
propose the best consumption scheme for deviators and show how to eliminate the problem
of many reference points in dynamic model by introducing the novel concept of sub-period
perfect referencepoints. Moreover, I nd the indirect relationship between consumption
and income through age and illuminate the existence of savers via this model. Finally, I nd
that the meaning of precautionary saving can be dened in a di¤erent way from the usual
one with this model of reference dependent preference under uncertainty.
The models in all of the rst three essays have a single utility component, i.e. consump-
tion. Regarding the best model specication among the three approaches to explain the
featured consumption hump, I can say that the third one would be the best one as that
specication requires least assumptions on the income structure while its prediction can be
chosen to t even more closely to the data than the other two. However, this claim should
be accompanied with the understanding that the result in the third essay is based on the
property of the model: a descriptive model that may have more parameters to describe the
agents specic behavior.
In the fourth and the nal essay, I show how the inclusion of time endowment generates
full-blown lifecycle pattern of consumption, giving, leisure, and volunteer time, which closely
follow the data. I specically show that my model reproduces a giving prole that follows
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an inverse J-shaped pattern over the lifecycle and volunteer time that is nearly at till
retirement, beyond which it increases with age among volunteers. I also nd that giving in
terms of income (productivity) is inversely related. Regarding policy, I nd that the price
elasticity of giving is greater than the income elasticity when the tax rate is not very high.
Finally when the deductible rate is non-distortionary, the highest welfare is obtained with
tax rate of 23%.
My ndings in general equilibrium are encouraging for the view that analysis with pref-
erences beyond the limit of standard preference can be useful in explaining macroeconomic
data and complementing standard economic theories.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
Breakage of monotonicity in three-period model
This part is to show how the bounded rationality model induces non-monotonic consumption prole even
with three-period planning horizon when the income is non-monotonic. Assume that a boundedly rational
agent lives three periods t = 0; 1; 2 but plans only for two periods, {current; next}.1 From the consumption
functions of Section 2.2, it is easy to see that the consumption schedule for this agent is






















Assume yT = y2 = 0: Then the consumption is

































Rearrange the consumption to get,


















It is easy to see that the income stream applies as a scalar and does not a¤ect the consumption ratio.
For example, if fy0; y1; y2g = fx; 2x; 0g; then


















1If the agent plans for only current period, this returns to the hand to mouth consumer. In this case
consumption and income coincides and monotonicity breaks if income is non-monotonic.
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To show the breakage of monotonicity, it is enough to look at the case R=1:
Because 1 =
1














which implies c0 > c1 = c2 for all R 6= 0: Therefore, the monotonicity breaks.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4







(1) c0 > c0; c1 > c



















































(2) c0 > c0; c1 = c



























































(3) c0 > c0; c1 < c

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(5) If c0 > c0; c1 < c
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Five-period consumption plans The solutions for the four alternative ve-period plans are as
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Proof of Proposition 7 First, it is straightforward that DM with ! > 1 would not deviate
because deviation would not increase his utility at all. The maximization problem of DM who has low loss
aversion (! < 1) and intends to overconsume for the rst two periods, {c0 > c0; c1 > c

1; c2 < c

2g; is






















The optimality conditions are
(1+)c 0
(1+)c 1





Using budget constraint, this yields



















Then the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 8 By the same logic as DM(0) would not deviate, if DM(1) has !1 > 1;
he would not deviate from the optimal solution to the maximization problem that starts from t=1, which is












Because DM(0) consumes c0; leaving b1 = y0   c0;


















    y1R1 + y2R2 



























































Therefore, c1 = c1: His consistent consumption is not di¤erent from the one DM(0) planned for the
period.
Proof of Proposition 9 When DM(1) has a taste of !1 < 1; he would deviate from the optimal




















































[(1  !1)] > 0 if !1 < 1:




























































Proof of Proposition 10 The maximization problem of DM(1) is




















c2 = y2 +R(y1 +Rb1   c1)










































































































1(0) if !1 < 1
Proof of Proposition 11 Suppose that DM(+1) has a higher weight than previous DM such that
!+1 > !; but consumes c00+1 which is larger than c and as a result c00+s < c+s; s = 1; 2; :::; T   s   :
Then this consumption is not a consistent consumption prole with respect to his belief on his reference point:
because the reference point for the the subsequent periods are u(c+s), he has loss utility  [u(c+s) u(c00+s)];
and if his loss aversion is greater than his previous DM, then this loss utility should not be bigger than
 [u(c+s)   u(c0+s)] for each of the subsequent periods. Therefore, c00+s 6 c0+s. If however, !+1 <
! < 1; then because his loss aversion is lower than before, c0+1 is no more a consistent solution. Thus he
deviates.
Proof of Proposition 12 Suppose DM( + 1) with !+1 > ! consumes c00+1 which is larger






+s; s = 1; 2; :::; T   s    : Then this consumption must be a
consistent consumption prole with respect to his belief on his reference point. Because the reference point
for the the subsequent periods are u(c+s), he denitely has loss utility  [u(c+s) u(c00+s)] which is bigger
than  [u(c+s)   u(c0+s)] for each of the subsequent periods. Since his loss aversion is greater than his
previous DM, c00+s is not the consistent consumption. If however, !+1 < ! < 1; then because his loss
aversion is lower than before, c0+1 is no more a consistent solution. He deviates for more.
Proof of Proposition 13 Suppose DM(t) with !t > 1 deviates for more consumption than the
sub-period perfect plan and consumes c0t which is higher than c

t : Then by doing this, DM incurs prospective
losses of  [u(ct )   u(c0t)]. Comparing his expected loss utility of zero if he follows the sub-period perfect
plan, it is clear that the plan is not fullling DMs high loss aversion. Thus he would not deviate for more.
Likewise deviation for less produces a current loss of  [u(ct )  u(c0t)] < 0 and thus this cant be an optimal
choice to DM either. If however, !t < 1; then deviation is justied because the losses  [!t[u(ct) u(ct )]]
are not bigger than the expected gains [u(ct)  u(ct )] from the alternative consumption he chooses. That
is, [u(ct)  u(ct )]  !t[u(ct)  u(ct ) > 0:
Proof of Proposition 14 Because the path fc0; c1; :::; c 1g has been chosen, this path leaves the
DM with no extra debts or savings for the period  than the amount that is necessary for the optimal path
for the remaining periods. Let this be the optimal bond demand at t =  ; b : Since the sub-period perfect
plan at time t is dened by the optimization rule based on the current nancial wealth at period  ; this
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wealth is equal to the optimal bond demand for time  : Thus, if the new plan starting from period  ; then
the reference point must be from the sub-period perfect plan at time  ; which is c . The proof of deviation
by DM() for more or less consumption follows the same logic as in the previous proposition.
Proof of Proposition 15 Notice that Rh0 = h1 +Ry0: The rst two consumptions are
c0 =
h0










































which does not depend on income stream (ht). It is straight forward to get c0 < c1 if the condition is
satised. The upper bound of 1 is obtained directly from the condition.
Proof of Proposition 16 It is clear that
c3
c2
































Therefore, it is straight forward that c2 > c3; if the condition is satised.
Proof of Proposition 17 By the above two propositions, it is clear that combining both conditions
yields c0 < c1 > c2: Thus the consumption hump is achieved for fc0; c1; c2; c3g:
Proof of Proposition 18 First, suppose that  = 1=R. Because R = 1; the condition re-





: Thus, if the condition is satised then
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R 0 + (Ry0+y1)0: Therefore c0 < c1: Second, consider the case  < 1=R:











Therefore c0 < c1: Third, consider the case  > 1=R: Because R > 1; it is satised that either






1  R 0+ 11

(Ry0 + y1) < y2(1+
1
0) or






 (Ry0 + y1): In either case, it is true that




0): Therefore c0 < c1:

























 1  0 Ry0+y1 + y2R + y2  1 + 1R2   1 or y3 is su¢ ciently small: y3 <
(1 + 1R0)
 1(1 + 1R1)











1 + 1R2   1

> 0, since 0 6 s 6 1: Thus " = 0 is the
su¢ cient condition for c1 > c2: Similarly, if either (0; 1) or y3 is su¢ ciently small, then c1 > c2 for all
choices of :
Proof of Proposition 20 By the above two propositions, it is clear that combining both conditions
yields c0 < c1 > c2: Thus the consumption hump is achieved for fc0; c1; c2g:
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 5
Proof of Proposition 21 From the indirect utility function obtained, it is clear that V (M;we) is
continuous in M for both M > (1 t2)we1  and M <
(1 t2)we
1  . Therefore, to see the continuity, it is necessary
to check if it is continuous on the threshold M = (1 t2)we1  where the binding starts. Thus,







= limM#M V (M;we)
Therefore, V (M;we) is continuous all over the domain M:
Proof of Proposition 22 The value function is continuously di¤erentiable over M for both
M > (1 t2)we1  and M <
(1 t2)we
1  . Therefore, to verify the value function continuously is di¤erentiable, it is
necessary to check if the derivative is continuous on the threshold where the binding starts. So,
limM"M
dV (M;we)









Therefore, V (M;we) is continuously di¤erentiable all over the domain M . Because it is di¤erentiable,


















if M > M
9>>>>=>>>>;











D((1  )  1)(1 ) [M   (1  t2)w](1 ) 2 (1 )(1 ) < 0
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Therefore, the value function is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave with respect to M .
Proof of Proposition 23 The same logic as above can be applied to prove the proposition. The
optimal choice functions are
x (M;we) =
8<: M if M M[M   (1  t2)we] if M > M
9=;
l (M;we) =
8<:  (1  ) M(1 t2)we if M M if M > M
9=;
g (M;we) =
8<: (1  ) M(1 t1) if M M1 
1 t1 [M   (1  t2)we] if M > M
9=;
v (M;we) =
8<: (1  ) (1  ) M(1 t2)we if M M1   if M > M
9=;
From the optimal choice functions obtained above, it is clear that
limM"M x (M;we) =
(1 t2)we
1  = limM#M x (M;we)
limM"M g (M;we) =
(1 )(1 t2)we
(1 t2)(1 ) = limM#M g (M;we)
limM"M l (M;we) =  = limM#M l (M;we)
limM"M v (M;we) = 1   = limM#M v (M;we)
Proof of Proposition 24 Notice that the agent has only one source of income which is labor

















which is impossible. Therefore, the agent has to work in some period of time.
Proof of Proposition 25 When R = 1, then VM (Mt ; w) = (R)t is constant. This implies that
Mt is constant over time, so the agent works all the time without retirement.
Proof of Proposition 26 When R > 1, then VM (Mt ; w) = (R)t is strictly decreasing over
time, which implies Mt is increasing over time so that
M0  M1      MT
Thus, if he stops working then he never comes back to work again because Mt never gets lower.
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